Articles Posted in Violent Crimes

In People v. Brenda WW, the New York Court of Appeals addressed how the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) should be applied on appeal. Specifically, the Court clarified that while an appellate court has full authority to resentence a defendant under the DVSJA, it may not reduce or eliminate the mandatory postrelease supervision term by crediting excess time already served.

This decision underscores the importance of understanding both the procedural and sentencing implications of the DVSJA for those incarcerated as a result of surviving prolonged abuse.

The Background of the Case

Brenda WW was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, assault, and a weapons offense for killing her abusive husband. She received a sentence of twenty years to life, along with a five-year postrelease supervision term. Years later, she applied for resentencing under the DVSJA, which allows sentencing relief for incarcerated survivors of domestic abuse if they can prove that abuse was a significant factor in their offense.

Brenda presented extensive evidence that her husband had subjected her to years of brutal physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, including cigarette burns, strangulation, and repeated assaults. Based on this history, she argued that her twenty-year sentence was unduly harsh and requested relief under the DVSJA.

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In People v. T.P. (2025), the New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for first-degree manslaughter, finding that trial counsel’s failure to object during a highly improper prosecutorial summation deprived the defendant of her right to a fair trial.

Case Summary and Facts

The defendant, referred to as T.P., was charged with first-degree manslaughter under Penal Law § 125.20(1) after she stabbed and killed her boyfriend during a violent confrontation. T.P. contended she acted in self-defense under Penal Law § 35.15, explaining that the victim had repeatedly abused her—physically, sexually, and emotionally—which was corroborated by witnesses and supported by a prior order of protection.

On the night of the incident, the confrontation escalated significantly. According to T.P., her boyfriend forcibly performed oral sex, strangled her, and during the ensuing struggle, fearing for her life, she grabbed a knife and stabbed him once.

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A recent appeal from Tompkins County shows how quickly a violent-felony indictment can turn into a long prison term—and how limited your options become once you plead guilty. The defendant, accused of taking part in a rolling gunfight that ended with a deadly crash, eventually accepted a plea to manslaughter in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Although he later challenged the indictment and the use of his hospital-room statements, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction and the five-to-fifteen-year sentence. If you are facing serious charges in New York, this ruling offers hard-earned guidance on what to contest, when to contest it, and why clear, early strategy matters.

The indictment contained nine counts, ranging from reckless endangerment to homicide. After rejecting an initial offer and losing a suppression motion, the defendant chose to plead on the morning trial was set to begin. On appeal he argued that the weapons count was jurisdictionally defective, that the state’s licensing statute is unconstitutional, and that his statements should have been suppressed because he was injured and asked for a lawyer. None of those claims succeeded, largely because of the legal standards that apply once you accept a negotiated plea.

First, the court dealt with the indictment. A New York indictment is invalid only when it omits an essential element of a charged crime or describes conduct that is not criminal. The defendant claimed the weapon count failed to distinguish between his driveway—arguably private space not covered by the statute—and the public roads where the shootout occurred. He also said the indictment never alleged that he lacked a pistol license. The court called the driveway argument a matter of evidence, not jurisdiction, and ruled that the license issue was satisfied because the count cited the exact Penal Law provision, which by definition requires the firearm to be unlicensed. For anyone accused of a gun offense, the lesson is simple: if a count references the governing statute and tracks its language, a court will likely label it valid. You must raise evidentiary challenges through motions or at trial; waiting until appeal almost always forfeits them.

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If you have been charged with a violent crime in New York, including assault, assault and battery, or a firearms charge, there may be grounds to argue that there is an issue of identity in the case against you. In a recent case in a New York court, the defendant argued that the guilty conviction against him was unreasonable because the assault victim had no way of accurately identifying him after the incident in question.

Case Before the Appellate Division

In the case before the New York Appellate Division, Third Department, the defendant argued that his assault-related case should have been dismissed by the trial court. According to the defendant, the victim did not actually see who punched him on the left side of his face, since he was busy looking at two other individuals involved in the altercation, who were wrestling on the ground. Therefore, said the defendant, the guilty conviction was not supported by legally sufficient evidence. He asked the higher court to vacate his conviction.

Analysis of Events Surrounding the Assault

The higher court disagreed with the defendant, concluding instead that the events surrounding the incident could have led a reasonable jury to believe he was guilty of the assault. For example, the assault victim saw the defendant standing directly over him after he was hurt. After that, the defendant and the victim had a verbal altercation, and the defendant head-butted the victim. Because of this chain of events, the victim could have sensibly identified the person that assaulted him. Therefore, defendant’s argument did not have merit – there was not reason for the trial court to have dismissed his case.

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If you receive an unfavorable jury verdict in a criminal trial, the good news is that you can appeal that verdict. Sometimes, though, even if the higher court grants your appeal, the State might appeal again, subjecting you to additional waiting and uncertainty. A recent case before the New York Court of Appeals serves as an example of this process, and in this case, even though the defendant got a favorable decision on his first appeal, he got an unfavorable decision from the second appeal when the court decided the prosecution’s error in his trial was ultimately “harmless.”

Originally, the defendant in this case was charged with first-degree assault and attempted murder. The defendant pled not guilty, his case went to trial, and a jury found him guilty of the assault. On appeal, though, the defendant argued that it was unfair for a police officer to testify regarding the victim’s daughter’s statements about the attack. Because the officer testified about the daughter’s statements, the defendant argued he was deprived of his right to cross-examine the daughter about what she said.

The Appellate Division agreed that this testimony was a violation of the defendant’s rights. It granted the defendant’s request and gave him an entirely new trial. The State appealed again, and the New York Court of Appeals then had to decide whether it was correct for the defendant to be given this new trial.

When a defendant is charged with committing a violent crime in the state of New York, there are various affirmative defenses he can raise in hopes of reducing both his conviction and the resulting sentence. In a recent criminal case before an appellate court in New York, the defendant successfully asked the court to reduce his murder conviction based on the argument that he acted “under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.” The facts of the case serve as a reminder that this defense applies only in rare circumstances, but that when it does apply, it can serve as a powerful tool in otherwise difficult cases.

The Standard

To successfully argue the affirmative defense of emotional disturbance, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of evidence (1) that he suffered “extreme” emotional disturbance and (2) that there was a reasonable explanation for the emotional disturbance. The first element focuses on the defendant’s mental state, while the second focuses on how the defendant viewed his circumstances at the time of the offense. The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance is different than a psychiatric defense.

April 2024 Case

In the case recently decided by the New York court, the defendant originally argued during trial that he murdered a fellow patient at a medical center because of emotional disturbance. The jury found that this was not a reasonable defense, and it found him guilty.

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During interrogation, New York detectives and officers are only legally able to obtain statements from defendants that are made voluntarily. If a detective coerces a defendant, or if the defendant does not understand what he or she is being interrogated about, a court may later rule that any confession was involuntarily and thus invalid. A recent case coming out of the Appellate Division, Third Department, shows some of the limits on this law and serves as a reminder of the importance of experienced, qualified counsel in criminal cases.

The Ruling

In the court’s ruling, it first reiterated the law that when prosecuting a criminal case, the State bears the burden of showing that a defendant’s statements during interrogation were voluntary. The State must therefore show that the defendant’s statements were “not products of coercion, either physical or psychological.”

In the case before the court, a defendant was being interrogated about a recent murder. During the interrogation, the defendant asked the questioning officer for medical attention, and the officer refused. Later on in the conversation, the defendant confessed to being involved in the murder, and he ended up pleading guilty to manslaughter in the first degree. Before pleading guilty, however, he filed a motion to suppress the confession, which the trial court denied.

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In a recent case before the New York Court of Appeals, New York’s highest Court the defendant asked the court to affirm a lower court’s ruling, which concluded that the prosecution failed to meet its burden during the trial of his criminal case. The case in question involved a brutal murder, and even though the evidence showed that the defendant killed the victim in the case, he argued that the prosecution did not prove every element that the relevant statute required it to prove. On appeal, the court agreed, ultimately affirming the ruling that vacated one count of the defendant’s indictment.

Facts and Procedural History

The opinion lays out the facts of the case: one day in 2018, members of two New York gangs were engaged in a physical fight when they came across a teenager that they believed to be part of one of the gangs. The opposing gang members chased the teenager down, dragging him across the street and stabbing him in the process. The defendant in this case ultimately stabbed the victim, and he bled out and then died shortly thereafter.
The defendant’s case went to trial, and he was convicted of first-degree murder. He appealed, and the Appellate Division vacated the first-degree murder conviction. According to the higher court, the evidence was not sufficient to show that the defendant was guilty of first-degree murder. The State appealed this order, and the New York Court of Appeals issued an opinion regarding the State’s appeal.

The Court’s Decision

On appeal, the court reviewed the evidence and decided that the prosecution failed to establish at least one element of the case during trial. According to the first-degree murder statute in question, the prosecution was supposed to show that the defendant showed “a sense of pleasure” in injuring the victim. And, according to the court, the prosecution had not presented evidence to demonstrate this sense of pleasure.

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In a recent case before the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, the defendant appealed his convictions of attempted murder, attempted assault, robbery, burglary, and criminal possession of a weapon. Part of the defendant’s argument regarding the “attempted murder” offense was that the facts of the case did not support the jury’s finding of guilt, and the verdict should therefore be reversed. Reviewing the record, the higher court disagreed and ultimately affirmed the lower court’s verdict, emphasizing that the defendant’s actions throughout his physical altercation with the victim led to a reasonable inference that he intended to kill the victim.

Defendant’s Argument

The defendant’s argument centered around the fact that during the incident in question, he and the victim both fought in the hallway of a motel while one of them was holding a gun. Shots were fired, and the victim was shot during the parties’ struggle for the gun. There was not enough evidence, maintained the defendant, to prove that he attempted to kill the victim – the evidence only showed that the victim’s injuries were the result of a chaotic fight that involved a loaded gun. Without reason to assume that he intended to kill the victim, there was no basis for the “attempted murder” conviction. The defendant therefore asked the higher court to reverse the lower court’s ruling.

Basis for Appellate Court’s Ruling

The appellate court disagreed. According to important New York case law, it is possible to infer intent to kill from the defendant’s actions. Here, the victim testified that the defendant shot directly at him while they were fighting, as well as that the defendant placed the gun directly on his body before shooting. Other witnesses affirmed this testimony. These actions directly supported the inference that the defendant intended to kill the victim.
Additionally, the victim’s injuries showed a gunshot wound, lacerations above the eyebrow, and abrasions to other parts of the body. These injuries were consistent with the victim’s testimony about where and how the defendant shot him. Given that the physical evidence, in addition to the testimony, supported the inference that the defendant wanted to kill the victim, it was reasonable for the jury to have found the defendant guilty.
Ultimately, then, the court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, and the defendant’s convictions stayed in place.

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In a recent case before the Appellate Division, Fourth Department in New York, the defendant took issue with the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. In his appeal, the defendant argued that the lower court made a prejudicial decision in denying his motion, and the decision should therefore be reconsidered. The higher court reviewed the defendant’s argument and ultimately disagreed; the court did, however, decide that the trial court unfairly sentenced the defendant, and it lowered the defendant’s overall sentence as a result.

Background of the Case

The defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated family offense, meaning a jury found that he violated a no-contact order that was in place in favor of the mother of the defendant’s children. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the defendant filed a motion for a mistrial, arguing that part of the admitted testimony was inappropriate and prejudicial.

During the proceedings, the individual that had obtained the no-contact order against the defendant (called the “complainant”) testified on the stand about how the defendant had strangled her in front of their children. The defendant objected on the grounds that this was improper testimony. The trial court judge agreed, and while the opinion did not describe why this testimony was improper, both the defendant and the trial court’s judge agreed that it was inadmissible. Having that the testimony was not helpful for the jury in deciding whether to find the defendant guilty, the judge instructed the jury to disregard the testimony from the complainant.
The basis of the defendant’s motion, then, was that the judge did not do enough to fix the problem that the jury heard this prejudicial testimony, and that the jury was therefore biased against him.

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