New York Criminal Attorney Blog

Recently we reported in our blog that a DWI conviction was vacated on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where the lawyer simply had his client plead guilty to Driving While Intoxicated without conducting an investigation into the evidence in the case. Now, just last week, the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction where a defense attorney neglected to tell the defendant about a plea offer and the defendant was later sentenced to a much more lengthy prison sentence than he would have gotten if he accepted the plea deal.

In the case of Missouri v. Frye the United States Supreme Court for the first time recognized that the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that a defendant's right to effective representation extends to the plea bargain process and that if the lawyer is ineffective during the plea bargain process, the defendant may be entitled to reversal of his conviction.

In the Frye case, Galin Frye was accused of driving with a revoked license. Since he had been convicted of this same offense three times in the past he was facing a felony charge which carries up to 4 years in prison. During the pendency of the case, the prosecutor told Frye's lawyer that Frye could plead guilty to a misdemeanor and receive a sentence of 90 days. Frye's lawyer never conveyed that offer to him and he subsequently plead guilty and received three years in prison. On appeal Galin Frye argued that that we was denied his right to counsel because of ineffective of assistance of counsel. His conviction was reversed.

In the second decision, issued the same day last week, the United States Supreme Court agreed with two lower Federal Courts that reversed the convictions of a defendant who rejected a plea deal because of his lawyers erroneous advice.

In Lafler v. Cooper, Anthony Cooper shot the victim and was charged with Assault with Intent to Murder under Michigan Law. The prosecutor offered a plea deal that carried a sentence of 51-85 months in prison. Anthony Cooper on the advice of his attorney refused the plea deal and was subsequently convicted after trial and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 185-360 months, more than three times the plea offer. Cooper's lawyer had erroneously advised him to reject the plea deal because in the opinion of the lawyer the prosecutor could not prove intent to murder since all of the gun shots landed below the waist. This advice was wrong.

In the Cooper case, as in the Frye case, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to effective representation includes the right to effective representation during plea bargaining. According to a recent New York Times article 94% of cases in State Court and 97% of cases in Federal Court are resolved by plea bargains. In a system where the overwhelming majority of cases result in plea bargains, it seems that these two cases offer defendants critical constitutional protections that are at least as important as trial rights.

As these cases make clear, a criminal defense lawyer must not only communicate with his or her client, particularly about plea offers but must also offer competent advice about whether or not to accept those offers.

The New York State Appellate Court sitting in Brooklyn ordered a new trial for Anthony DiPippo who was convicted of rape and murder back in 1997. It was since discovered that Mr. DiPippo's attorney in 1997 had a conflict of interest which denied Mr. DiPippo effective assistance of counsel. Attorneys for Mr. DiPippo brought a motion to vacate his conviction before County Court Judge Robert Neary who denied the motion but the Appellate Division, Second Department overturned Judge Neary's decision after learning about the conflict. This marks the second time Judge Neary has been reversed by the Appellate Division in decisions published in the New York Law Journal in the last six months. Please see our previous blog for details on the prior reversal.

Mr. DiPippo was represented at trial by an attorney named Robert Leader who had previously represented Howard Gombert in an unrelated rape. During Mr. DePippo's trial it became clear that Mr. Gombert was also a suspect in this murder and rape but Mr. Leader failed to disclose his obvious conflict of interest. Despite his assertions that he attempted to introduce photographs of Mr. Gombert's car at the trial of Mr. DiPippo, the Appellate Division noted that the trial transcript didn't contain any reference to the admission of the photos.

The right to counsel, that is the right to an attorney which guaranteed in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution not only requires that a defendant in a criminal trial have an attorney but it further requires that the defendant has an EFFECTIVE attorney. If you or a loved one believes that you have been denied effective legal representation, please contact our office.

The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department unanimously overturned a Murder conviction from Nassau County because the trial Court committed a series of errors which combined to deny the defendant a fair trial. In People v. Terraine Slide the Court ruled that permitting the prosecutor to ask the defendant about his prior arrests for Marijuana and Shoplifting without giving a "limiting instruction" combined with additional errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Generally, a prosecutor may only use prior bad acts to cross-examine a defendant for the limited purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility. The jury is generally instructed that they may consider the evidence only for that limited purpose and not to show a propensity by the defendant toward committing crimes.
In addition, Judges are required to hold a Sandoval hearing prior to trial to determine what if any prior bad acts may be used to cross-examine the defendant. The concern is that jurors will hear about a defendant's criminal record and convict him based upon his record and not the evidence of guilt.
In the Slide case, the prosecutor asked the defendant about his mother's incarceration which was clearly irrelevant and which tended to insinuate that he had a genetic predisposition to commit crimes. Although a motion for a mistrial was made, it was denied by the trial Court.
The New York criminal law firm of Tilem & Campbell represents individuals charged with all types of serious criminal offenses including murder and other types of homicide. Serious charges of these types require a high level of skill and experience to properly defend. Senior partner, Peter H. Tilem has been practicing criminal law for almost 20 years and has the advantage of having been a homicide prosecutor for the District Attorney's office.

In a unanimous ruling, issued yesterday and reported on the front page of today's New York Law Journal, the Appellate Division unanimously revered the conviction of a carjacker who had been sentenced to 5 1/2 years in prison because of repeated, improper comments made to a criminal defense lawyer in front of the jury. Judge Neary, who spent 28 years as a Westchester County Assistant District Attorney before becoming a judge was recently transferred from Westchester to the Bronx Court. The case in question stemmed from a trial in the Bronx.

Judge Neary, according to the Appellate Court decision referred to the defense attorney's line of questioning at one point in the trial as "silly" and "irrelevant". During summation, Judge Neary at one point told the defense attorney "you are turning this into a comedy and its not."

"Most egregiously, however, when defense counsel objected during the People's summation, the court did not merely overrule the objection, but stated: 'Would you please behave like a professional, please and not like a clown.' "People v. Leggett, 2869 3401/07, NYLJ 1202472024104 at 4 (App. Div. 1st, Decided September 14, 2010).

It is obviously very hard to win a trial before a jury when the supposedly neutral judge is telling the jury that your questions are irrelevant and that you are acting like a clown. The Appellate Court recognized that this conduct by the judge deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

The Appellate Division ordered that the defendant be given a new trial before a different Judge.

According to today's newspapers the NYPD Cop accused of killing a woman while driving in an intoxicated condition, had a blood alcohol content of 0.0 indicating that no alcohol was present in the officers blood seven hours after the incident. The blood was not drawn for seven hours after the accident. As discussed in my previous blog, New York drivers arrested for DWI have the right to refuse to take a chemical test. The result of the blood test substantially weakens the case against the officer who is accused of killing the woman while driving drunk.

Currently, Tilem & Campbell has one appeal pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit challenging the constitutionality of the previously discussed 100:1 powder cocaine v. crack cocaine sentencing discrepancy. Tilem & Campbell has another Federal Narcotics case for which it is preparing the appeal now. Among other arguments, we have presented an Equal Protection argument centered on the unequal sentences imposed on crack offenders as compared to powder cocaine offenders.

Every day that a crack offender spends in prison beyond that which a powder cocaine offender would spend for the same quantity of drug is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty; a fundamental right. Such sentencing discrepancies cannot survive a rational basis analysis let alone a strict scrutiny analysis.

The above-discussed “100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three to six times longer than those for powder offenses involving equal amounts of drugs.” Kimbrough v. U.S. 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007). As a result of this disparity, “a major supplier of powder cocaine may receive a shorter sentence than a low-level dealer who buys powder from the supplier but then converts it to crack.” Id.

Such a penal disparity bears no relation to the government’s goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them. When Congress passed the crack cocaine mandatory minimums, it believed, as did many others at the time, that crack was leading a parade of evils into a national drug-abuse epidemic.

These fears, however, proved unfounded. When the United States Sentencing Commission began to empirically research cocaine sentencing policy, it soon found, much to its dismay, that the 100:1 disparity bore little relationship to differences that actually existed between the two forms of cocaine. The data showed that the disparity significantly overstated the relative seriousness of crack offenses. As discussed in a previous blog, crack and powder cocaine are two forms of the same drug.

If you would like to discuss this issue further or have a another sentencing issue including an appeal, contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for a free telephone consultation or visit on the web, www.888AnyCrime.com

As experienced New York and Federal criminal defense lawyers, we keep track of changes and proposed changes in the law that may effect our clients. When appropriate, and as part of the effort of our effort, though this blog to educate the public, our clients and our friends, we post proposed changes in the law here, in our blog.

Congress is taking notice to the injustice associated with the previously discussed 100:1 ratio crack cocaine vs powder cocaine sentencing disparity. At least 6 Bills in 2007 and 1 in 2008 were proposed by both Democrats and Republicans that would in some way reduce or eliminate the 100:1 cocaine/cocaine base ratio. These proposed Bills include:

H.R. 5035, the Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2008: Eliminates mandatory minimums for cocaine offenses. On January 17, Rep. Robert “Bobby” C. Scott (D-Va.), who is Chairman of the House Committed on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security and also serves on the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, introduced H.R. 5035, The Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2008. The bill would, among other things, eliminate the distinction between powder cocaine and cocaine base (crack) and eliminate all mandatory cocaine sentences. This bill is the first bill introduced in the House in the 110th Congress that would eliminate mandatory minimums for crack and powder cocaine sentences.

S. 1711, the Drug Sentencing Reform and Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007: Sponsored by Vice-President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), S. 1711 would, inter alia, eliminate sentencing differences between crack and powder cocaine in favor of a single mandatory minimum at the current powder cocaine levels and eliminate the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. This bill is supported by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton . The direction of our incoming Administration is clear. “Obama and Biden believe the disparity between sentencing crack and powder-based cocaine is wrong and should be completely eliminated.” (See http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/civil_rights/#sentencing-disparities)

H.R. 4545, the Drug Sentencing Reform and Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007: Introduced on December 13 by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Texas), H.R. 4545 is the House companion to the above-discussed S. 1711. The bill would, among other things, eliminate sentencing differences between crack and powder cocaine in favor of a single mandatory minimum at the current powder cocaine levels and eliminate the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. The bill has 43 cosponsors:

S. 1685, the Fairness in Drug Sentencing Act of 2007: Introduced by Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), S. 1685 would reduce the difference between crack and powder sentencing by increasing the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger the five-year mandatory minimum sentences from five to 25 grams and the 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 to 250 grams. It would also eliminate the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession. The bill would not eliminate the cocaine sentencing disparity but reduce it from 100:1 to 20:1. The bill also directs the Sentencing Commission to review the sentencing guidelines and amend them if appropriate to account for specified aggravating and mitigating characteristics. There are three cosponsors.

S. 1383, the Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2007: Sponsored by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), S. 1383 would adjust the disparity between crack and powder sentencing by raising the amounts of crack cocaine that trigger the five- and 10-year mandatory minimum sentences (from five to 20 grams and from 50 to 200 grams respectively) while also lowering the triggering quantities for powder cocaine (from 500 grams to 400 grams for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence and from five kilograms to four kilograms for the ten-year mandatory minimum). It would also lower the simple possession mandatory minimums. S. 1383 directs the Sentencing Commission to amend the guidelines by adding enhancements for a variety of aggravating factors. The bill would cap sentences at level 32 (roughly 10 years) for defendants who played a minimal role in the offense and creates a pilot program to test releasing certain nonviolent elderly prisoners. There are three cosponsors.

H.R. 79, the Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2007:
Introduced by Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), H.R. 79 would equalize the crack and powder cocaine sentences at by lowering the triggering quantities to those for crack cocaine.

H.R. 460, the Crack Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2007:
Introduced by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), H.R. 460 would also equalize the crack and powder penalties, but at the powder level. The bill has 20 cosponsors and has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee’s crime subcommittee.

The above discussed proposed legislation shows us that Congress is taking notice of the baseless 100:1 powder cocaine vs. crack cocaine discrepancy and is attempting to correct this injustice. All the evidence and studies show that the fears relied upon when the crack cocaine mandatory minimums were implemented never materialized, that the drugs are chemically identical and that there is no justification for the discrepancy; a discrepancy that has devastated a generation of young black males.

For more information about this and other sentencing issues, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com

The case of Blakely v. Washington decided in 2004, significantly changed New York and Federal sentencing and substantially altered the way experienced criminal defense lawyers handled their most serious cases. It also led to the change in the once mandatory federal sentencing guidelines to a system that is now now merely advisory.

In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, Ralph Blakely pleaded guilty in a Washington State Superior Court to kidnapping his estranged wife. The statutory maximum for the offense Blakely pleaded guilty to was 53 months. The sentencing judge, however, sentenced Blakely to 90 months - more than three years above the 53 month maximum - finding that Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty. Note, Blakely never admitted to acting with deliberate cruelty nor did a jury find that he did so beyond a reasonable doubt.

Blakely appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals which rejected his argument that Washington’s sentencing procedure which allowed sentence enhancements above the statutory maximum based upon judicial determinations deprived him of his federal constitutional right to have all facts legally essential to his sentence determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The United Supreme Court granted certiorari (agreed to hear the case) and ultimately found the Washington State sentencing procedure unconstitutional.

The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether a state judge may consider facts, that were not admitted by the defendant nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, to enhance the defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum sentence the judge may have imposed based upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

In striking down the Washington State sentencing procedure, the United States Supreme Court held that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To allow otherwise would violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Where a defendant, such as Blakely, pleads guilty, the State may seek judicial sentence enhancements only if the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial fact-finding.

It is of critical importance to note that the statutory maximum is not necessarily the absolute maximum sentence that may be imposed but instead is the maximum sentence that may be imposed within the authorized sentencing range based upon the admitted or proven facts. In Blakely for example, Washington State argued that the challenged sentencing procedure was constitutional because a judge could never go above the statutory maximum based upon judicial findings but could only increase the sentence within the statutorily authorized range.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument noting that had Blakely been sentenced to 90 months based solely upon the admitted facts, the sentence would have been reversed even though it was less than the maximum 10 years.

If you have any questions regarding any sentencing issue, are awaiting sentencing or want to file a criminal appeal of your conviction or sentence feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

As I have been discussing in previous blogs, the rationale behind the 100:1 powder cocaine to crack cocaine sentencing disparity has been proven to be unfounded and false. Yet another argument the New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell is raising in one of our appellate challenges to the constitutionality of the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine is that crack cocaine and powder cocaine are the same drug.

As observed by the United States Supreme Court, crack and powder cocaine are two forms of the same drug and they share the same active ingredient - cocaine hydrochloride. Kimbrough v. U.S. 128 S.Ct. 558, 566 (2007). Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that the physiological and psychotropic effects of crack and powder cocaine are the same, and the drugs are now widely acknowledged as pharmacologically identical.

For example, a 1996 study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found analogous effects on the body for both crack and powder cocaine.

Similarly, Charles Schuster, former Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse and Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, found that once cocaine is absorbed into the bloodstream and reaches the brain its effects on brain chemistry are identical regardless of whether it is crack or powder.

In fact, crack cocaine is made by taking cocaine powder and cooking it with baking soda and water until it forms a hard substance. This hard substance can then be broken into pieces (rocks) and sold in small quantities.

Whether it remains powder cocaine or is “baked” into crack cocaine, the fact remains that they are the same drug and produce the same effects on the body. There can be therefore, no rationale basis to punish crack cocaine offenses more severely than powder cocaine offenses.

If you would like a free consultation regarding any New York or federal drug offense or sentencing issue, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at 888ANYCRIME.COM.

As I have previously discussed, Congress justified Draconian mandatory minimum sentences for federal crack cocaine offenses upon their mistaken belief that, among other things, crack cocaine was more dangerous than powder cocaine because it was believed to be more addictive and create more violence than powder cocaine; that it was more harmful than powder cocaine; that it was popular with teenagers; and that its low cost made it more accessible and popular.

These concerns and beliefs have proven false. As observed by Congressman Alcee Hastings (D Fl): “Rather than waging war on drugs, [the mandatory minimums for crack offenses] waged war on America's poor and minorities.” Rep. Hastings also noted that the crack mandatory minimums were “rooted in propaganda rather than empirical data.” (See Congressman Alcee Hastings’ website )

The reality is, the mandatory minimums are not being imposed on the “major” and “serious” suppliers of crack cocaine but instead the majority of crack cocaine defendants are small-scale, street-level dealers. The 100:1 ratio disproportionately impacts far more low-level traffickers than it does the intended targets of the ratio. As observed by the Supreme Court, “the 100-to-1 ratio can lead to the anomalous result that retail crack dealers get longer sentences than the wholesale drug distributors who supply them the powder cocaine from which their crack is produced.” See Kimbrough v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 558, 564 (U.S.,2007).

Indeed, both the Sentencing Commission and the United States Supreme Court have acknowledged that real world experiences have shown us that the reasoning and assumptions that led to the creation of the 100:1 ratio have proven false.

Tilem & Campbell has presented the above arguments in an appeal currently pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the constitutionality of the crack v. powder cocaine disparity. We are arguing, among other things, that there is absolutely no rational basis to incarcerate those convicted of crack cocaine offenses (who are overwhelmingly African-American) significantly longer than those convicted of powder cocaine offenses (who are overwhelmingly Caucasian) involving similar weight.

If you or a loved one needs legal representation for an upcoming sentencing hearing, sentence appeal, or needs legal advise any any federal or New York criminal case contact one of the experienced criminal attorneys at Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at www.888ANYCIME.com.

New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell is vigorously challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences for federal crack cocaine offenses set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA). We currently have one appeal on this issue pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and will be filing another appeal shortly.

The ADAA established a two-tier system of sentencing with 5 and 10 year mandatory minimum sentences for certain manufacturing and distribution offenses. Congress passed the 10 year mandatory minimum to combat “major drug dealers” while the 5 year mandatory minimum was for the “serious traffickers”. In reality, however, the mandatory minimums are weight driven. It is the weight of the drugs involved that controls with no regard for whether the defendant is a “major dealer” or “serious trafficker”.

The ADAA also established a 100-to-1 disparity between the distribution of powder cocaine and crack cocaine (21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)). For example, distributing just 5 grams of crack cocaine (about a thimble full) carries a mandatory minimum five-year federal prison sentence. However, one must distribute 500 grams of powder cocaine to trigger that same five-year federal prison sentence. (21 U.S.C. § 841).

The absurdity of this disparity is even more apparent when discussing the 10 year mandatory minimum found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B). Distributing just 50 grams of crack cocaine (less that 2 ounces) triggers a 10 year mandatory minimum. However, it would take 5000 grams of powder cocaine or "5 kilos" to trigger the same 10 year mandatory minimum. That’s a staggering disparity which is not supported by facts, reasons or reality.

The staggering disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentencing can be better appreciated when the two sentences are compared side by side:

Federal Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences for First Time Cocaine Offenders:

DRUG FIVE YEARS NO PAROLE 10 YEARS NO PAROLE
Crack Cocaine 5 grams (approx a sugar packet) 50 grams
Powder Cocaine 500 grams 5 kilos (5000 grams)

These mandatory minimums for crack offenses were passed because Congress mistakenly believed that crack was more dangerous than powder cocaine because it was thought to be more addictive and involve more violence than powder cocaine; that it was more harmful than powder cocaine; that it was popular amongst teenagers; and that its low cost made it more accessible. See Kimbrough v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 558, 564 (U.S.,2007).

As I will discuss in my next blog, these concerns and assumptions proved to be unfounded and not supported by the facts. In fact, 23 years of real world experience has shown us that there is absolutely no rational basis for sentencing crack offenses any differently than powder cocaine offenses.

If you are awaiting sentencing, want to appeal a sentence or have any other questions about an appeal issue, feel free to contact one of the experience federal criminal defense attorneys at Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME for a free consultation or visit us on the web at 888ANYCRIME.COM

Just 16 years after the passage of The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 which all but eliminated harsh mandatory minimums for federal drug offenses, Congress reversed course and passed The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA). The ADAA was passed by Congress during the media frenzy that followed the cocaine induced death of University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias. The ADAA established harsh mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses involving “crack” cocaine (referred to as “cocaine base” in the federal statutes).

Congressional members used Bias’ high-profile death as a political opportunity to portray a “tough on crime” stance. However, Congress utterly failed to undertake any discussion or debate about the failings of the mandatory minimums found in the The Boggs Act of 1951and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 (which I have discussed in previous blogs).
In fact, Sen. Specter noted that Congress “may be acting with undue haste” and Sen. Mathias stated that none of the members of the Senate “had an adequate opportunity to study this enormous package” and that the ADAA “did not emerge from the crucible of the committee process, tempered by the heat of debate.”

As I have discussed in prior blogs, the ADAA established Draconian mandatory minimums for relatively small quantities of crack cocaine while mandating much shorter sentences for an equal amount of powder cocaine. However, 23 years of experience has shown us that the fears that Congress used to justify these obscene mandatory sentences for crack offenses have simply not materialized.

Tilem & Campbell is currently challenging the constitutionality of the powder cocaine v. crack cocaine sentencing disparity in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. We also anticipate filing another appeal shortly (also in the Second Circuit) arguing that the powder v. crack sentencing disparity violates African-Americans’ equal protection rights. Should you have a sentencing issue or appeal you would like to discuss with our attorneys, call 1-888-ANY-CRIME toll free or visit us on the web at 888anycrime.com

In continuing with my commentary on federal mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses and Tilem & Campbell’s challenge to the constitutionality of such sentences, it’s of paramount importance to point out other, influential groups and individuals who are also opposed to mandatory minimums for drug offenses. As previously discussed, former Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were all opposed to mandatory minimums for drug offenses and, at Nixon’s urging, in 1970, Congress abolished almost all mandatory minimum sentencing for federal drug offenses with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.

These former Presidents were not, and are not, the only influential individuals opposed to such sentences. With regard to the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 (both of which contained draconian mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses), a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee found that 92 percent of federal prison wardens who responded were opposed to the mandatory minimum sentences, and 97 percent were opposed to the prohibition against probation or parole. Of the probation officers who responded, 83 percent were opposed to mandatory minimums while 86 percent were opposed to prohibition against probation or parole. Of the federal judges who responded, 73 percent were opposed to mandatory minimums, and 86 percent were opposed to the prohibition against probation or parole.

Many members of law enforcement also supported the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and its elimination of the mandatory minimum sentences found in the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. According to then Congressman William L. Springer (R Ill.): “It is the opinion of most law enforcement people that the harsh mandatory sentences in narcotics law have been a hindrance rather than an aid to enforcement.”

Tilem & Campbell is vigorously challenging the constitutionality of the current mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses and the corresponding 100:1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine ratio. It is this ratio that brings about tremendously longer sentences for blacks and minorities convicted of crack offenses than their white counterparts convicted of powder cocaine offenses involving equal weight. If you are currently charged with a crime and are in need of a federal criminal defense attorney or if you have been convicted of a crime and which to discuss various post conviction remedies such as an appeal, contact Tilem & Campbell at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at www.888AnyCrime.com.

New York criminal lawyer Peter H. Tilem has been admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, effective January 12, 2009. Having been recommended for admission by two current members of the bar of the US Supreme Court the motion for Mr. Tilem's admission was granted and his admission has taken effect.

The admission of Mr. Tilem to this prestigious bar will enhance the appellate practice of Tilem & Campbell and will give it the ability to challenge cases already in the United States Court of Appeals at the United States Supreme Court level, without seeking outside counsel. Tilem & Campbell has several criminal appeals pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and is currently challenging the mandatory minimums applicable to crack cocaine cases in federal courts.