New York Criminal Attorney Blog

NEW YORK FIREARMS LAWYERS, NRA MEMBER BECOMES NRA CERTIFIED FIREARMS INSTRUCTOR

March 27, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

Senior Partner Peter H. Tilem of the White Plains law firm, Tilem & Campbell recently passed the test to become an NRA Certified Pistol Instructor. Mr. Tilem, who is a senior criminal defense lawyer, NRA member and handles much of the firms firearms law practice together with law partner Peter Tilem, was an experienced and avid firearms enthusiast before passing the National Rifle Association’s instructors’ test.Besides being a lifelong shooter, Mr. Tilem has been handling gun and weapons cases for decades. Initially, as a prosecutor, in one of the most anti-gun counties, in one of the most anti-gun states in the United States, Mr. Tilem handled the prosecution of countless gun and knife cases as well as cases involving a variety of other weapons. After several years as a prosecutor, Mr. Tilem was asked to join the District Attorney’s Office’s Firearms Trafficking Unit where he handled large scale, gun trafficking conspiracy cases in addition to other gun cases and violent crimes and became an adviser to other prosecutors in the handling of gun cases.

After leaving the District Attorney’s Office and entering private practice, Mr. Tilem put his experience and knowledge of New York gun laws to work helping law-abiding citizens who got caught in the web of New York’s criminal justice system which treats law-abiding citizens with firearms (or knives) as criminals. In New York, a law abiding citizen who carries his (or her) pistol into New York with an out-of-state permit (ccw) faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 3 and 1/2 years in prison. In addition, New York still has on the books the functional equivalent of the since repealed Federal Assault Weapons ban which punishes as a felony possession of rifles or shotguns that have cosmetic features that are deemed to look offensive. The outdated and ill conceived assault weapon ban in New York is so poorly written and hard to understand that neither the police, prosecutors nor civilians can be sure of what is felonious conduct and what is perfectly legal.

In addition to New York’s bizarre gun laws, New York bans virtually any weapon imaginable including brass knuckles, billy clubs, “sand bag[s]” (whatever that means), wrist-brace type sling shots, nun-chucks and kung fu stars just to give some examples. As Mr. Tilem has written about extensively, New York’s ban on knives is so complete that it seems to ban steak knives in restaurants (at least in the five boroughs of New York City) and virtually any lock blade folding knife as a “gravity knife.”

US SUPREME COURT VACATES TWO CONVICTIONS FOR LAWYERS INEFFECTIVE PLEA BARGAINING

March 26, 2012 | Jasmine Hernandez

Recently we reported in our blog that a DWI conviction was vacated on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel where the lawyer simply had his client plead guilty to Driving While Intoxicated without conducting an investigation into the evidence in the case. Now, just last week, the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction where a defense attorney neglected to tell the defendant about a plea offer and the defendant was later sentenced to a much more lengthy prison sentence than he would have gotten if he accepted the plea deal.

In the case of Missouri v. Frye the United States Supreme Court for the first time recognized that the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that a defendant’s right to effective representation extends to the plea bargain process and that if the lawyer is ineffective during the plea bargain process, the defendant may be entitled to reversal of his conviction.

In the Frye case, Galin Frye was accused of driving with a revoked license. Since he had been convicted of this same offense three times in the past he was facing a felony charge which carries up to 4 years in prison. During the pendency of the case, the prosecutor told Frye’s lawyer that Frye could plead guilty to a misdemeanor and receive a sentence of 90 days. Frye’s lawyer never conveyed that offer to him and he subsequently plead guilty and received three years in prison. On appeal Galin Frye argued that that we was denied his right to counsel because of ineffective of assistance of counsel. His conviction was reversed.

New York Speeding Tickets: Speed Not Prudent Charge Cannot Be Based Upon The Mere Happening of An Accident

February 20, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

Have you been charged in New York with “speed not prudent” by an officer who did not witness the alleged offense? Were you involved in an accident and then issued a ticket for an infraction by an officer who did not witness the accident? Judge Malone of the Justice Court of Mendon, New York, noted in People v. Genovese, that the practice whereby police officers in New York issue tickets for traffic infractions they did not witness occurs every day in lower courts across the State.

One of the most common scenarios is where an officer arrives upon the scene of an accident he did not witness and, after conducting an “investigation”, concludes that one of the drivers (or the only driver if it was a single car accident) had to be driving at a speed not reasonable and prudent and issues a traffic ticket to the “offending” driver charging him or her with violating VTL 1180(a) – “Speed Not Prudent” – which states that:

No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual
and potential hazards then existing.

This practice is wholly improper. First, as detailed above, a police officer cannot issue an appearance ticket for a traffic infraction not committed in his presence. Second, “[t]he mere happening of the accident because of the skidding of [driver’s car] did not warrant the conclusion that there had been negligent operation of a motor vehicle or that the statute had been violated.” Weisinger v. MacDuff, 285 A.D. 607, 611 (1st Dept. 1955). To be guilty of driving faster than is reasonable and prudent, the conduct of the driver must constitute more than mere error of judgment or simple negligence. People v. Benway, 41 Misc.2d 39 (1963) see also Hessney v. MacDuff, 284 A.D. 70, 72 (4th Dept. 1954)(Negligent operation of a motor vehicle may not be inferred merely because a car skidded or an accident happened); Fake v. MacDuff, 281 A.D. 630, 633 (4th Dept. 1953)(The fact that the car skidded or slid off the road does not, standing alone, even constitute ordinary negligence).

Sentencing Issues In New York: Court Has No Authority To Alter a Judgment And Sentence In The Absence Of The Defendant And His Attorney

February 13, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

In New York, a court cannot change, amend or otherwise alter a sentence in a criminal case without the defendant and his or her criminal defense attorney being present. Occasionally a court might attempt to change an otherwise legal sentence post sentence by signing additional probation conditions. This practice is contrary to both statutory and decisional law. The New York Criminal Procedure Law provides that “[t]he defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.” CPL 380.40(1). It is axiomatic that a defendant has a statutory and constitutional right to be present at the time of sentencing. People v. Brown, 155 A.D.2d 608 (2nd Dept. 1989)(CPL 380.40(1) requires a defendant to be present at the time of sentence); People v. Lucks, 91 A.D.2d 896 at 897, 457 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1st Dept. 1983)(“CPL 380.40 (subd 1) is clear in its direction that a defendant be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”)

More importantly however, is the long-standing, clearly established, rule of law, that a court has no authority to alter a sentence in the absence of the defendant and his attorney. People v. Saperstein, 1 A.D.2d 949, 150 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1st Dept. 1956). A court’s failure to have a defendant produced at a proceeding at which the defendant’s sentence is amended, violates that defendant’s statutory right to be present at the time of sentencing. People v. Garrison, 9 A.D.3d 436, 780 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2nd Dept. 2004); see also People ex rel. Walker v. Wilkins, 23 A.D.2d 619, 256 N.Y.S.2d 810 (4th Dept. 1965)(Change of sentence out of presence of defendant and his attorney ruled invalid).

Not only must the defendant be present for all sentencing proceedings, his or her attorney must also be present. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. VI. Similarly, the New York State Constitution provides in pertinent part: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . .” NY Const. Art I, § 6.

Appearance Tickets In New York: Whether The Court Must Dismiss, May Dismiss or Cannot Dismiss If The Required Accusatory Instrument Is Not Filed By The Return Date Of The Appearance Ticket Has Not Been Definitively Determined By The Courts

February 7, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

In prior blogs I have explained that where the police choose to issue an arrestee an appearance ticket instead of detaining that person until they can see a judge, the police must thereafter file a sufficient accusatory instrument with the court on or before the return date listed in the appearance ticket. What action the courts can take where the required accusatory instrument has not been filed before the return date has not been definitively decided by the courts with some holding the court may dismiss the appearance ticket, while others have held the court must dismiss and still others have held the court cannot dismiss.

The differing holds are discussed in the following three sections.

Must Dismiss:

Appearance Tickets In New York: Detention Of A Person In New York For Purposes Of Issuing That Person An Appearance Ticket Is An Arrest Situation Which Would Allow The Officer To Search That Person As If That Person Was Formally Arrested

January 31, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

In New York, if a person is formally arrested, they can be searched incident to that arrest. However, can the officer also search a person if the person could have been arrested but the officer decides to issue that person an appearance ticket on scene instead? The answer is “sometimes.” Generally, the police can search a person they issue an appearance ticket to. However, the New York courts have frowned on a blanket right to search where traffic infractions are involved.

The detention of a person for the purpose of issuing that person an appearance ticket amounts to an arrest situation. People v. Hazelwood, 104 Misc.2d 1121, 1123 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1980) see also People v. King, 102 A.D.2d 710 (1st Dept. 1984)(Where an “officer intends to issue an appearance ticket in lieu of a lawful arrest, he had the concomitant right to ‘pat down’ the defendant.”).

In Hazelwood, 104 Misc.2d 1121, the court held that the police could search a person they detained for the purpose of issuing that person an appearance ticket. Noting that the officer could have arrested the person and then searched the person incident to that arrest, the court observed: “to hold that a search is not permissible because an arrest did not occur in a case where the defendant was subject to arrest, but the officer gave the defendant a break, is an injustice to the officer.” Id. at 1124.

HOW CAN APPEARANCE TICKETS ISSUED IN NEW YORK BE SERVED [CPL 150.40(2)]

January 22, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

With Limited Exceptions, When the Defendant is a Natural Person,
Appearance Tickets Must be Served Personally [CPL 150.40(2)]

Generally, under New York law, other than an appearance ticket issued for a traffic infraction relating to parking, an appearance ticket must be personally served. Except, an appearance ticket issued for the violation of a local zoning ordinance or local zoning law, or of a local building or sanitation code may be issued in any manner authorized for service in a civil action under CPLR 308. CPL 150.40(2).

To summarize, appearance tickets issued to natural persons in New York must be personally served. Except, appearance tickets may be served in accordance with CPLR 308 (see below section) if they are for parking violations or violations of local zoning, building or sanitation violations.
Service Upon a Natural Person by Mail Insufficient. New York City Routinely Ignores The Requirement That Appearance Tickets Issued To Natural Persons Be Personally Served.

Personal service on a “defendant, whose liberty will be at stake in a criminal action, serves to assure his right to adequate notice and expeditious resolution of the charges.” People v. DiLorenzo, 149 Misc.2d 791, 794 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990). In DiLorenzo, the court noted that the certified mailing of an appearance ticket that should have been personally served was insufficient service.

In People v. Baxter, 148 Misc.2d 1009 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1990) the court found service of appearance tickets by a New York City administrative agency by mail defective and dismissed charges for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, the court observed “that the CPL requirements of personal service are not being followed by the Buildings Department and other administrative agencies.” Id. at 1010.

In People v. Neuberger, 149 Misc.2d 1 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) the court dismissed all charges against the defendants in the interests of justice explaining that “[a]s for the Corporation Counsel’s continued practice of flouting the service requirements of the Criminal Procedure Law, that abuse cannot be left unremedied.” People v. Neuberger, 149 Misc. 2d 1, 5 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1991).

In Neuberger, several defendants were served appearance tickets by mail which ordered them to appear in criminal court. The Honorable Martin G. Karopkin explained that the Corporation Counsel had been warned numerous times over the preceding several months that such service by mail was improper:

On numerous occasions during the past several months this court, and others, have warned the Office of the Corporation Counsel, the Buildings Department and other city agencies that service by mail is improper and contrary to CPL 150.40, as well as CPL 600.10.

Id. at 1-2.

Despite the repeated warnings of both J. Karopkin and other judges, “the Corporation Counsel . . . continued to submit affidavits of mailing to the court accompanying its pleadings and to argue that the defendants’ appearances confer jurisdiction and render that issue moot.” Id. at 2-3. In other words, the New York City Corporation Counsel knowingly served appearance tickets on individuals by mail, in clear contravention of the law. What’s more troubling is that they continued to do so even after several judges warned the Corporation Counsel that such service was improper. Thus, the Corporation Counsel “acquired these defendants’ presence by means of improper service” and then argued that the defendants’ mere presence before the court conferred jurisdiction thus mooting the service issue. Id. at 5.

Service When Issued For Violation Of Local Zoning Laws,
Ordinances or a Building or Sanitation Code

An appearance ticket issued for the violation of a local zoning ordinance or law or a building or sanitation code may be served the same way a summons may be personally served upon a person in a civil action. [CPL 150.40(2)]. Personal service of summons upon a person in a civil action doesn’t necessarily require that the summons be literally handed (served) to the person. Pursuant to CPLR 308, personal service can be accomplished by:

(1) Actual Personal Service: Delivering the summons/appearance ticket upon the person within the State [CPLR 308(1)]; or
(2) Suitable age and Discretion Servcie: Delivering the summons/appearance ticket within the State to a person of suitable age and discretion at the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode of the person to be served. When service is made by this method, it must be followed by either mailing the summons to the person to be served at his or her last known residence or by mailing the summons by first class mail to the person to be served at his or her actual place of business in an envelope bearing the legend “personal and confidential” and not indicating on the outside thereof, by return address or otherwise, that the communication is from an attorney or concerns an action against the person to be served. This follow-up mailing must be done within twenty days of the delivery of the summons/appearance ticket to the person of suitable age and discretion as described above [CPLR 308(2)]; or
(3) Service on Designated Agent: Delivering the summons/appearance ticket within the State to an agent designated in accordance with CPLR 318 [CPLR 308(3)]; or
(4) “Nail-and-Mail” Service: If service cannot be made in a manner described above despite due diligence (a diligent effort), service may be made by affixing the summons/appearance ticket to the door of either the actual place of business, dwelling place or usual place of abode within the State of the person to be served and by either mailing the summons to such person at his or her last known residence or by mailing the summons by first class mail to the person to be served at his or her actual place of business in an envelope bearing the legend “personal and confidential” and not indicating on the outside thereof, by return address or otherwise, that the communication is from an attorney or concerns an action against the person to be served. This follow-up mailing must be done within twenty days of the “affixing” of the summons/appearance ticket as described above [CPLR 308(4)]; or
(5) Court Ordered Service: If service of the summons/appearance ticket in a manner described above is impracticable, service may be made in a manner as the court, upon a motion without notice, directs [CPLR 308(5)]
In Contravention of New York State Law; New York City Code
Allows Service of Departmentally Issued Notices by Mail

While CPL 150.40(2) requires that appearance tickets issued for the violation of a local zoning ordinance or law or a building or sanitation code must be served the same way a summons may be personally served upon a person in a civil action, NYC Administrative Code 26-244 (c) provides for service of departmentally issued notices by mail.

GUILTY PLEA IN NEW YORK DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATE CASE VACATED BECAUSE DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY DID NOT PROVIDE MEANINGFUL REPRESENTATION

January 17, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

If you are charged with Driving While Intoxicated [VTL 1192(2), (3)] in New York, the criminal defense attorney you choose can be one of the most important decisions of your life. Are you going to retain a “read-em-and-plead-em” hack, the lawyer who handled the closing when you purchased your home, the lawyer who drafted your Will or are you going to retain a lawyer well versed in the law, science and procedures associated with DWI cases?

Are you going to choose an attorney that has experience not just in DWI cases; but also in winning Driving While Intoxicated trials? Make no mistake about it, district attorneys and prosecutors know full well which attorneys are capable of actually taking a DWI case to trial. An attorney’s trial ability often plays a role in the plea bargaining offer. If your attorney has no trial experience, plea bargains all of his or her cases, always backs down at the last minute and accepts whatever offer the prosecution has made and has shown him or herself to be incompetent in the few hearings or trials he or she has done, the prosecutor has no real concern that the case will ever go to trial. If the prosecutor knows that in the end, your attorney will “plea you out” the prosecutor has no incentive to offer anything other than their standard policy offer.
Of course, accepting a plea bargain offer in certain cases is advisable. However, a detailed “risk/benefit” analysis must first be done. If the prosecution wants you to plead guilty to misdemeanor DWI with three years of probation and you’re a first time offender and the case did not involve any accident or injuries; their might not be any risk associated with going to trial because it’s very unlikely you would be sentenced to anything more than probation if you lost at trial.

A lawyer should not advise a client to accept a plea bargain unless that attorney has thoroughly investigated the case. That includes listening to, and investigating, not only a defendant’s claim of innocence, but the facts, circumstances and issues concerning probable cause to stop the vehicle, the legality of the roadblock, the administration of Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, the timeline of events, the officers involved, the administration of any breathalyzer testing, blood drawing, urine collecting and other issues that can arise in DWI cases.

In certain Driving While Intoxicated cases it might be advisable that the attorney visit the scene of the stop. The attorney might view the area where the defendant performed the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests. The attorney might even travel the route the defendant traveled prior to being pulled over. If the defendant claims he or she only had one or two drinks, credit card statements from the restaurant or other establishment where the defendant was prior to being stopped by the police might be helpful. Interviews with employees of the establishment where the defendant drank might reveal a witness to defendant’s drinking. Are their any witnesses to defendant’s driving?

Only after a searching and diligent review and investigation of the above factors as well as the relevant statutes, regulations and case law can an attorney render an opinion on a plea bargain offer. Most importantly however, the attorney who conducts the case review must be extremely knowledgeable and experienced in DWI defense. An attorney can spend countless hours reviewing and investigating all aspects of a Driving While Intoxicated case with zealous enthusiasm, however, if that attorney simply doesn’t know the laws, rules, regulations, case law, science, toxicology, breath testing, chemical testing, police procedures, etc., that lawyer’s opinion on a plea bargain offer will be no better than flipping a coin.

In a recent decision, the New York State Appellate Division unanimously affirmed a lower court ruling which granted a defendant’s motion to vacate his guilty plea in a Driving While Intoxicated case. The Court concluded that “[d]efense counsel failed to conduct any investigation, make any motions, or even view the video of defendant’s breathalyzer test before negotiating a plea bargain whereby defendant would plead guilty to the top count of the accusatory instrument.” People v Rivera, 2012 NY Slip Op 43, 1 (1st Dept. Jan. 5, 2012).
In support of its decision, the Court observed that there were defenses that should have been investigated including matters affecting the accuracy of the breathalyzer result. Furthermore, the Court explained that, because the defendant had no prior record and no accident occurred, it was extremely unlikely that he would have received a jail sentence had he lost at trial. Therefore, the “defendant received little, if any benefit, by pleading guilty to the top count without ever having received even a minimally accurate assessment of the strength of the People’s case.” Id.

The Rivera decision unfortunately does not indicate the sentence defendant received as part of the plea deal or what his Blood Alcohol Concentration was. In fairness to the attorney that represented defendant in Rivera, if his BAC was alleged to be, for example .16 or .17 and the plea offer didn’t require probation, than Rivera did receive some benefit. Specifically, he avoided probation, which can be difficult for some. For example, in Westchester, avoiding probation is a major consideration on DWI cases because DWI probation in Westchester County can be fairly onerous.

Nevertheless, the Rivera decision should put all defense attorneys on notice that it is unacceptable to advise a DWI client to plead guilty to the top charge without first conducting any real investigation into the strength of the prosecution’s case. The Rivera decision should also put everyone who is charged with DWI on notice that they should speak with several attorneys and get several opinions prior to retaining an attorney. And, the attorney they retain should be knowledgeable specifically with DWI cases.

Generally, if you are charged with Driving While Intoxicated and have no prior criminal history; there was no accident; no injuries; no property damage and there are no allegations that you were driving in an overly reckless or unreasonable manner, be very careful if your attorney recommends you plead guilty to the top charge with probation – be even more careful if your attorney makes such a recommendation very early in the case.

Appearance Tickets In New York: New York Has Carved Out Only Three Specific Exceptions Which Allow An Officer To Arrest A Person For A Traffic Infraction Not Committed In the Officer’s Presence

January 10, 2012 | Tilem & Associates

The New York State Legislature has acknowledged that CPL140.10(1)(b) prohibits an officer from making an arrest or issuing an appearance ticket for a traffic infraction not committed in his or her presence and has determined that there are only three specific traffic infractions where an officer should be allowed to arrest or issue an appearance ticket despite the fact that said infractions were not committed in the officer’s presence.

Specifically, the New York State Legislature has authorized an officer to arrest or issue an appearance ticket in lieu of arrest where the motorist leaves the scene of an incident involving property damage in violation of VTL 600(1) or leaves the scene of an incident involving injury to certain animals in violation of VTL 601.

Indeed, VTL 602 states in pertinent part that an officer may arrest “in case of violation of section six hundred and section six hundred one, which in fact have been committed, though not in his presence, when he has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such person.” Therefore, with regard to VTL 600(1) and VTL 601, both non-criminal traffic infractions, the Legislature has determined that officers may arrest or issue appearance tickets even where said infractions are not committed in the officer’s presence.

Additionally, the Legislature has authorized an officer to arrest where the motorist has committed the violation of Driving While Ability Impaired by alcohol in violation of VTL 1192(1) if the motorist was involved in an accident. The relevant statute, VTL 1194(1)(a) states in pertinent part:that a police officer may arrest a person, without a warrant in case of a violation of subdivision (1) of section 1192 of this article, “if such violation is coupled with an accident or collision in which such person is involved, which in fact has been committed, though not in the police officer’s presence, when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such person.”

Accordingly, only if a motorist is believed to have committed VTL 600(1); VTL 601 or VTL 1192(1) involving an accident can an officer arrest even though these non-criminal traffic infractions were not committed in the officer’s presence.The Legislature’s Exclusion of Some Traffic Infractions From The Precepts Of CPL 140.10(1)(b) Establishes An Irrefutable Inference That Those Not Excluded Were Intentionally Not Excluded
That an officer may not arrest for non-criminal traffic infractions not committed in his presence except where said infraction is for violating VTL 600(1); VTL 601; and VTL 1192(1) involving an accident is supported by the Latin maxim “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius”. What this Latin Maxim means is that where a law expressly describes a situation where it applies, an irrefutable inference arises that what was excluded or omitted was intentionally excluded or omitted. This ancient rule of statutory construction is codified in New York Statutes 240 titled “Expression of one thing as excluding others”.

Section 240 states in pertinent part: “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.” In other words, where a statute specifically mentions that said statute applies to one category of persons, said statute irrefutably implies the exclusion of other persons not specifically mentioned was intended by the Legislature. See e.g. Combs v. Lipson, 44 Misc.2d 467 (1964)(Holding that the express grant of power to one person excludes by implication the grant of same powers to another.).
The New York Legislature has in fact judicially created several exceptions to the general rule found in CPL 140.10(1) which prohibits an officer from making an arrest or issuing an appearance ticket for non-criminal traffic infractions not committed in his presence. These express exceptions created by the legislature pertain to violations of VTL 600(1); VTL 601 and VTL 1192(1) involving an accident.

It must be noted however that the Legislature did not except any other non-criminal traffic violations from the precepts of CPL 140.10(1). Therefore, under New York Statute 240, there is an irrefutable inference that the Legislature purposely chose not to exclude any other non-criminal traffic infractions from the precepts of CPL 140.10(1)(a).

NEW YORK’S “MOVE OVER” LAW JUST EXPANDED

January 6, 2012 | Jasmine Hernandez

New York’s “move over” law was expanded starting at the beginning of this year (January 1, 2012) making it applicable to not only emergency vehicles that are stopped on the side of the road but now to “hazard vehicles”. The law, which originally went into effect last January originally only covered “emergency vehicles” those vehicles which are displaying either a red light or a combination of red and white lights such as a police, fire or emergency medical vehicle. Now, as of this year, the law also applies to “hazard vehicles” those vehicles which display one or more amber lights such as tow trucks, road service vehicles and highway crews.

New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Sec 1144-a requires that drivers on a limited-access highway or parkway to exercise “due care” when approaching an emergency or hazard vehicle and defines due care as requiring at a minimum that the driver move from the lane adjacent to the shoulder where the emergency or hazard vehicle is stopped. In other words if the emergency vehicle is stopped on the right shoulder and you are driving in the right lane, you must move over to the center lane as you pass the emergency or hazard vehicle. Since moving over is not always possible on busy New York highways, the law does set the condition that you should move over only if it complies with other New York Vehicle & Traffic Laws such as moving from lane unsafely under V&TL 1128 and disobeying a traffic control device under V&TL 1110. In other words, if it is not safe to do so you or it is otherwise illegal to move over you should not. Rather, in that case you should slow down.

Violating the new “move over” law is a traffic infraction under New York Law punishable by a fine of $150, 2 points on you license and up to 15 days in jail although it should be emphasized that jail in not a likely possibility and that the points have been improperly reported in the media. The points count toward suspension of your driver’s license and/or the driver responsibility assessment.

Motorists should be warned that when section 1144-a originally went into effect last year the police were very aggressively enforcing the new law. We fully anticipate that the police will be aggressively enforcing all of the new provisions of section 1144-a. In addition motorists need to exercise extreme caution when they attempt to move over. The purpose of the law is safety and changing lanes create another risk. Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1144-a makes clear that you must observe all other Vehicle and Traffic Laws including but not limited to using your turn signal, changing lanes safely, complying with lane markings, signs and speed restrictions.