CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Category Archives — Page 9 of 23 — New York Criminal Attorney Blog Published by White Plains, New York Criminal Defense Lawyers

Are New York Police Required To Read A Driver Their “Miranda Rights” Before Questioning Them During a Car Stop?

April 5, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

If you’re stopped by the police in New York (Greenburgh, White Plains, Harrison, etc) for a traffic infraction such as speeding, should the police read you your “rights” prior to questioning you about where you coming from, if you had anything to drink or if you knew why you were stopped? When a person is arrested they lose certain rights. For example, when one is arrested, they lose their right to liberty and they are subject to a warrantless search incident to their arrest. In fact, a search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the many exceptions to the search warrant requirement.

However, while a person loses certain rights when they are arrested, they also obtain certain rights once they are arrested. For example, before the police can question a person who has been arrested they must read that person their “rights” – the police must “Mirandize” an arrested person before questioning.

There is absolutely no doubt that Uniform Traffic Tickets or Simplified Traffic Informations are also appearance tickets. See e.g., People v. Tyler, 1 N.Y.3d 493 (2004)(speeding ticket deemed an appearance ticket); People v. Hollinger, 15 Misc. 3d 130A (App. Term 2nd Dept. 2007)(The front of the uniform traffic tickets directed defendant to appear in the Justice Court of the Village of Old Westbury on September 18, 2003, thus serving as an “appearance ticket” under CPL 150.10); Farkas v. State, 96 Misc. 2d 784, 787 fn 1 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978)(Appearance ticket includes, by definition, uniform traffic tickets); People v. Litean, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5475, 240 N.Y.L.J. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)(“A summons requiring a defendant to appear in court is the equivalent of a desk appearance ticket . . .”); People v. Genovese, 156 Misc. 2d 569, 571 (J. Ct. 1992)(“the yellow copy of the simplified traffic information is an appearance ticket as defined by CPL 150.10”).

Since People v. Hazelwood, 104 Misc.2d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1980) held that the detention of a person by the police for the purpose of issuing such person an appearance ticket creates an “arrest situation” justifying a search of such person just as if they had been formally arrested, doesn’t it follow that the police would have to Mirandize this so-called “arrested” person before questioning them? Why should the police get the benefit of deeming the person “arrested” so they can search them but not allow this “arrested” person the benefit of his Miranda rights just like any other arrested person?

One stopped by the police is clearly not free to go. In People v. Wallgren, 2011 NY Slip Op 51556U, (N.Y. County Ct. Aug. 16, 2011) the police officers testified at the probable cause hearing that defendant’s vehicle was driving erratically and they stopped it only to check on the driver’s “welfare.” However, as observed by the court, the officers were not concerned about the driver’s welfare but instead immediately launched into a DWI investigation:
Notwithstanding both officers’ testimony regarding the welfare
check, Officer Einsfeld, upon approaching the driver’s window,
asked whether the defendant was drinking prior to driving, where
the defendant came from and where the defendant was going.
These questions were clearly indicative of a DWI investigation,
not a welfare check and are designed to solicit incriminating
evidence from a motorist.

Furthermore, the police admitted that “when a police officer activates the police lights, the person is supposed to stop and is not free to leave until the police speak with the person.” Id. The court therefore concluded that the police testimony established that the defendant was in custody from the very inception of the defendant’s encounter with the police: “By [Officer Einsfeld’s] testimony alone the custodial status of the defendant from the very inception was admitted by the police.” Id.

NEW YORK FIREARMS LAWYERS, NRA MEMBER BECOMES NRA CERTIFIED FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR

March 27, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

Senior Partner Peter H. Tilem of the White Plains law firm, Tilem & Campbell recently passed the test to become an NRA Certified Pistol Instructor. Mr. Tilem, who is a senior criminal defense lawyer, NRA member and handles much of the firms firearms law practice together with law partner Peter Tilem, was an experienced and avid firearms enthusiast before passing the National Rifle Association’s instructors’ test.Besides being a lifelong shooter, Mr. Tilem has been handling gun and weapons cases for decades. Initially, as a prosecutor, in one of the most anti-gun counties, in one of the most anti-gun states in the United States, Mr. Tilem handled the prosecution of countless gun and knife cases as well as cases involving a variety of other weapons. After several years as a prosecutor, Mr. Tilem was asked to join the District Attorney’s Office’s Firearms Trafficking Unit where he handled large scale, gun trafficking conspiracy cases in addition to other gun cases and violent crimes and became an adviser to other prosecutors in the handling of gun cases.

After leaving the District Attorney’s Office and entering private practice, Mr. Tilem put his experience and knowledge of New York gun laws to work helping law-abiding citizens who got caught in the web of New York’s criminal justice system which treats law-abiding citizens with firearms (or knives) as criminals. In New York, a law abiding citizen who carries his (or her) pistol into New York with an out-of-state permit (ccw) faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 and 1/2 years in prison. In addition, New York still has on the books the functional equivalent of the since repealed Federal Assault Weapons ban which punishes as a felony possession of rifles or shotguns that have cosmetic features that are deemed to look offensive. The outdated and ill conceived assault weapon ban in New York is so poorly written and hard to understand that neither the police, prosecutors nor civilians can be sure of what is felonious conduct and what is perfectly legal.

In addition to New York’s bizarre gun laws, New York bans virtually any weapon imaginable including brass knuckles, billy clubs, “sand bag[s]” (whatever that means), wrist-brace type sling shots, nun-chucks and kung fu stars just to give some examples. As Mr. Tilem has written about extensively, New York’s ban on knives is so complete that it seems to ban steak knives in restaurants (at least in the five boroughs of New York City) and virtually any lock blade folding knife as a “gravity knife.”

US SUPREME COURT VACATES TWO CONVICTIONS FOR LAWYERS INEFFECTIVE PLEA BARGAINING

March 26, 2012 | Jasmine Hernandez

Recently we reported in our blog that a DWI conviction was vacated on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where the lawyer simply had his client plead guilty to Driving While Intoxicated without conducting an investigation into the evidence in the case. Now, just last week, the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction where a defense attorney neglected to tell the defendant about a plea offer and the defendant was later sentenced to a much more lengthy prison sentence than he would have gotten if he accepted the plea deal.

In the case of Missouri v. Frye the United States Supreme Court for the first time recognized that the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that a defendant’s right to effective representation extends to the plea bargain process and that if the lawyer is ineffective during the plea bargain process, the defendant may be entitled to reversal of his conviction.

In the Frye case, Galin Frye was accused of driving with a revoked license. Since he had been convicted of this same offense three times in the past he was facing a felony charge which carries up to 4 years in prison. During the pendency of the case, the prosecutor told Frye’s lawyer that Frye could plead guilty to a misdemeanor and receive a sentence of 90 days. Frye’s lawyer never conveyed that offer to him and he subsequently plead guilty and received three years in prison. On appeal Galin Frye argued that that we was denied his right to counsel because of ineffective of assistance of counsel. His conviction was reversed.

New York Speeding Tickets: Speed Not Prudent Charge Cannot Be Based Upon The Mere Happening of An Accident

February 20, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

Have you been charged in New York with “speed not prudent” by an officer who did not witness the alleged offense? Were you involved in an accident and then issued a ticket for an infraction by an officer who did not witness the accident? Judge Malone of the Justice Court of Mendon, New York, noted in People v. Genovese, that the practice whereby police officers in New York issue tickets for traffic infractions they did not witness occurs every day in lower courts across the State.

One of the most common scenarios is where an officer arrives upon the scene of an accident he did not witness and, after conducting an “investigation”, concludes that one of the drivers (or the only driver if it was a single car accident) had to be driving at a speed not reasonable and prudent and issues a traffic ticket to the “offending” driver charging him or her with violating VTL 1180(a) – “Speed Not Prudent” – which states that:

No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual
and potential hazards then existing.

This practice is wholly improper. First, as detailed above, a police officer cannot issue an appearance ticket for a traffic infraction not committed in his presence. Second, “[t]he mere happening of the accident because of the skidding of [driver’s car] did not warrant the conclusion that there had been negligent operation of a motor vehicle or that the statute had been violated.” Weisinger v. MacDuff, 285 A.D. 607, 611 (1st Dept. 1955). To be guilty of driving faster than is reasonable and prudent, the conduct of the driver must constitute more than mere error of judgment or simple negligence. People v. Benway, 41 Misc.2d 39 (1963) see also Hessney v. MacDuff, 284 A.D. 70, 72 (4th Dept. 1954)(Negligent operation of a motor vehicle may not be inferred merely because a car skidded or an accident happened); Fake v. MacDuff, 281 A.D. 630, 633 (4th Dept. 1953)(The fact that the car skidded or slid off the road does not, standing alone, even constitute ordinary negligence).

Sentencing Issues In New York: Court Has No Authority To Alter a Judgment And Sentence In The Absence Of The Defendant And His Attorney

February 13, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

In New York, a court cannot change, amend or otherwise alter a sentence in a criminal case without the defendant and his or her criminal defense attorney being present. Occasionally a court might attempt to change an otherwise legal sentence post sentence by signing additional probation conditions. This practice is contrary to both statutory and decisional law. The New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that “[t]he defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.” CPL 380.40(1). It is axiomatic that a defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to be present at the time of sentencing. People v. Brown, 155 A.D.2d 608 (2nd Dept. 1989)(CPL 380.40(1) requires a defendant to be present at the time of sentence); People v. Lucks, 91 A.D.2d 896 at 897, 457 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1st Dept. 1983)(“CPL 380.40 (subd 1) is clear in its direction that a defendant be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”)

More importantly however, is the long-standing, clearly established, rule of law, that a court has no authority to alter a sentence in the absence of the defendant and his attorney. People v. Saperstein, 1 A.D.2d 949, 150 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1st Dept. 1956). A court’s failure to have a defendant produced at a proceeding at which the defendant’s sentence is amended, violates that defendant’s statutory right to be present at the time of sentencing. People v. Garrison, 9 A.D.3d 436, 780 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2nd Dept. 2004); see also People ex rel. Walker v. Wilkins, 23 A.D.2d 619, 256 N.Y.S.2d 810 (4th Dept. 1965)(Change of sentence out of presence of defendant and his attorney ruled invalid).

Not only must the defendant be present for all sentencing proceedings, his or her attorney must also be present. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI. Similarly, the New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . .” NY Const. Art I, § 6.

Appearance Tickets In New York: Whether The Court Must Dismiss, May Dismiss or Cannot Dismiss If The Required Accusatory Instrument Is Not Filed By The Return Date Of The Appearance Ticket Has Not Been Definitively Determined By The Courts

February 7, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

In prior blogs I have explained that where the police choose to issue an arrestee an appearance ticket instead of detaining that person until they can see a judge, the police must thereafter file a sufficient accusatory instrument with the court on or before the return date listed in the appearance ticket. What action the courts can take where the required accusatory instrument has not been filed before the return date has not been definitively decided by the courts with some holding the court may dismiss the appearance ticket, while others have held the court must dismiss and still others have held the court cannot dismiss.

The differing holds are discussed in the following three sections.

Must Dismiss:

Appearance Tickets In New York: Detention Of A Person In New York For Purposes Of Issuing That Person An Appearance Ticket Is An Arrest Situation Which Would Allow The Officer To Search That Person As If That Person Was Formally Arrested

January 31, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

In New York, if a person is formally arrested, they can be searched incident to that arrest. However, can the officer also search a person if the person could have been arrested but the officer decides to issue that person an appearance ticket on scene instead? The answer is “sometimes.” Generally, the police can search a person they issue an appearance ticket to. However, the New York courts have frowned on a blanket right to search where traffic infractions are involved.

The detention of a person for the purpose of issuing that person an appearance ticket amounts to an arrest situation. People v. Hazelwood, 104 Misc.2d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1980) see also People v. King, 102 A.D.2d 710 (1st Dept. 1984)(Where an “officer intends to issue an appearance ticket in lieu of a lawful arrest, he had the concomitant right to ‘pat down’ the defendant.”).

In Hazelwood, 104 Misc.2d 1121, the court held that the police could search a person they detained for the purpose of issuing that person an appearance ticket. Noting that the officer could have arrested the person and then searched the person incident to that arrest, the court observed: “to hold that a search is not permissible because an arrest did not occur in a case where the defendant was subject to arrest, but the officer gave the defendant a break, is an injustice to the officer.” Id. at 1124.

HOW CAN APPEARANCE TICKETS ISSUED IN NEW YORK BE SERVED [CPL 150.40(2)]

January 22, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

With Limited Exceptions, When the Defendant is a Natural Person,
Appearance Tickets Must be Served Personally [CPL 150.40(2)]

Generally, under New York law, other than an appearance ticket issued for a traffic infraction relating to parking, an appearance ticket must be personally served. Except, an appearance ticket issued for the violation of a local zoning ordinance or local zoning law, or of a local building or sanitation code may be issued in any manner authorized for service in a civil action under CPLR 308. CPL 150.40(2).

To summarize, appearance tickets issued to natural persons in New York must be personally served. Except, appearance tickets may be served in accordance with CPLR 308 (see below section) if they are for parking violations or violations of local zoning, building or sanitation violations.
Service Upon a Natural Person by Mail Insufficient. New York City Routinely Ignores The Requirement That Appearance Tickets Issued To Natural Persons Be Personally Served.

Personal service on a “defendant, whose liberty will be at stake in a criminal action, serves to assure his right to adequate notice and expeditious resolution of the charges.” People v. DiLorenzo, 149 Misc.2d 791, 794 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990). In DiLorenzo, the court noted that the certified mailing of an appearance ticket that should have been personally served was insufficient service.

In People v. Baxter, 148 Misc.2d 1009 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990) the court found service of appearance tickets by a New York City administrative agency by mail defective and dismissed charges for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the court observed “that the CPL requirements of personal service are not being followed by the Buildings Department and other administrative agencies.” Id. at 1010.

In People v. Neuberger, 149 Misc.2d 1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) the court dismissed all charges against the defendants in the interests of justice explaining that “[a]s for the Corporation Counsel’s continued practice of flouting the service requirements of the Criminal Procedure Law, that abuse cannot be left unremedied.” People v. Neuberger, 149 Misc. 2d 1, 5 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1991).

In Neuberger, several defendants were served appearance tickets by mail which ordered them to appear in criminal court. The Honorable Martin G. Karopkin explained that the Corporation Counsel had been warned numerous times over the preceding several months that such service by mail was improper:

On numerous occasions during the past several months this court, and others, have warned the Office of the Corporation Counsel, the Buildings Department and other city agencies that service by mail is improper and contrary to CPL 150.40, as well as CPL 600.10.

Id. at 1-2.

Despite the repeated warnings of both J. Karopkin and other judges, “the Corporation Counsel . . . continued to submit affidavits of mailing to the court accompanying its pleadings and to argue that the defendants’ appearances confer jurisdiction and render that issue moot.” Id. at 2-3. In other words, the New York City Corporation Counsel knowingly served appearance tickets on individuals by mail, in clear contravention of the law. What’s more troubling is that they continued to do so even after several judges warned the Corporation Counsel that such service was improper. Thus, the Corporation Counsel “acquired these defendants’ presence by means of improper service” and then argued that the defendants’ mere presence before the court conferred jurisdiction thus mooting the service issue. Id. at 5.

Service When Issued For Violation Of Local Zoning Laws,
Ordinances or a Building or Sanitation Code

An appearance ticket issued for the violation of a local zoning ordinance or law or a building or sanitation code may be served the same way a summons may be personally served upon a person in a civil action. [CPL 150.40(2)]. Personal service of summons upon a person in a civil action doesn’t necessarily require that the summons be literally handed (served) to the person. Pursuant to CPLR 308, personal service can be accomplished by:

(1) Actual Personal Service: Delivering the summons/appearance ticket upon the person within the State [CPLR 308(1)]; or
(2) Suitable age and Discretion Servcie: Delivering the summons/appearance ticket within the State to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served. When service is made by this method, it must be followed by either mailing the summons to the person to be served at his or her last known residence or by mailing the summons by first class mail to the person to be served at his or her actual place of business in an envelope bearing the legend “personal and confidential” and not indicating on the outside thereof, by return address or otherwise, that the communication is from an attorney or concerns an action against the person to be served. This follow-up mailing must be done within twenty days of the delivery of the summons/appearance ticket to the person of suitable age and discretion as described above [CPLR 308(2)]; or
(3) Service on Designated Agent: Delivering the summons/appearance ticket within the State to an agent designated in accordance with CPLR 318 [CPLR 308(3)]; or
(4) “Nail-and-Mail” Service: If service cannot be made in a manner described above despite due diligence (a diligent effort), service may be made by affixing the summons/appearance ticket to the door of either the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode within the State of the person to be served and by either mailing the summons to such person at his or her last known residence or by mailing the summons by first class mail to the person to be served at his or her actual place of business in an envelope bearing the legend “personal and confidential” and not indicating on the outside thereof, by return address or otherwise, that the communication is from an attorney or concerns an action against the person to be served. This follow-up mailing must be done within twenty days of the “affixing” of the summons/appearance ticket as described above [CPLR 308(4)]; or
(5) Court Ordered Service: If service of the summons/appearance ticket in a manner described above is impracticable, service may be made in a manner as the court, upon a motion without notice, directs [CPLR 308(5)]
In Contravention of New York State Law; New York City Code
Allows Service of Departmentally Issued Notices by Mail

While CPL 150.40(2) requires that appearance tickets issued for the violation of a local zoning ordinance or law or a building or sanitation code must be served the same way a summons may be personally served upon a person in a civil action, NYC Administrative Code 26-244 (c) provides for service of departmentally issued notices by mail.

Appearance Tickets In New York: New York Has Carved Out Only Three Specific Exceptions Which Allow An Officer To Arrest A Person For A Traffic Infraction Not Committed In the Officer’s Presence

January 10, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

The New York State Legislature has acknowledged that CPL140.10(1)(b) prohibits an officer from making an arrest or issuing an appearance ticket for a traffic infraction not committed in his or her presence and has determined that there are only three specific traffic infractions where an officer should be allowed to arrest or issue an appearance ticket despite the fact that said infractions were not committed in the officer’s presence.

Specifically, the New York State Legislature has authorized an officer to arrest or issue an appearance ticket in lieu of arrest where the motorist leaves the scene of an incident involving property damage in violation of VTL 600(1) or leaves the scene of an incident involving injury to certain animals in violation of VTL 601.

Indeed, VTL 602 states in pertinent part that an officer may arrest “in case of violation of section six hundred and section six hundred one, which in fact have been committed, though not in his presence, when he has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such person.” Therefore, with regard to VTL 600(1) and VTL 601, both non-criminal traffic infractions, the Legislature has determined that officers may arrest or issue appearance tickets even where said infractions are not committed in the officer’s presence.

Additionally, the Legislature has authorized an officer to arrest where the motorist has committed the violation of Driving While Ability Impaired by alcohol in violation of VTL 1192(1) if the motorist was involved in an accident. The relevant statute, VTL 1194(1)(a) states in pertinent part:that a police officer may arrest a person, without a warrant in case of a violation of subdivision (1) of section 1192 of this article, “if such violation is coupled with an accident or collision in which such person is involved, which in fact has been committed, though not in the police officer’s presence, when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such person.”

Accordingly, only if a motorist is believed to have committed VTL 600(1); VTL 601 or VTL 1192(1) involving an accident can an officer arrest even though these non-criminal traffic infractions were not committed in the officer’s presence.The Legislature’s Exclusion of Some Traffic Infractions From The Precepts Of CPL 140.10(1)(b) Establishes An Irrefutable Inference That Those Not Excluded Were Intentionally Not Excluded
That an officer may not arrest for non-criminal traffic infractions not committed in his presence except where said infraction is for violating VTL 600(1); VTL 601; and VTL 1192(1) involving an accident is supported by the Latin maxim “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius”. What this Latin Maxim means is that where a law expressly describes a situation where it applies, an irrefutable inference arises that what was excluded or omitted was intentionally excluded or omitted. This ancient rule of statutory construction is codified in New York Statutes 240 titled “Expression of one thing as excluding others”.

Section 240 states in pertinent part: “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.” In other words, where a statute specifically mentions that said statute applies to one category of persons, said statute irrefutably implies the exclusion of other persons not specifically mentioned was intended by the Legislature. See e.g. Combs v. Lipson, 44 Misc.2d 467 (1964)(Holding that the express grant of power to one person excludes by implication the grant of same powers to another.).
The New York Legislature has in fact judicially created several exceptions to the general rule found in CPL 140.10(1) which prohibits an officer from making an arrest or issuing an appearance ticket for non-criminal traffic infractions not committed in his presence. These express exceptions created by the legislature pertain to violations of VTL 600(1); VTL 601 and VTL 1192(1) involving an accident.

It must be noted however that the Legislature did not except any other non-criminal traffic violations from the precepts of CPL 140.10(1). Therefore, under New York Statute 240, there is an irrefutable inference that the Legislature purposely chose not to exclude any other non-criminal traffic infractions from the precepts of CPL 140.10(1)(a).

OVER CRIMINALIZATION – Part III – There Are No Accidents

January 2, 2012 | Jasmine Hernandez

The Wall Street Journal Reported last week, that criminal charges were being prepared against British Petroleum and/or individuals who worked for British Petroleum and who were supposedly responsible for the oil spill that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico last year after the Deep Water Horizon drilling platform caught fire. This news highlights another troubling trend in the national trend toward over criminalization; “there are no accidents.”

Traditionally, criminal liability required two elements; a criminal act and a criminal mind referred to in Latin as “MENS REA”. The criminal mind required for criminal liability traditionally and under New York law was either that you acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence. Specifically absent from the list was acting negligently or carelessly. Under New York law one who merely acts negligently or carelessly could be held liable for financial damages but could not be found guilty of a crime. As we over criminalize our society the traditional rule is giving way to attempts to hold someone criminally liable for every tragedy.

Recently in New York, three individuals were indicted by a grand jury, tried and acquitted of Manslaughter and related charges after a tragic fire in the Deutsche Bank building in lower Manhattan tragically killed two firefighters. The sadness and the outcry were great as the City attempted to place blame for the tragedy. Ultimately, a site safety officer, a contractor and an an abatement foreman, all of whom worked at the site were indicted for Manslaughter under the theory that they recklessly caused the death of the two firefighters. All were ultimately found not guilty in separate verdicts.

Whatever the tragedy, our society has moved to the point where it is not enough to merely hold someone civilly responsible and force them to pay for the damage they caused. Rather someone must be indicted, tried and if convicted sent to prison. It does not really matter whether the tragedy is a crane collapse, elevator accident, collapse of a company, oil spill or fire. The issue of who is to be held criminally responsible seems to take a back seat to the outrage and the need to find anyone who can be sent to prison. In the Deutsche Bank case, the jurors who were interviewed after specifically rejected such scapegoating.

As we have discussed in our prior blog, the element of having a criminal mind has been substantially relaxed or eliminated in many newer statutes, particularly in statutes that punish “Environmental Crimes.” As a result, convictions are easier to obtain in many of these cases brought as a result of tragic accidents.