New York Criminal Attorney Blog

An issue that comes up very frequently in New York criminal cases is “when may the police properly stop a vehicle”? The intuition or hunch of an officer, even if it thereafter turns out to be correct, cannot justify a stop. Absent at least a reasonable suspicion that its occupants had been, are then, or about to be, engaged in criminal activity, the stopping of an automobile by the police constitutes an impermissible seizure. In addition, any contraband, such as drugs or guns, recovered as a result of improper police conduct may be suppressed.
For example, in People v. Cascio, 63 A.D.2d 183, the defendant had pleaded guilty to Assault in the Second Degree but appealed the denial of his suppression motion. Officers observed defendant and another man walk to the rear defendant’s parked car, open the trunk, look inside and then exchange what appeared to the officer to be money. Based upon that observation, the officers followed defendant’s vehicle and eventually attempted to pull it over. Defendant fled and a chase ensued. Ultimately the defendant crashed his vehicle, a struggle followed and marijuana was found in the vehicle.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the seized evidence but the Appellate Court reversed finding that the record lacked any objective evidence of criminal activity. It was insufficient that the officer “felt” a crime was about to be committed. Therefore, the stop was illegal and the evidence found as a result of the stop should have been suppressed. Accordingly, the Appellate Court vacated defendant’s guilty plea and reversed his conviction for Assault in the Second Degree.
If you have been charged with any offense in New York State, including but not limited to New York City, Westchester, Dutchess, Putnam, Orange and Rockland Counties, contact Tilem & Campbell at 1-877-377-8666 for a free consultation or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

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Many times police will encounter a vehicle with someone sleeping in the driver’s seat. This often leads to arrests for DWI related charges. The issue in such a situation is whether the police may approach that vehicle, awaken the driver and thereafter ask the driver to exit the vehicle. As with virtually all issues associated with stops, seizures and searches, there is no set answer. This issue is decided on a case-by-case basis taking several factors and variable into account.

In People v. May, 81 A.D.2d 805 the police encountered a parked vehicle in New York City with the driver slumped over the steering wheel. The keys were in the ignition but the car was not running. One of the officers knocked on the window and awakened the defendant. The defendant’s reactions were slow and his speech was slurred. The officer asked defendant to exit the vehicle and while defendant was doing so, a gun fell to the ground. The trial court held that the police were allowed to approach the vehicle and check on the occupant/defendant but that the police were not justified in asking defendant to exit the vehicle because they had no basis to suspect he was involved in criminal activity or was violating the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

The Appellate Division reversed finding that the officers’ conduct was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was instead based on specific and articulable facts such as the fact that defendant was slumped at the wheel with the key in the ignition and, when he was aroused, his speech was slurred and his movements were slow. Considering the original approach of the vehicle was legal, in these circumstances, the police could properly ask defendant to step out of the car and display his license and registration.

For more information about this and other New York criminal law issues, or if you are currently charged with any offense such as Drug Charge or New York Gun Offense, call us toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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In New York, a stop of a vehicle on a public roadway is a seizure and must be based upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975). Many times, a vehicle stop is made because the vehicle or its occupants match the description of a suspect wanted in connection with an offense. But what if the only identifying feature known about the suspect is his or her race? Is it enough to stop an individual simply because his or her race matches that of a wanted suspect?

The answer is no. Many times race does play a role in the determination of reasonable suspicion, since witnesses and victims will often describe suspects by their skin color. (see, generally, Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale LJ 214). A suspect’s race is “a characteristic which may properly be used as one element of identification”. Franklin v State, 374 So 2d 1151, 1154 (Fla). Indeed, race is “an identifying factor which . . .assists the police in narrowing the scope of their identification procedure.” United States v Collins, 532 F2d 79.

A person’s race, however, cannot serve as the sole basis for reasonable suspicion. The New York Court of Appeals has held that ethnic identity alone is an insufficient basis upon which to premise reasonable suspicion. People v George T., 39 N.Y.2d 1028 (1976). Therefore, it is improper for the police to stop someone simply because they are the same race as the suspect even where an individual of one race is seen is a neighborhood inhabited primarily by members of another race. People v. George T. supra.

If you have been charged with any offense in New York and feel the reason the police stopped you was because of your race, evidence seized as a result of that stop may be suppressed. In other words, it may not be allowed to be used against you at trial. For more information, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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In New York, the police may not stop your vehicle solely to ask you questions regarding the whereabouts of an individual wanted in connection with a past crime. In People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749 (1995), the defendant was convicted of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree and Criminal Possession of Marijuana in the Fourth Degree. The weapon and marijuana were found in defendant’s car after the police stopped him looking for information regarding the whereabouts of defendant’s friend who was wanted in connection with an assault that took place approximately forty hours earlier. The defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion arguing that the police could not stop his vehicle for the sole purpose of requesting such information.
Noting that the right to request information does not include the right to unlawfully seize, the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant holding that the stop was unreasonable. The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment does not permit the stopping of potential witnesses. However, noting that the police were investigating past criminal conduct, the Court insinuated the stop might have been legal if the police were investigating recent or ongoing crimes. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted defendant’s motion to suppress physical evidence and dismissed the indictment.
For more information about this or any other New York criminal law issue, please contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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One of the first lines of defense in any New York criminal case involving evidence found during a car stop is whether the search of the car was constitutional. In New York, where a vehicle is stopped for a traffic infraction, it is improper for the police to ask for consent to search the vehicle. This rule has been strictly construed by New York courts with one Appellate Court going so far as to suppress a body found in the back of a vehicle stopped for a traffic infraction because the police had no basis to ask for consent to search.
In People v. Turriago, 219 A.D.2d 383 (1st Dept. 1996), the defendant’s vehicle was stopped for speeding by State Troopers on Rt. 17 in Orange County. The Troopers, concerned about illegal hunting, asked defendant for consent to search the vehicle which defendant gave. The police subsequently found the body of a murder victim in the rear of the vehicle. In seeking to suppress the body and other evidence (statements and evidence found during a search of defendant’s apartment), the defendant argued that whether he gave consent was irrelevant because the Troopers had no right to seek his consent to search in the first instance.
The First Department agreed holding that while the Troopers had a valid reason to stop the vehicle, nothing transpired during the stop to justify a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot which was necessary to trigger the Trooper’s common law right to inquire thus justifying a request for consent to search. The First Department therefore, reversed the lower court and held that the body, statements and evidence found as a result of subsequent searches of apartments where defendant stayed must be suppressed.
The People appealed the case to the New York Court of Appeals which did not disturb the First Department’s holding that the Troopers had no right to ask for consent to search but did find that the body would have been inevitably discovered as part of an inventory search of the vehicle. So ultimately the evidence was allowed but under the inevitable discovery doctrine because the vehicle would have been impounded since the defendant’s license was suspended. The request to search however was improper. This distinction, I’m sure, was of no consequence to the defendant in this case.
For more information about this and any other New York criminal law issue, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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One of the first lines of defense in any New York criminal case involving evidence found during a car stop is whether the search of the car was constitutional. In New York, where a vehicle is stopped for a traffic infraction, it is improper for the police to ask for consent to search the vehicle. This rule has been strictly construed by New York courts with one Appellate Court going so far as to suppress a body found in the back of a vehicle stopped for a traffic infraction because the police had no basis to ask for consent to search.
In People v. Turriago, 219 A.D.2d 383 (1st Dept. 1996), the defendant’s vehicle was stopped for speeding by State Troopers on Rt. 17 in Orange County. The Troopers, concerned about illegal hunting, asked defendant for consent to search the vehicle which defendant gave. The police subsequently found the body of a murder victim in the rear of the vehicle. In seeking to suppress the body and other evidence (statements and evidence found during a search of defendant’s apartment), the defendant argued that whether he gave consent was irrelevant because the Troopers had no right to seek his consent to search in the first instance.
The First Department agreed holding that while the Troopers had a valid reason to stop the vehicle, nothing transpired during the stop to justify a suspicion that criminal activity was afoot which was necessary to trigger the Trooper’s common law right to inquire thus justifying a request for consent to search. The First Department therefore, reversed the lower court and held that the body, statements and evidence found as a result of subsequent searches of apartments where defendant stayed must be suppressed.
The People appealed the case to the New York Court of Appeals which did not disturb the First Department’s holding that the Troopers had no right to ask for consent to search but did find that the body would have been inevitably discovered as part of an inventory search of the vehicle. So ultimately the evidence was allowed but under the inevitable discovery doctrine because the vehicle would have been impounded since the defendant’s license was suspended. The request to search however was improper. This distinction, I’m sure, was of no consequence to the defendant in this case.
For more information about this and any other New York criminal law issue, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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An issue sometimes arises in New York when the police stop a vehicle for a traffic violation or other legitimate reason but continue to detain the driver after the ticket has been issued or other legitimate police concerns have been addressed. Where a driver is stopped for a traffic infraction and issued a ticket, it is improper for the officer to then ask for permission to search the car. At that point, the request to search exceeds the scope of the reasonable detention of the motorist for the traffic infraction. People v. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 626 N.Y.S.2d 986, 650 N.E.2d 833 (1995).
Furthermore, where a roving border patrol officer stops a vehicle he or she suspects contains illegal aliens, it is improper to ask to search the trunk once that officer determines that the vehicle does not contain illegal aliens. To do so would exceed the scope of the stop. People v. LaRose, 5 Misc.3d 621 (St. Lawrence Co.Ct. 2004). In LaRose, the County Court held that a roving border patrol agent could make an investigatory stop of a vehicle with Texas plates observed near the Canadian border making “improbable” turns (whatever that means).
Generally, investigatory stops are illegal if they are not based upon reasonable cause to believe that a traffic infraction has occurred. People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413 (1975). In fact, in Ingle, the Court held that it was improper for the officer to stop the car because of its unusual appearance. Therefore, it would appear that the even initial stop in LaRose was illegal because the officer admitted it was not based upon reasonable cause to believe a traffic infraction had been committed but instead was based upon the officer’s belief that it was unusual to see a car with Texas plates near the Canadian border.
However, the LaRose decision relied upon a United States Supreme Court decision which held that where an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain illegal aliens, the government interest at stake may justify the minimal intrusion of a brief investigatory stop. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).
For more information about this, and other criminal defense issues, please contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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One of the first questions I ask a defendant charged with Driving While Intoxicated, Driving While Ability Impaired or Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs or any type of possession crime such as drugs or guns, is what brought about his or her initial contact with the police. If their vehicle was stopped by the police, my next area of inquiry is “was the stop legal”? Today, with a cell phone in virtually every car, we are seeing more and more cases where motorists are reporting erratic driving to the police right from the road. The question therefore is: can the police stop a vehicle based solely on a phone tip that the vehicle was driving erratically? The answer is no.
In People v. Royko, 201 A.D.2d 863 (4th Dept. 1994), the police received a call reporting a car driving erratically. About an hour later, officers saw the vehicle parked outside a restaurant and later observed the vehicle driving down the street. The officers then stopped the vehicle, at which time they detected to odor of an alcoholic beverage and observed the driver to have bloodshot, watery eyes. The driver admitted to having two beers and was unable to perform standardized field sobriety tests. The driver was subsequently arrested for Driving While Intoxicated.
At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that his sole purpose for stopping defendant’s vehicle was the radio dispatch he had heard regarding the erratic driving an hour earlier. The officer made no independent observations. The Fourth Department held that the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop a vehicle based upon a report that it was driving erratically an hour earlier. The officers made no independent observations of erratic driving and further they had no way of knowing if it was the same driver. The defendant’s suppression motion was therefore, granted.
If you have been charged with any offense anywhere in the New York City, Westchester, or surrounding areas, call Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for a complimentary telephone consultation or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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New York criminal defense attorneys know that a Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT) can be your best friend. Its great for the attorney who doesn't have to go to Court in the middle of the night to do an arraignment, its great for the client who doesn't have to be locked up for 24 hours or more while they are waiting to see a judge and its even good for the police who can process the arrest at their leisure and who do not have to worry about racking up police overtime while processing the arrest.

Briefly, a DAT in New York is simply a notification to a person arrested that they must appear in Court on a future date in connection with certain specific charges. The police officer or prosecutor will then file those charges in Court. It permits a police officer to release the person prior to the charges being filed in Court and prior to seeing a judge.

DATs are governed by New York CPL Article 150 which limits when police officers may issue Desk Appearance Tickets. In sum, they may only be issued for Class A and B misdemeanors, Class E felonies and violations. There are also some specific exceptions such as certain Escape, Absconding or Bail Jumping charges. People charged with those crimes or more serious felonies will not be eligible for Desk Appearance Tickets.

It should be emphasized that Desk Appearance Tickets are issued at the discretion of the police. Ultimately, it is the police who will decide whether or not to issue a person a DAT. Ironically, in New York City, where a person can spend more than 24 hours waiting to see a judge and winding their way through the Central Booking Process, fewer cases are DAT'd than in other places where the arraignment process can be much shorter. In New York City, charges such at DWI, DWAI, Aggravated Unlicensed Operation of a Motor Vehicle are almost never DAT'd whereas outside of New York City they usually are DAT'd.

The statute permits police officers to accept bail as a condition of getting a Desk Appearance Ticket but in New York City the police will not accept bail. Bail amounts can range as a a maximum of $750 for an "E" felony down to a maximum of $100 for a violation.

DATs are a useful tool and for a person who is going to be arrested, they can be a huge benefit. If you are going to turn yourself in to the police an experienced attorney should explore whether or not you are eligible for and whether you will receive a desk appearance ticket. In many cases everyone wins when the accused is issued a DAT.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , Legal Terms Defined

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If you a charged with an offense such as Driving While Intoxicated, weapons offense (guns, etc) or controlled substance offense (cocaine, crack, marijuana etc), one of the first areas a criminal defense attorney will look at is why the police stopped you in the first instance. In other words, what brought about that initial contact between you and the police? If the stop was illegal, all evidence, including observations, obtained as a result of that illegal stop should be suppressed.
In New York, an officer may approach an individual sitting in a parked car and request information provided they have an articulable reason not necessarily related to criminal activity. For example, in a case discussed in a prior blog, despite the fact that it is legal to do so, officers may approach an individual sitting in the driver’s seat of a car parked in front of a fire hydrant and request the that person’s license and pedigree information. People v. Thomas, 19 A.D.3d 32, (1st 2005). In New York, this is referred to as a “Request for Information”.
Obviously an officer cannot request information from a person in a moving car; that car must be stopped first. In order to legally stop a vehicle, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a person in that vehicle was involved in a felony or a misdemeanor or that the vehicle committed a traffic infraction. In New York, this is referred to a “Stop”. Therefore, what if that parked car in Thomas had started to pull away just as the officer had pulled up? The officer would have had to actually stop that car.
In People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725 (1992), the police approached a car parked on desolate street in a known drug area. Just as the police pulled up on the parked car, it slowly pulled away at which time the officers activated their emergency lights and stopped the vehicle. The officers subsequently learned that the vehicle was stolen and upon a search of the driver after his arrest, drugs were found. The Court of Appeals held that the stop was illegal because, once the vehicle pulled away, the officers needed reasonable suspicion that a crime had been or was about to be committed. The evidence, ruled the Court, should have been suppressed.
For more information, or if you have been arrested in New York, call Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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In a case involving a New York City drug case, the Appellate Division held that a police officer may request the driver’s license and pedigree of an individual sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parked in front of a fire hydrant. People v. Thomas, 19 A.D.3d 32, 792 N.Y.S.2d 472 (1st 2005).
In Thomas, the police approached a defendant who was sitting in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parked in front of a fire hydrant and asked him for his license and pedigree information. A computer check indicated that defendant’s license was suspended and he was then arrested. Upon searching his pockets, the police found “crack” cocaine. Defendant was subsequently charged with Aggravated Unlicensed Operation in the Third Degree (VTL § 511(1)(a)) and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Fifth Degree (Penal Law § 220.06).
In granting the defendant’s motion and suppressing the drug evidence, the Honorable William A. Wetzel of the New York County Supreme Court found, and I believe correctly, that by stopping his police van so as to block in defendant’s vehicle, the officer had in fact “stopped” defendant. Because J. Wetzel found the police conduct constituted a “stop”, the police needed probable cause. Noting that VTL § 1202(3)(b) permits parking in front of a fire hydrant provided a licensed driver is in the driver’s seat, J. Wetzel held that the officer did not have probable cause to suspect a traffic infraction had occurred (this is obvious because the officer would have had no way of knowing the driver’s license status).
In reversing, the First Department held that the blocking of the vehicle was not a “stop” and therefore the officer did not need probable cause/reasonable suspicion but instead only needed an objective, credible reason not necessarily indicative of criminality to make was is referred to as a Level I “Request for Information”. Of key importance was the Court’s finding that the “blocking in” of an already parked vehicle is not a seizure. The Court agreed that had the vehicle been moving, however, the officer would have needed probable cause to stop it.
If you have been charged with any offense in New York from a simple traffic infraction to a misdemeanor or serious felony, one of the first lines of defense is challenging the legality of the police officer’s initial stop (seizure) of you or your motor vehicle. For more information call Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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In any New York criminal case where the prosecution has obtained evidence such as guns or narcotics, that they intend to introduce at trial, one of the first areas a criminal defense attorney will explore is why the police stopped/seized and searched the defendant, his home, his vehicle etc. If the stop/seizure was illegal, all evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be suppressed.
In People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 (1978), the police observed a vehicle driving slowly at night in a well traveled and well lit entertainment and shopping area. Several burglaries had recently taken place in the area. The police observed the occupants glance towards a bar as the vehicle actually came to a stop and paused for two seconds. The vehicle then continued to a stop sign where the police claimed the occupants glanced towards a second bar. At that point, the police stopped the vehicle. The driver exited the vehicle and told the police he did not have a license nor could he produce a registration card. The passengers were then ordered out of the vehicle and during a pat-down search, bullets were found in the pocket of one of the passengers. A gun was subsequently found in the vehicle.
The defendant’s motion to suppress the weapon and the bullets was denied and defendant was convicted of Unlawful Possession of Weapons by Persons Under Sixteen in violation of Penal Law 265.05. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of defendant’s suppression motion however, the Court of Appeals reversed holding that there was no objective evidence of criminal activity as of the time of the stop. The defendant’s “innocuous” acts of pausing in front of a bar and stopping at a stop sign did not reasonably denote criminal activity. The gun and bullets were therefore suppressed, the judgment vacated and the indictment dismissed.
For more information about this, or any other New York State or Federal criminal matter, please contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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A police officer may not stop your vehicle based upon hunches or gut feelings. A vehicle may only be stopped if the officer has reasonable suspicion of a violation of the law or in accordance with nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, uniform procedures, such as at roadblocks, checkpoints and weighing stations.
In People v. Reynolds, 185 Misc.2d 674, 713 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 2000), the Monroe County Court held that an officer observing a known male prostitute entering a vehicle was insufficient to justify the stop of that vehicle. In fact, the Court suppressed a computer check of the vehicle’s registration. In Reynolds, the officer observed a known male prostitute enter a parked pick-up truck which then pulled away. The officer followed the pick-up truck and ran a computer check on the license plate number which revealed an expired registration. The officer then stopped the vehicle, separated the driver and passenger at which time he observed the driver the exhibit signs of intoxication. The driver was subsequently charged with Driving While Intoxicated. No prostitution related charges were ever filed.

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Westchester DWI defense firm, Tilem & Campbell won another DWI trial last week when Mount Pleasant Judge Nicholas Masselli issued a decision finding that the client who was pulled over on the side of the highway was not "operating" the vehicle and therefore could not be convicted of Driving While Intoxicated. Judge Masselli also dismissed another charge of Parking on the Pavement and issued an order sealing the record.

The case arose after the client was found sleeping behind the wheel of a running vehicle that was sitting on the side of the road by a New York State Trooper. The Trooper testified that he smelled the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on the driver's breath and that the driver failed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test that was performed on the side of the road. The Trooper testified that the driver failed other field sobriety tests and refused a breath test that he was offered at the police station.

Managing partner John Campbell tried the case on behalf of the firm and this victory makes three DWI wins in a row for Mr. Campbell. The defense focused on the troopers errors in administering and scoring the field sobriety tests and the lack of the intent to operate the vehicle.

Tilem & Campbell is a White Plains based criminal defense firm that has an extensive DWI and traffic practice. For more information contact Tilem & Campbell.

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As discussed in the previous blog New York police are limited in the way they interact with civilians that they encounter on the street. If the police overstep their authority an experienced criminal defense attorney can use the police conduct to get evidence in a case suppressed.

Below are the four levels of intrusion as set forth by the New York Court of Appeals in Debour. Keep in mind that each case is an individual and may be affected by the minute details of the case.

Level 1 “Request for Information”: The police may approach a civilian when they have some articulable, objective credible reason for doing so even if that reason is not necessarily indicative of criminality. This is not equivalent to a stop. These encounters should be brief and not be harassing or intimidating. For example, approaching possible witnesses to a crime and checking to see if everyone involved in an accident is alright.
Level 2: “Common-Law Right to Inquire”: This is a greater level of intrusion that must be based upon a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Here, the officer’s questioning might lead a person to believe they are suspected of criminality.
Level 3: “Forcible Stop and Frisk”: The police may stop and frisk an individual when they have a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime (misdemeanor or felony). In such a situation, the police may frisk the individual if the officer reasonably suspects he is in danger because the individual is armed.
Level 4: “Arrest”: Of course, the most intrusive Level of a police encounter is an arrest. The police may arrest an individual when they have probable cause to believe that individual has committed a crime, whether in the officer’s presence or not, or an offense in his presence (See CPL 140.10).

If you have been charged with a crime, one the first areas your attorney should investigate is the legality of law enforcement’s stop and/or seizure of you or your vehicle. For more information, contact Tilem & Campbell toll free 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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In New York, a large body of law has developed around police interaction with civilians that they encounter on the street. When may a police officer approach you for information, question you about criminal activity, detain you and finally, arrest you? Experienced New York criminal defense lawyers must be well versed in this area of law. If the police overstep their authority and thereby obtain evidence, skilled criminal attorneys can challenge that evidence in Court at a suppression hearing and have the evidence suppressed. Suppression of evidence can lead to the dismissal or reduction of charges, favorable jury verdicts and favorable plea bargains. Here at Tilem & Campbell, we have used suppression to obtain dismissals of some tough cases.

Suppression, can be especially valuable in fighting drug cases or gun cases since without the contraband as evidence, the case is almost always dismissed. But suppression can also be useful to prevent the admission at trial of statements, identifications, physical evidence of criminal activity or electronic surveillance.

No two cases are alike and each case and each set of facts must be analyzed by analogizing from previously decided cases with similar facts. In a well written and thorough decision, the New York Court of Appeals developed four “Levels” of police intrusions with each Level being based upon the intensity of the intrusion upon the civilian’s life. See People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976). These four level have become the guiding principle for police encounters with civilians on the streets of New York. So much so that New York Courts have cited to Debour well over 1600 times in judicial opinions that have been published in New York. That means that in the more than 33years since Debour was decided, New York Courts cited to it on average about 50 times per year in published opinions.

In the next blog, I will lay out the four levels of intrusion that the Court of Appeals described in Debour.

Remember, to consult with experienced criminal lawyers about the specific facts of a case.

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Tilem & Campbell senior partner, Peter Tilem was quoted by the Associated Press over the weekend in an article about Brooke Astor's son, Anthony Marshall. Marshall was convicted on October 8, 2009 of several counts including Grand Larceny in the First Degree for looting his mother's estate. Grand Larceny in the First Degree carries a mandatory minimum of one to three years in state prison and last Friday, Marshall's attorneys filed a Clayton motion seeking to dismiss the Grand Larceny in the First Degree charge so that Mr. Marshall could avoid a prison sentence.

Mr. Tilem, who is familiar with the Clayton Motion also called a Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice was interviewed for the article and was quoted. As discussed in our previous blog, on the subject, a Judge must consider 10 factors which are listed in the New York Criminal Procedure Law when considering a Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice. Mr. Tilem raised a concern about one the factors in the Astor case. The statute asks a judge to examine the impact that dismissal would have on the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system. Mr. Tilem raised the concern that because of the wealth and notoriety of Mr. Marshall a dismissal, especially at this post trial stage of the case, would make it appear that Mr. Marshall was treated differently than others with less money or fame.

For more information about a New York Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice contact Tilem & Campbell.

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New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell scored another major victory in a DWI case today when Supreme Court Justice William Wetzel found the defendant not guilty of felony DWI after trial. The defendant was found not guilty of the felony but was found guilty of unlawful possession of marihuana, a non-criminal offense that carries a maximum penalty of a $100 fine. The defendant was facing up to four years in prison on the felony charge.

The charge arose based upon a one car accident in Yonkers. The defendant refused to take a chemical test but his driving privileges were quickly restored after Tilem & Campbell, partner Peter Tilem won at the DMV refusal hearing.

The defendant had been charged with one count of Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs or Alcohol and Drugs under Vehicle & Traffic Law section 1192 (4-a), a relatively new section of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.

Managing Partner John Campbell conducted the trial. Mr. Campbell focused the defense on the failure of the police to properly administer the field sobriety tests as well as the lack of evidence of the defendant's operation of the vehicle.

Tilem & Campbell is a White Plains, New York based criminal defense firm that handles a wide array of criminal cases including DWI, Assault, Drugs, Guns and homicides. For more information contact Tilem & Campbell.

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Our July 15, 2009 blog on the Auxiliary Police Officer arrested for possession of Mace has sparked tremendous interest with many calling our firm or writing in about the issue and many wanting to find out how to obtain a New York City permit for mace. Some have contacted us about there failed efforts to obtain information about the permit from the New York City Police Department. The regulations are summarized in our May 24, 2009 blog. So I leave it to you; if any one knows how to obtain a New York City permit for mace, please comment to this blog, or contact Tilem & Campbell with the information. I will publish the results in a future blog.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , IN THE NEWS , WEAPONS OFFENSES

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According to today's newspapers the NYPD Cop accused of killing a woman while driving in an intoxicated condition, had a blood alcohol content of 0.0 indicating that no alcohol was present in the officers blood seven hours after the incident. The blood was not drawn for seven hours after the accident. As discussed in my previous blog, New York drivers arrested for DWI have the right to refuse to take a chemical test. The result of the blood test substantially weakens the case against the officer who is accused of killing the woman while driving drunk.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL APPEALS , CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , IN THE NEWS

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Early Sunday morning, New York City Police Officer Andrew Kelly, while allegedly driving in an intoxicated condition, struck and killed 32 year old Vionique Valnord in Old Mill Basin, Brooklyn. The accident happened at approximately 12:41 a.m., however, Kelly’s blood was not drawn for more than seven hours. How can this happen? Simple, Officer Kelly exercised his statutory right to refuse to submit to a chemical test.

Let’s start with a brief overview of New York’s “deemed consent” law. To summarize the law; every New York driver is deemed to have given consent to the testing of their breath, blood, urine or saliva to determine the alcoholic and/or drug content of their blood provided the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the driver is impaired or intoxicated and the test is administered within two hours of arrest. See NY VTL § 1194(2)(a)(1), (2) see also 10 NYCRR 59.2 (All samples shall be collected within two hours of the time of arrest).

However, a driver has a qualified statutory right to refuse to submit to a chemical test. The right to refuse is qualified in several ways. Yes, one may refuse to take the test and, absent a court order, no test will be given. However, although one may refuse the test, if properly warned of the consequences, and if they persistently refuse, they may incur a “civil” penalty which includes a fine and the revocation of their driver’s license if the refusal is proven at a DMV refusal hearing. See NY VTL § 1194(2)(b). Further, if the driver, after being sufficiently warned about the consequences associated with refusing, nevertheless, persistently refuses, the refusal can be used by the prosecution at trial. See NY VTL § 1194(2)(f).

Finally, if a driver refuses to submit to a chemical test, that driver can be subjected to a compulsory, court ordered, chemical test. See NY VTL§ 1194(3). Such court ordered compulsory tests are almost always of the blood.

Notably, refusing to submit to a chemical test is not a criminal offense nor is it even a non-criminal traffic infraction. This is distinguished from refusing a breat screening test which is a traffic infraction. Refusals are purely “civil” offenses handled by the Department of Motor Vehicles. See People v. Thomas, 45 N.Y. 2d 100 (1978).

In this case, Officer Kelly exercised his qualified right to refuse to submit to a chemical test. As a result, his refusal can be used against him at trial. But more importantly, in this case, his qualified right to refuse was overcome by the issuance of a court order compelling Officer Kelly to submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol or drug content of his blood. See VTL § 1194(3)(b).

For more information about Driving While Intoxicated, chemical testing, blood testing or any other question you might have, please contact Tilem & Campbell, PC toll free at 1-888-DWI-COUNSEL or visit us on the web at www.888DwiCounsel.com.

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As previously discussed, officers are trained in three different Phases of Driving While Intoxicated detection. Phase 1 involves the officer’s observations of the vehicle in motion, Phase 2 involves the officer’s personal contact with the driver and Phase 3, which I will discuss here, involves Pre-Arrest Screening.

During Phase 3, the officer will determine whether the driver has consumed alcohol and whether such consumption has impaired the driver to the extent that he should be arrested. The main focus during Phase 3 is on the driver’s performance on the Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs). During this Phase the officer might also ask the driver to blow into a Portable Breath Test (PBT) to determine the presence of alcohol but the PBT should only be used to support the SFST; it should not be used in place of SFSTs. In New York, the results of a PBT are not admissible at trial (but they are admissible at pre-trial hearings).

The SFSTs not only determine impairment but also whether the driver can perform divided attention tasks. The only three SFSTs validated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are the (1) Walk-and-Turn; (2) One-Leg-Stand; and (3) Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus. These will all be discussed separately in future blogs.

After the driver has performed the SFSTs, the officer will make a determination with regard to intoxication based upon the totality of the evidence developed during all three Phases of DWI detection.

If you have been arrested for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) in New York, feel free to contact us at toll-free at 1-888-DWI-COUNSEL or visit us on the web at www.888DWICOUNSEL.com. Those charged with DWI need attorneys who know not the law, but the science and procedures relevant to DWI. Managing partner, John Campbell, is certified in Driving Under the Influence Detection by Blackwater Worldwide having successfully completed the same 8 hour course many members of law enforcement have taken.

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Those charged with a New York DWI/DUI or related offenses, should be pleased to hear that New York criminal defense lawyer, John Campbell, the managing partner at Tilem & Campbell recently completed two courses relevant to Driving Under the Influence, Driving While Intoxicated and Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs. These courses are the same courses that some members of law enforcement take themselves. The knowledge gained in these classes will help Mr. Campbell better cross-examine police officers, toxicologists and others at trial.

With regard to DWI and/or DUI, Mr. Campbell has completed and has been certified by Blackwater Worldwide in Driving Under the Influence Detection. This 8 hour course concentrates on, among other things, the three “validated” Standardized Field Sobriety Tests which are the (1) Walk-and-Turn; (2) One Leg Stand; and (3) the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus. The course also focuses on Preliminary Breath Screening (which is the handheld device officers sometimes ask a motorist to blow into on the side of the road), and “Red Flags” an officer looks for when observing moving vehicles that indicate a possible intoxicated driver. (weaving, swerving, no headlights at night, wide turns, etc)

Further, Mr. Campbell recently completed a course in, and has been certified by, NIK Public Safety in Narcotic Field Testing. This 2 hour course focused on the field testing of substances to identify illegal drugs such as cocaine and marijuana. Field testing of this type is usually done by law enforcement officers in the field to test substances found during searches, car stops, etc. Mr. Campbell was trained in how to use field testing kits and identify various drugs based upon the test results, how to properly use NIK’s Polytesting system which is utilized when the officer has no idea what the substance is (as opposed to most situations where an officer has an idea of what the substance is), and how to utilize NIK’s reference materials relating to narcotic field testing.

Mr. Campbell was required to pass a competency exam at the end of both courses before receiving his certifications. If you have been charged with any Driving While Intoxicated or related offenses such as Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs, you need attorneys who know not just the law, but also the science and procedures associated with DWI. In addition to the above-discussed courses, in a continuing effort to provide clients with the best possible DWI defense, the lawyers at Tilem & Campbell routinely attend seminars and classes relating to all aspects of DWI defense. For further information feel free to call us toll free at 1-888-DWI-COUNSEL.

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Mortgage Fraud has taken center stage in Westchester County Courts and around New York State. This national problem has taken on extra prominence in New York where property values are high. As a criminal defense law firm that has handled many mortgage fraud cases including headline making cases we are seeing an increased number of cases and increased enforcement by law enforcement authorities.

Indeed, in connection with a high profile mortgage fraud case that this firm is involved with, the Westchester County District Attorney's Office announced the formation of a Mortgage Fraud Unit to investigate and prosecute mortgage fraud in Westchester County. The Westchester County case resulted in the arrest of 8 people, 6 of whom were mortgage professionals and two attorneys.

Mortgage Fraud can take on many different flavors. The Westchester case is alleged to involve "Equity Stripping" which is a way of stealing the equity from a person facing foreclosure. Other cases can involve appraisal fraud, falsely preparing mortgage applications, using straw buyers with good credit to purchase properties, "flipping" properties from one buyer to another, identity theft or a combination of these practices.

The bottom line is that what was tolerated as normal practice several years ago by the banks is now considered fraud once the bank loses money because of a foreclosure or bankruptcy. While banks in the past encouraged "fraud" by loans that promised "no documentation", "light documentation" or "stated income", today they complain that the information they received from borrowers was not accurate.

In addition, victims of mortgage fraud and/or identity theft can have a difficult time navigating through the maze of legal issues related to resolving credit issues and resolving title issues.

These cases can become very complex. Whether you are the victim of mortgage fraud or are suspected of or accused of mortgage fraud, contact us, to speak to an experienced criminal attorney that has specific experience handling New York mortgage fraud cases or Federal mortgage fraud cases.

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Senior partner, Peter H. Tilem, appeared on the five o'clock news earlier this evening commenting on the Taconic Parkway fatal collision that left the driver and seven others dead. The piece appeared on channel 7's Eyewitness news shortly after 5 pm. Mr. Tilem, who is a former senior prosecutor in the New York County District Attorney's Office, was asked about the possibility of charges being brought against the husband of the woman who was allegedly intoxicated and indicated that it would not be sufficient if the husband was merely are of a history of substance abuse.

The full video is available and can be viewed at Tilem & Campbell's media page along with other videos of partners Peter Tilem and John Campbell in the news.

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As a former Manhattan Prosecutor I have presented hundreds of cases to grand juries in New York. As a partner at a prominent criminal defense firm I have sat with clients inside the grand jury as they were questioned by prosecutors. With recent news reports about the a New York County Grand Jury considering charges against New York Giants stars Plaxico Burress and Antonio Pierce, it is important to understand exactly what a grand jury is and how it operates.

No person may be tried on a felony charge in New York unless a grand jury has considered evidence and voted an indictment or unless the person has waived indictment. The grand jury itself is made up of between 16 and 23 people. They are charged with the duty of hearing and examining evidence involving offenses or misconduct whether or not the misconduct is criminal. In order for a grand jury to vote an indictment 12 of the grand jurors must vote to indict.

The burden to vote for an indictment is low. A grand juror need only find that there is reasonable cause to believe that a person committed an offense. In laymans terms that means that a grand jury need only find sufficient evidence to accuse a person of having committed a felony. This is a very different standard than the proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" needed to convict someone of a crime.

The burden to obtain an indictment is so low that the former Chief Judge of New York State, Sol Wachtler, humorously noted that a prosecutor could persuade a grand jury to "indict a ham sandwich." It is not only the low burden that makes it so easy to indict, it is an area of the Court that is almost exclusively controlled by the prosecutor. Although, in theory the grand jury is supervised by the Court, no Judge sits in the grand jury room while they are hearing evidence or deciding cases. It is the prosecutor that presents all of the evidence and instructs the grand jury on the law. It is the prosecutor who decides what evidence the grand jury will see and which witnesses they will hear.

Although the prosecutor truly controls the goings on in a grand jury, a target of a grand jury investigation or presentation has certain rights which will be discussed in a future blog. In the meantime, if you are charged with a felony or believe that a grand jury may be considering charges against you, contact one of the lawyers at the New York criminal defense firm, Tilem & Campbell.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , GUN CRIMES , IN THE NEWS , NARCOTICS

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If you are charged with DWI, you need criminal defense lawyers that not only know the law, but also know the science and procedures relevant to a Driving While Intoxicated cases. Continuing with my series of blogs pertaining to blood draws in New York Driving While Intoxicated cases, in this blog I will briefly review cases which make clear that when the blood is drawn by specifically listed technicians, phlebotomists and the like, such a blood draw must be under the “supervision and at the direction of a physician”.

In People v. Olmstead, 233 A.D.2d 837, 649 N.Y.S.2d 624 (4th Dept. 1996), blood test results were suppressed where a medical laboratory technician did the draw at the direction of a nurse instead of a physician. Other cases firmly establish that only a physician can direct and supervise those technicians and the like listed in VTL 1194(4)(a)(1)(ii) to perform a blood draw for DWI purposes. The Fourth Department had previously reached the same conclusion in People v. Ebner, 195 A.D.2d 1006, 600 N.Y.S.2d 569 (4th Dept. 1993) where they suppressed the results of a blood test because a registered nurse, instead of a physician, authorized a medical laboratory technician to perform the blood draw.

In People v. Reynolds, 193 Misc.2d 697, 749 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 2002), the Essex County Court suppressed blood test results for non-compliance with the physician supervision requirement holding “[t]he People did not meet their burden of showing that a physician either directed or supervised the taking of a blood sample from Defendant by an AEMT. The blood test results should, therefore, be suppressed.”

Similarly, in People v. Griesbeck, 17 A.D.3d 717, 793 N.Y.S.2d 227 (3rd Dept. 2005), the Third Department upheld the trial court’s reversal of a jury’s guilty verdict because the People “failed to introduce evidence that the medical technologist who drew defendant’s blood was authorized to do so by a physician.”

The Appellate Term for Second Department has reached the same conclusion. In People v. Gertz, 189 Misc.2d 315, 731 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Term 2nd Dept. 2001), the Appellate Term held that the People did not establish that a physician directed a medical technologist to draw the defendant’s blood in the emergency room. In rejecting the People’s position, the Appellate Term observed that the technologist merely testified that he received a call to draw blood and that a doctor was on duty in the emergency room.

The above summarized cases establish that the courts strictly construe the supervision and direction of a physician requirement when the blood is drawn by one other than a physician, registered nurse or physician’s assistant.

For more information about Driving While Intoxicated laws in New York, call Westchester Criminal Defense Firm, Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666.

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Last Friday, Tilem & Campbell managing partner, John Campbell scored a major victory on a DWI case in the Town of Ramapo when a jury acquitted the client of all charges in connection with a DWI that police alleged was committed during the Jewish holiday of Purim. The client was charged with DWI and DWAI but was found not guilty on all charges. Although police alleged that the keys were in the ignition of the car and that the engine was running, the client was sleeping in the car and the jury found that the client did not "operate" the vehicle as required for a DWI conviction.

On Monday, the next business day, Tilem & Campbell was back in Ramapo Town Court this time representing a client charged with committing a second DWI just one month after pleading guilty to the reduced charge of Driving While Ability Impaired in connection with the client's first DWI. The client was again offered a plea to the reduced charge of Driving While Ability Impaired (DWAI) and entered a plea to the DWAI with a minimum fine. Other traffic infractions pending against the client were dismissed. This second case was handled by Tilem & Campbell senior partner Peter Tilem.

If you or a loved one has been arrested or charged with a DWI, DWAI or any criminal case in New York contact one of the experienced criminal defense attorneys at the Westchester criminal defense firm of Tilem & Campbell.

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As I have previously explained, in a New York Driving While Intoxicated case where a blood test is directed by a police officer, only a physician, a registered nurse or a physician’s assistant my draw the blood unsupervised. [See NY VTL 1194(4)(a)(1)(i)]. Other specifically listed technicians and the like may also perform the blood draw but only under the supervision and direction of a physician. [See NY VTL 1194(4)(a)(1)(ii)].

But what if a registered nurse instead of a physician directs and supervises those specifically listed technicians to do the blood draw? The statute is very clear – only a physician may direct and supervise those listed technicians and the like. In People v. Olmstead, 233 A.D.2d 837, 649 N.Y.S.2d 624 (4th Dept. 1996), the blood draw was done by a medical laboratory technician at the direction of a registered nurse instead of a physician. The Fourth Department suppressed the blood test result observing that “[t]he critical element, deemed essential by the Legislature when it amended the statute in 1969 . . .is that a physician authorize the taking of the sample.”

Amazingly, the trial court in Olmstead had originally declined to suppress the blood test result holding that there was substantial compliance with the statute because the nurse, who could have drawn the blood without the physician's direction, was present and watched the blood being drawn. This substantial compliance exception created by the trial court in Olmstead was rejected by the Fourth Department.

Wouldn’t we all like to avoid the ramifications and sanctions of the law by simply telling a court that we substantially complied with such law? Wouldn’t it be nice to show up in traffic court and tell the judge to throw out your speeding ticket because you substantially complied with the law by exceeding the speed limit by only 10 mph? Or how about courts dismissing DWI cases where the driver blows .09 (just .01 over the limit) because such a small amount over the .08 limit is substantial compliance with the law.

Nevertheless, in the end the rule of law prevailed. If you have been charged with DWI or other Driving While Intoxicated offense, please call Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666. We cover the entire downstate area including Westchester, Rockland, Dutchess, Orange and Putnam counties as well as New York City (Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, Manhattan and Staten Island).

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As outlined in our May 24, 2009 blog New York City bans certain items that are legal other places in New York State and most other places in our Country. New York City Auxiliary Police Officer Alexander Gonzalez found that out the hard way when he was arrested, while on duty, in Manhattan for possession of mace. Mace is one of those items which is illegal in New York City but was made legal in New York State in 1996.

New York City Auxiliary Police Officers are neither police officers or peace officers under New York Law and therefore are not entitled to possess any weapons that civilians are not also entitled to possess. Senior partner, Peter H. Tilem was interviewed for an article written about the case today.

Tilem & Campbell handles a large number of gun and weapons charges in New York and has seen an increase in overly aggressive enforcement of minor weapons violations in New York City for items such as Mace and knives.

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As I previously discussed in Part 1 of this group of blogs pertaining to blood testing in NY DWI cases, one of the first areas of attack in a blood test DWI case is the person who drew the blood – the “drawer”. Briefly, at the request of a police officer only a physician, a registered professional nurse or a registered physician's assistant may draw a motorist’s blood for the purpose of determining its alcoholic and/or drug content. [See NY VTL 1194(4)(a)(1)(i)]. For purposes of my blogs, I refer to this as the “first group” of drawers.

And, at the request of a police officer and at the direction and supervision of a physician, a medical laboratory technician or medical technologist as classified by civil service; a phlebotomist; an advanced emergency medical technician as certified by the department of health; or a medical laboratory technician or medical technologist employed by a clinical laboratory approved under title five of article five of the public health law may draw a motorist’s blood for the purpose of determining its alcoholic and/or drug content. [See NY VTL 1194(4)(a)(1)(ii)]. I refer to this group as the “second group” of drawers.

When the blood draw is done by someone in the second group of drawers, what exactly does at the “direction and supervision of a physician” mean? Recall, those in the second group of drawers may only draw at the “direction and supervision of a physician”.
In People v. Moser, 70 N.Y.2d 476, 522 N.Y.S.2d 497, 517 N.E.2d 212 (1987), the Court of Appeals held that the personal presence and supervision by a physician of a technician who drew a blood sample was not required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. In so holding, the Court of Appeals only required the physicians authorization of the test.

It’s important to note that the physician in Moser testified that he directed and supervised all activities in the emergency room and had authorized the drawing of the blood. In People v. Ellis, 190 Misc.2d 98, 737 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y.Co.Ct. 2001), the Cattaraugus County Court distinguished Moser and held that the People had not established that a physician authorized the blood draw by an Advanced Emergency Medical Technician because the physician who allegedly authorized the test did not testify.

Therefore, while Moser held that the physician who directs and supervisors the blood draw need not actually watch the draw, that physician should testify at trial that he or she directed and supervised all activities in the emergency room (or similar locale) and had authorized the drawing of the blood. Defense counsel should object to the introduction of a blood test result where the draw was done at the direction and under the supervision of a physician if that physician does not testify at trial.

If you have been charged in New York with Driving While Intoxicated or impaired, contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for a free telephone consultation.

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Anyone who drives in New York is deemed to have consented to the chemical testing of his or her breath, blood, urine, or saliva, to determine the alcoholic and/or drug content of their blood. [See NY VTL 1193(2)(a)].

Typically a New York DWI suspect’s breath is tested and he or she is asked to take a Breathalyzer [or similar type] test. However, a police officer might direct that the driver’s blood be tested instead. In this regard, at the request of a police officer, a physician, a registered professional nurse or a registered physician's assistant may draw a motorist’s blood for the purpose of determining its alcoholic and/or drug content. [See NY VTL 1194(4)(a)(1)(i)]

Or, again, at the request of a police officer and under the supervision and at the direction of a physician, a medical laboratory technician or medical technologist as classified by civil service; a phlebotomist; an advanced emergency medical technician as certified by the department of health; or a medical laboratory technician or medical technologist employed by a clinical laboratory approved under title five of article five of the public health law may draw a motorist’s blood for the purpose of determining its alcoholic and/or drug content. [See NY VTL 1194(4)(a)(1)(ii)].

Therefore, when defending a DWI blood test case, the first thing you want to look at with regard to the blood test itself is whether the blood was drawn by an authorized person and/or under the direction and supervision of an authorized person. In other words, at the request of a police officer, only a physician, a registered professional nurse or a registered physician's assistant may draw a motorist’s blood for the purpose of determining its alcoholic and/or drug content without additional supervision or direction. We will refer to these people as the first group of authorized blood drawers.

The second group of blood drawers authorized to draw blood at the direction of a police officer for alcohol and/or drug testing must do so under the supervision and at the direction of a physician. To review, this second group of blood drawers consists of a medical laboratory technician or medical technologist as classified by civil service; a phlebotomist; an advanced emergency medical technician as certified by the department of health; or a medical laboratory technician or medical technologist employed by a clinical laboratory approved under title five of article five of the public health law.

Again, always check the qualifications or title of the blood drawer and make the People prove it. Was that really a Registered Nurse? Did a doctor direct that the Emergency Medical Technician draw blood and further, did the doctor supervise the draw? Also, was the Emergency Medical Technician an “Advanced” Emergency Medical Technician?

In coming blogs on this topic I will discuss this issue at length and review some sample cases where who did the blood draw was an issue as well as cases regarding whether the blood draw was properly supervised. Meanwhile, if you have been charged in New York with Driving While Intoxicated or any similar offense, call Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for more information.

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So you have been charged in New York with Driving While Ability Impaired by Drugs (VTL 1192(4) or VTL 1192(4-a) if it’s a combination of drugs and alcohol) – specifically, the drug you are alleged to have ingested is cocaine. What comes next? Many times the officer who makes the initial stop is not a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) so he might call for one to come to the scene. I will discuss DREs in a later blog. But typically, the arresting officer makes a few observations – dilated pupils, fidgety, talkative and of course, you admit to ingesting cocaine.

Once the arresting officer has your admission that you ingested cocaine, he will ask for a urine sample as opposed to a breath sample in a typical Driving While Intoxicated case. However, unlike a Breathalyzer test which supposedly can give a definitive Blood Alcohol Concentration based upon the alcohol present in your lower lung air, the urine test for cocaine can only tell us that there are cocaine metabolites in your urine thus establishing that the drug was used at some point in the past.

In fact, unlike with alcohol where the Legislature has set a .08 % blood alcohol content, as a cut off above which you are presumed intoxicated, with drugs, there is no such line of demarcation. Therefore, not only must the prosecution prove that you ingested a drug, they must also prove that such ingestion impaired your ability to drive with no regard for the amount of the drug in your system. In other words, there is no law in New York that says if one has a certain amount of nanograms per milliliter of urine, they are presumed impaired.

This proves very beneficial for the defendant because, the presence of cocaine metabolites in one’s urine only indicates that the drug was used in the past. No conclusion can be drawn about the degree on one’s impairment from the cocaine, if any, at the time of the urine testing. In fact, the amount of cocaine metabolite concentration in one’s urine tells us absolutely nothing about the amount of cocaine in one’s blood. There is no urine to blood ratio with regard to cocaine metabolites. Any toxicologists who says there is any such relationship is mistaken. Period.

In fact, famed toxicologist and pathologist Steven Karch has written that any attempt to infer impairment based upon urine concentrations of cocaine is “pure folly”. Without a blood test, it is impossible to for an expert to state with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the defendant was impaired by cocaine based upon a urine test.

If you have been charged with driving under the influence of drugs in New York, you need experienced attorneys who are not just experienced with criminal defense but who are also well versed in the science behind your charges. Attorneys who can cross examine the People’s expert with knowledge of the science involved that not many attorneys have. We just don’t ask the standard scientific questions that so many attorneys ask without really knowing what they are talking about. We know these tests, we know the science behind them and we put the prosecution to the test. For more information call toll free 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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The United States Supreme Court ruled yesterday, that criminal defendants have a constitutional right to cross-examine the scientists who prepare reports which are introduced at trial. The list of scientists would include chemists who test for the presence of controlled substances, fingerprint analysts and ballistics experts as well as many others. Although the ruling is an important one for the rights of those accused of crimes the ruling is likely to have little impact in New York where State laws already gives defense lawyers the right to cross-examine scientific witnesses.

The ruling is an extension of the 2004 Supreme Court decision Crawford v. Washington which limited the permissible uses of hearsay in criminal trials under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court seems to be expressing continued concerned over the use of hearsay (out of Court statements) in criminal trials.

If you or a loved one stand accused of a crime or have been convicted of a crime based upon hearsay, contact one of the experienced criminal defense lawyers at Tilem & Campbell.

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A Westchester County substitute school teacher was arrested last week and charged with Assault in the Third Degree (misdemeanor assault), Endangering the Welfare of a Child and Harassment for an incident involving a third grader in his gym class. According to police the teacher allegedly taunted and then assaulted the student after the student came at the teacher in a New Rochelle, New York public school. The case has received a great deal of media attention and the teacher, Daniel Sanabria, has now hired the White Plains criminal defense law firm, Tilem & Campbell, to defend him against the criminal charges.

The Westchester Journal News extensively quotes Tilem & Campbell, partner Peter Tilem about Mr.Sanabria's action in the case. According to the Journal News article, both Mr. Sanabria and criminal defense lawyer Peter Tilem are disputing the allegations. An article has also been featured in the New York Post and stories have been run on cable news Channel 12.

Mr. Sanabria is due in New Rochelle City Court next week where he is expected to defend the charges.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , IN THE NEWS

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A recent change in New York Vehicle & Traffic Law sec. 1806 will make it much harder to fight traffic tickets in New York State. Prior to New York April 7, 2009, New York law made it clear that in most cases a person should only have to appear one time to fight a routine traffic infraction such as speeding, unsafe lane change or failure to signal. The Vehicle & Traffic Law made it clear that upon receipt of a "not guilty" plea from a motorist the Court was required to schedule the matter for a trial. On the trial date the motorist could plea bargain or proceed to trial. Judges who violated this rule faced sanctions from the Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Commission found that judges that set cases down for a "pre-trial" conference rather than trial were putting an unnecessary burden on motorists who would then feel coerced to plead guilty rather than appear in Court multiple times for a rather routine matter.

Well, the New York State Legislature and Governor decided that coercion was the best way to resolve New York traffic tickets and have now amended the Vehicle & Traffic Law to require Courts to send motorists an "appearance" date rather than a "trial" date. This law seems to require motorists to appear a minimum of two times to fight their traffic tickets.

Since New York State Troopers are not permitted to plea bargain their tickets and many localities do not have prosecutors to handle those tickets, we have to wonder both what the purpose is of holding such a Court appearance? and what would happen at that appearance?
In any case as noted by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, this practice is likely to coerce many guilty please.

Motorists who receive tickets need to understand that experienced traffic lawyers can make these appearances without the motorist being present and can usually resolve these tickets with reduced or no points. Since experienced traffic lawyers generally handle several cases in a Court at one appearance they can offer very reasonable rates to fight tickets. Traffic lawyers can save the motorist from making multiple appearances, save the motorist money, save the motorist points, save the motorist the driver responsibility assessment and save the motorist from insurance increases.

If you wish to fight a ticket contact one of the experienced traffic court attorneys at DrSummons.com.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , TRAFFIC

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New York State traffic offenses such as speeding tickets, DWI's, Driving with a Suspended License and other driving infractions and crimes are getting more expensive. New York State already imposes surcharges totaling $85 for any traffic infraction over and above any fine. The total Surcharge is $80 in City Courts. However, the law imposed a cap, or maximum surcharge of $100 per incident which meant that if a motorist was convicted of multiple tickets the maximum surcharge could be $100. In a memo sent to all New York State City, Town and Village Courts, the Office of Court Administration has notified the Courts that effective for New York Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) offenses committed after July 6, 2009, the cap for mandatory surcharges was raised to $180.

The calculations are complex because over the years, as a way to increase revenue, New York has imposed an increasing number of fees on all types of convictions especially traffic violations. For example the $85 surcharge imposed on a routine traffic infraction such as speeding or passing a red light actually includes a $55 mandatory surcharge, a $5 crime victim assistance fee, a $5 town and village fee if the conviction is not in a City Court, and a $20 additional surcharge. The new $180 cap only applies to the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee. So if you are convicted of 10 routine traffic infractions, the surcharges will total $180 (the "cap"), plus $200 (the $20 additional surcharge 10 times) plus $50 (the town and village fee 10 times).

A conviction for a DWI can cost $400 just in surcharges. That's excluding the fine of between $500 and $1000. Even a conviction for Driving While Ability Impaired by Alcohol, a traffic infraction, carries surcharges of $260. Additionally, suspension lift fees (suspension termination fees) have gone up from $35 to $70 and the cap on these fees has doubled to $400.

The bottom line is that simply pleading guilty to and paying New York traffic tickets has gotten very expensive. Routine tickets can result in fines, surcharges, imposition of the driver responsibility assessment and insurance increases and/or surcharges. If you receive a traffic ticket contact an experienced New York traffic Court attorney or visit DrSummons.com.

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As experienced New York DWI attorneys, we deal with many different types of New York DWI cases. Many times in a New York Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) case, the motorist will have an allegedly high Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) but yet perform well on Field Sobriety Tests (FSTs) such as the “Walk-and-Turn”, “One Leg Stand”, and “Finger-to-Nose” tests. Also, many times, despite a high BAC, the motorists will appear fine on a video. When this happens, defense attorneys argue the obvious – the Breathalyzer was not working properly and therefore, the high BAC score was incorrect. Why else would the motorist perform well of the FSTs and appear fine on the video?

In an effort to try and explain this apparent discrepancy between the motorists BAC score, the prosecution will try to offer “Tolerance” Evidence. In other words, the prosecutor will try to make the jury believe that the reason the motorists performed well of the FSTs but yet had a high BAC is because the motorists is a chronic drinker who has been drinking heavily for a long time and therefore, has developed a tolerance to the effects of the alcohol.

However, the prosecutor should not be allowed to offer evidence regarding the motorist’s tolerance where they have no evidence that the motorist is in fact a heavy drinker and has therefore developed a tolerance. Without knowing the motorist’s drinking history and whether they were in fact a heavy drinker, tolerance evidence is completely irrelevant.

If you have been charged in New York with Driving While Intoxicated or Driving While Ability Impaired, call one of the experienced DWI attorneys at Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for a free consultation. We handle cases throughout New York including White Plains, Greenburgh, Yonkers, New Rochelle, Mamaroneck and New York City as well as all other courts throughout the downstate area. You can also visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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The difference between a New York criminal conviction for Driving While Intoxicated and a non-criminal conviction for the violation of Driving While Ability Impaired lies in the extent of the driver’s impairment. In fact, where a defendant is charged with Common Law Driving While Intoxicated, it is a common strategy for an attorney to ask the jury to find the defendant not guilty of Common Law Driving While Intoxicated (VTL 1192(3)) but guilty of the lesser included offense of Driving While Ability Impaired (VTL 1192(1)). Driving While Ability Impaired is a non-criminal traffic infraction while Driving While Intoxicated is an unclassified misdemeanor.

"Impairment" means that the defendant, by voluntarily consuming alcohol or drugs, has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which he or she is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver. “Intoxication”, however, is defined in New York as a greater degree of impairment which is reached when the driver has voluntarily consumed alcohol to the extent that he or she is incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he or she is expected to possess in order to operate a motor vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver.

Therefore, one is impaired if their ability is impaired “to any extent” while to be intoxicated one must be totally incapable of operating the vehicle. It would appear that proving intoxication under this totally incapacitated standard would be difficult. However, impairment would be much easier to prove because all that is required is the slightest impairment – i.e., impairment “to any extent”.

If you have been charged in New York with Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) or Driving While Ability Impaired (DWAI), call Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for a free telephone consultation. Our attorneys are experienced with all aspects of DWI defense.

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New York City Administrative Code §10-131 prohibits the possession of common items which are lawful in most other parts of New York State and the Country. As a criminal defense attorney with experience in so many different weapons offenses I see many clients who innocently bring these items into New York City and find themselves facing extremely serious criminal charges.
A brief list of the items banned in New York City is as follows:

1. Air Pistols and Air Rifles. The Sale and possession are illegal in New York City pursuant to 10-131(b).

2. Sale of certain toy pistols pursuant to 10-131 (d) is illegal in New York City.

3. Sale or possession of mace, tear gas or pepper spray is illegal in New York City without a permit pursuant to 10-131(e). This is so even though in 1996 the New York State legislature repealed the law making self-defense sprays illegal state wide. These self-defense sprays are currently legal, without a permit outside New York City.

4. Sale or possession of certain toy or imitation pistols is illegal in New York City. 10-131 (g).

5. Carrying or possessing rifles and shotguns. These guns are available for sale outside of New York City without a license. Possessing them in New York City without a special license can be a misdemeanor or an offense. 10-131 (h).

6. It is illegal to sell or dispose of ammunition or ammunition feeding devices in the City of New York unless you are “authorized pursuant to law.” However a person who lawfully possesses such items may dispose of them to a dealer in firearms. 10-131 (i) 1.

7. It is unlawful for a gun dealer to sell ammunition to a licensed gun owner if he sells ammunition that cannot be fired from the firearms the gun owner is licensed to possess. 10-131 (i) 2.

8. It is illegal for a person not authorized to possess a pistol in New York City to possess any pistol ammunition. This is so even if you are authorized to possess a pistol some place outside of New York City and the ammunition is in your “shooting bag” in the trunk of your car. 10-131 (i) 3.

9. Even if you have a license to possess a pistol in New York City it is unlawful to possess ammunition of a different caliber. 10-131 (i) 4.

10. It is illegal to possess an ammunition feeding device (a magazine) unless you are authorized to possess a pistol that uses such device or except under other limited circumstances. 10-131 (i) 6.

11. It is unlawful for anyone to dispose of an ammunition feeding device except a gun dealer may sell one to a person authorized to possess the same caliber of pistol or a person authorized to possess it may sell it to a gun dealer. 10-131 (i) 7.

12. New York City has its own definition of assault weapons under Administrative Code Section 10-303.1. Possession of Assault Weapons in New York City are a crime and can subject a person to additional Civil Penalties of up to $10,000 per Assault Weapon.

The bottom line is be careful in New York City. Many people who lawfully possess these items in other States or Cities get caught in their cars or at the airports and find themselves facing serious charges. If you find yourself charged with any violation of these laws remember many of these offenses are crimes and can subject you to jail, fines, probation and leave you with a permanent criminal record.

If you have any questions or have been charged with any criminal offense contact us to discuss your specific circumstances.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , GUN CRIMES , WEAPONS OFFENSES

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Westchester County District Attorney Janet DiFiore announced the results of a three month sting operation which used underage criminal justice students to purchase alcohol at bars, restaurants and liquor store. The sting resulted in the arrest of 28 people but also demonstrated that establishments enforced the drinking age 81% of the time. The 28 people arrested were charged with selling alcohol to minors.

During this season when Proms, graduation parties and Memorial Day Weekend parties are in high gear it is important to remember the potential consequences of underage drinking and especially of underage drinking and driving. New York has a "zero tolerance" for people under 21 years of age driving with any alcohol in their system. In addition, New York imposes enhanced, severe penalties for minors who drink and drive.

If you or a loved one has been charged with an alcohol related offense in New York, contact one of the attorneys at Tilem & Campbell.

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Unless your New York Traffic Ticket was issued in New York City, Buffalo and parts of Suffolk County you are entitled as a matter of law to a supporting deposition on all moving violations (including: speeding, red lights, tailgating, unsafe lane change and failure to signal) . You must however, ask for it.

As experienced New York traffic court lawyers, demanding a supporting deposition from the complainant/police officer is one of many tools in our arsenal to help us successfully fight traffic violations. While it is clearly not the right tactic in every case, it can be an effective, although procedurally difficult tactic.

New York Criminal Procedure Law § 100.25(2) provides that a defendant charged by a simplified information is, upon a timely request, entitled as a matter of right to a supporting deposition of a complainant police officer and that upon such a request, a court must order the officer to serve a copy of the same within 30 days of the date such request is received by the court, or at least five days before trial, whichever is earlier. N.Y. CPL § 100.25(2).

Failure to comply with the order directing the service and filing of supporting depositions renders the traffic tickets for which they were demanded facially insufficient. CPL 100.40(2); People v. Titus, 178 Misc. 2d 687, 682 N.Y.S.2d 521 [AppTerm, 2d Dept 1998]). This failure divests this Court of jurisdiction to proceed on the simplified traffic information, a divestiture that cannot be "cured" by any attempted untimely service of the supporting deposition. People v. Aucello, 146 Misc. 2d 417, 558 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Appellate Term – Second Department 1990).

Furthermore, the plain language of CPL 100.25 (2) and CPL 100.40 (2) establishes that the designated 30-day period for supplying supporting deposition runs, not from the date of the order directing compliance with a defendant's demand, but from the date the demand is received by the court (see CPL 100.25 [2] [13]; cf. CPL 100.40 [2]; and see People v. Titus).
Moreover, a court may not grant an adjournment to allow the People to furnish a supporting deposition after the 30-day deadline. Rather the statute sets an absolute time, which may not be altered. People v DeFeo, 77 Misc.2d 523, 355 N.Y.S.2d 905 (App Term, 2d Dept. 1974)(Defendant who requested a supporting deposition had an absolute right under statute to a supporting deposition before commencement of trial for speeding, and court's offer of an adjournment for purpose of furnishing deposition could not cure defect and thus information was insufficient on its face requiring that it be dismissed).

If you have received a traffic ticket for any traffic related matter, you might consider demanding a supporting deposition. However, an experienced attorney familiar with the attitudes of the particular court and officer you are dealing with could better guide you with your decision to request a supporting deposition. In some courts, favorable plea bargains are readily available and requesting a supporting deposition might simply annoy the judge, prosecutor and officer. In addition, a person demanding a supporting deposition must make a timely motion for dismissal.

For more information contact Tilem & Campbell at 1-877-DR-SUMMONS or visit us on the web at www.DrSummons.com.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , TRAFFIC

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New York criminal defense lawyers, especially those that handle New York gun possession cases, know that New York has some of the most onerous laws restricting the possession, ownership and use of weapons of all types. This blog presents a brief overview of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree (CPW 3rd) (See NY Penal Law 265.02).

There are several ways one may commit CPW 3rd. First, a person is guilty of CPW 3rd in New York if they commit the crime of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (CPW 4th) and have been previously convicted of any crime. [See Penal Law 265.02(1) for exact wording] .

Second, one is guilty of CPW 3rd if they possess any incendiary or explosive bomb, bombshell, silencer, machine gun or any other firearm or weapon simulating a machine-gun and which is adaptable as a machine gun. [See Penal Law 265.02(2) for exact wording] .

Third, a person is guilty of CPW 3rd if they knowingly possess a firearm, machine-gun, rifle or shotgun which has been defaced to conceal or prevent the detection of a crime or to misrepresent the identity of such weapon. [See Penal Law 265.02(3) for exact wording].

Fourth, a person is guilty of CPW 3rd if they possess three or more firearms or possess at least one firearm while having been convicted on a Class “A” Penal Law Misdemeanor within the previous five years. [See Penal Law 265.02(5) for exact wording].

Finally, one is guilty of CPW 3rd if they knowingly possess a disguised gun, possess an assault weapon or a large capacity ammunition feeding device. [See Penal Law 265.02(6)-(8) for exact wording]. Note, possession of a disguised gun must be “knowingly”.

For more information about CPW 3rd or any other weapons offense, conatct Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us at www.HandGunAttorney.com.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , GUN CRIMES , WEAPONS OFFENSES

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Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (CPW 4th) is a class “A” misdemeanor in New York punishable by up to one year in jail. There are several ways one can commit the crime of CPW 4th. (There are also exemptions to the statute which will be discussed in future blogs). If you have been charged with a weapons offense, you need experienced criminal defense attorneys to defend you.

One is guilty of CPW 4th if he or she possesses any: (1) firearm; (2) electronic dart gun; (3) electronic stun gun; (4) gravity knife; (5) switchblade knife; (6) pilum ballistic knife; (7) metal knuckle knife; (8) cane sword; (9) billy; (10) blackjack; (11) bludgeon; (12) plastic knuckles; (13) metal knuckles; (14) chuka stick; (15) sand bag; (16) sandclub; (17) wrist-brace type slingshot or slungshot; and (18) shirken or “Kung Fu star”. [See NY Penal Law 265.01(1)].
One is also guilty of CPW 4th if he or she possesses any of the following weapons with
the intent to use it against another unlawfully: (1) dangerous knife; (2) dagger; (3) dirk; (4) razor; (5); imitation pistol; or (6) any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon. [See NY Penal Law 265.01(2)].

One is also guilty of CPW 4th if they knowingly possess a firearm, rifle or shotgun in a school or on school grounds including colleges and universities or in a school bus. [See NY Penal Law 265.01(3)]. Further, one convicted of a felony or serious offense may not possess a rifle or shotgun. [See NY Penal Law 265.01(4)]. Nor may a non-citizen possess a dangerous or deadly weapon. [See NY Penal Law 265.01(5)]. One is also guilty of CPW 4th if they have been certified not suitable to possess a shotgun or rifle and refuse to surrender such upon the demand of a police officer. [See NY Penal Law 265.01(6)].

Finally, one is guilty of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree if they possess a bullet containing an explosive material designed to explode on impact [See NY Penal Law 265.01(7)] or if they possess armor piercing ammunition with the intent to use it against another unlawfully. [See NY Penal Law 265.01(8)].

As I said above, there are many exceptions to the statute which I will discuss in a future blog. If you have been charged with any weapons offense contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , WEAPONS OFFENSES

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Tilem & Campbell just obtained a summary of the new Legislation repealing the Rockefeller Drug laws. If you or a loved one is currently serving a term in prison for a New York Narcotics case or is currently charged with any New York Drug case. Contact one of the experienced criminal attorneys at www.888anycrime.com

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , IN THE NEWS , NARCOTICS

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New York criminal defense lawyers, especially those that handle New York State drug cases, are monitoring an agreement just announced between the New York Senate, Assembly and Governor to repeal the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Details are not fully available but the legislation is expected to substantially reduce and in some cases eliminate mandatory minimums for New York Drug cases, give judges options of treatment instead of sentences of incarceration and give judges the ability to dismiss all charges and seal the arrest records of offenders who complete drug treatment.

While the bill, once passed is likely to have far reaching effects on New York drug cases, the legislation will not have any effect on the draconian, federal mandatory minimums that Tilem & Campbell is currently challenging in Federal Court. The bill will likely provide some relief to the many people serving lengthy state sentences under the old law.

The laws have not been passed yet but with agreement by all the major players, the bills should be passed quickly and will likely take effect soon. Tilem & Campbell will continue to monitor this important legislation and pass on updates as the become available. If you have any questions contact us at 888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at 888anycrime.com

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , IN THE NEWS , NARCOTICS

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New York Prostitution lawyers are watching a development reported in today's New York Post which reflects a steep decrease in enforcement of prostitution and other vice offenses by the NYPD. The Post is reporting that the NYPD shut down its enforcement of Prostitution on craigslist as long as 3 years ago. The Post is also reporting that other vice operations have been shut down or slowed down because of increased oversight.

Craigslist has a large number of ads catering to adult entertainment. Many of the craigslist ads are for escorts. Escorts are women (or men) who agree to spend time with a person for a fee. While this practice is legal if sex is exchanged it can violate state or federal prostitution laws.

Criminal lawyers John Campbell and Peter Tilem operate a website escortattorney.com which caters to the escort industry and represents, customers, escorts and escort agencies. Tilem & Campbell will continue to monitor these developments as they have a substantial impact on many Tilem & Campbell client's

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , IN THE NEWS , PROSTITUTION

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Tilem & Campbell is fortunate to have former Firearms Trafficking prosecutor Peter H. Tilem as its Senior Partner able to advise clients on all aspects of New York gun possession. Under New York law, the severity of a Criminal Possession of a Weapon charge dealing with a firearm can hinge on whether the firearm was loaded or not. For example, one may be charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon (CPW) in the Fourth Degree for simply possessing a firearm [See PL 265.01(1)]. Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree does not require that the firearm be loaded. Therefore, one is guilty of CPW 4th if they simply possess an unloaded firearm without proper licensing. Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the 4th degree is an “A” misdemeanor that carries up to one year in jail.

However, if one possess a loaded firearm outside their home or business, the charge is CPW 2nd, a “C” felony which carries a mandatory minimum 3 ½ year to a maximum 15 years in state prison. [See PL 265.03(3); PL 70.02(3)(b)]. Therefore, if you possess an operable firearm outside your home or place of business, the difference between facing an “A” misdemeanor (CPW 4th) which carries up to one year in jail with no mandatory minimum (which means probation is possible) and the “C” felony (CPW 2nd) which carries a mandatory minimum of 3 ½ years in state prison has everything to do with whether the firearm was loaded.

Here’s the problem. Your unloaded gun might be considered loaded under New York law. Under the Penal Law, a “Loaded firearm” is defined as any firearm actually loaded with ammunition or any firearm which is possessed by one who, at the same time, possesses ammunition for that firearm. [See PL 265.00(15) for the exact definition of “loaded firearm”]. Therefore, the term loaded firearm means not only a truly loaded firearm but also the contemporaneous possession of an unloaded firearm and ammunition for that firearm. Accordingly, under the law of New York State, an unloaded firearm may actually be considered a loaded firearm.

For more information or if you have been charged with any weapons offense, contact Tilem & Campbell toll-free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com. For more information about New York’s gun laws, visit www.HandGunAttorney.com.

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Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , GUN CRIMES

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Currently, Tilem & Campbell has one appeal pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit challenging the constitutionality of the previously discussed 100:1 powder cocaine v. crack cocaine sentencing discrepancy. Tilem & Campbell has another Federal Narcotics case for which it is preparing the appeal now. Among other arguments, we have presented an Equal Protection argument centered on the unequal sentences imposed on crack offenders as compared to powder cocaine offenders.

Every day that a crack offender spends in prison beyond that which a powder cocaine offender would spend for the same quantity of drug is an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty; a fundamental right. Such sentencing discrepancies cannot survive a rational basis analysis let alone a strict scrutiny analysis.

The above-discussed “100-to-1 ratio yields sentences for crack offenses three to six times longer than those for powder offenses involving equal amounts of drugs.” Kimbrough v. U.S. 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007). As a result of this disparity, “a major supplier of powder cocaine may receive a shorter sentence than a low-level dealer who buys powder from the supplier but then converts it to crack.” Id.

Such a penal disparity bears no relation to the government’s goals and no ground can be conceived to justify them. When Congress passed the crack cocaine mandatory minimums, it believed, as did many others at the time, that crack was leading a parade of evils into a national drug-abuse epidemic.

These fears, however, proved unfounded. When the United States Sentencing Commission began to empirically research cocaine sentencing policy, it soon found, much to its dismay, that the 100:1 disparity bore little relationship to differences that actually existed between the two forms of cocaine. The data showed that the disparity significantly overstated the relative seriousness of crack offenses. As discussed in a previous blog, crack and powder cocaine are two forms of the same drug.

If you would like to discuss this issue further or have a another sentencing issue including an appeal, contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for a free telephone consultation or visit on the web, www.888AnyCrime.com

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Posted In: CRIMINAL APPEALS , CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , NARCOTICS

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New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell is pleased to report that after years of fierce opposition to New York's draconian "Rockefeller" drug laws, and after some amendments, passed in 2004, did away with some of the harshest sentences, it now appears that much of the remnants of the Rockefeller Drug laws are going to be repealed. Last week by a more that 2-1 margin, the New York State Assembly passed a bill which would repeal additional provisions of the Rockefeller Drug Laws and which would give Judge's greater discretion in sentencing drug-offenders to non-jail, treatment programs. These provisions can have a substantial effect on New York Drug cases.

Governor Patterson has already signaled his approval of amending the Rockefeller Drug Laws and with democrats in control of the New York State Senate, it seems that some significant change in New York State Drug laws is all but certain.

As an experienced criminal defense lawyer I have handled numerous drug cases. In addition, as a former prosecutor I have handled hundreds if not thousands of drug cases. In my vast experience, rarely do I see major traffickers getting arrested and often see low level dealers or users get sentenced to many years in prison. What I find surprising is that often then prosecutor, and judge agree that the sentence is to severe but under the law, often the judges and prosecutors are powerless to reduce the sentence.

The proposed law gives more discretion to New York State judges who are often in the best position to determine whether a person should get treatment or go to prison.

At a time when the law is changing, it is most important for people accused of drug crimes and their families to stay in touch with the latest changes in New York Drug laws. Not all lawyers stay abreast of the latest changes in the law, so stay informed. If you have any questions about any Westchester County drug cases, New York City drug cases, federal drug cases in the New York area please contact Tilem & Campbell at 888-ANY-CRIME (888-269-2746)

Posted by Peter Howard Tilem | Permalink | Email This Post

Posted In: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE , IN THE NEWS , NARCOTICS

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As experienced New York and Federal criminal defense lawyers, we keep track of changes and proposed changes in the law that may effect our clients. When appropriate, and as part of the effort of our effort, though this blog to educate the public, our clients and our friends, we post proposed changes in the law here, in our blog.

Congress is taking notice to the injustice associated with the previously discussed 100:1 ratio crack cocaine vs powder cocaine sentencing disparity. At least 6 Bills in 2007 and 1 in 2008 were proposed by both Democrats and Republicans that would in some way reduce or eliminate the 100:1 cocaine/cocaine base ratio. These proposed Bills include:

H.R. 5035, the Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2008: Eliminates mandatory minimums for cocaine offenses. On January 17, Rep. Robert “Bobby” C. Scott (D-Va.), who is Chairman of the House Committed on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security and also serves on the House Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, introduced H.R. 5035, The Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2008. The bill would, among other things, eliminate the distinction between powder cocaine and cocaine base (crack) and eliminate all mandatory cocaine sentences. This bill is the first bill introduced in the House in the 110th Congress that would eliminate mandatory minimums for crack and powder cocaine sentences.

S. 1711, the Drug Sentencing Reform and Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007: Sponsored by Vice-President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), S. 1711 would, inter alia, eliminate sentencing differences between crack and powder cocaine in favor of a single mandatory minimum at the current powder cocaine levels and eliminate the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. This bill is supported by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton . The direction of our incoming Administration is clear. “Obama and Biden believe the disparity between sentencing crack and powder-based cocaine is wrong and should be completely eliminated.” (See http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/civil_rights/#sentencing-disparities)

H.R. 4545, the Drug Sentencing Reform and Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007: Introduced on December 13 by Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Texas), H.R. 4545 is the House companion to the above-discussed S. 1711. The bill would, among other things, eliminate sentencing differences between crack and powder cocaine in favor of a single mandatory minimum at the current powder cocaine levels and eliminate the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of crack cocaine. The bill has 43 cosponsors:

S. 1685, the Fairness in Drug Sentencing Act of 2007: Introduced by Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), S. 1685 would reduce the difference between crack and powder sentencing by increasing the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger the five-year mandatory minimum sentences from five to 25 grams and the 10-year mandatory minimum from 50 to 250 grams. It would also eliminate the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession. The bill would not eliminate the cocaine sentencing disparity but reduce it from 100:1 to 20:1. The bill also directs the Sentencing Commission to review the sentencing guidelines and amend them if appropriate to account for specified aggravating and mitigating characteristics. There are three cosponsors.

S. 1383, the Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2007: Sponsored by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.), S. 1383 would adjust the disparity between crack and powder sentencing by raising the amounts of crack cocaine that trigger the five- and 10-year mandatory minimum sentences (from five to 20 grams and from 50 to 200 grams respectively) while also lowering the triggering quantities for powder cocaine (from 500 grams to 400 grams for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence and from five kilograms to four kilograms for the ten-year mandatory minimum). It would also lower the simple possession mandatory minimums. S. 1383 directs the Sentencing Commission to amend the guidelines by adding enhancements for a variety of aggravating factors. The bill would cap sentences at level 32 (roughly 10 years) for defendants who played a minimal role in the offense and creates a pilot program to test releasing certain nonviolent elderly prisoners. There are three cosponsors.

H.R. 79, the Powder-Crack Cocaine Penalty Equalization Act of 2007:
Introduced by Rep. Roscoe Bartlett (R-Md.), H.R. 79 would equalize the crack and powder cocaine sentences at by lowering the triggering quantities to those for crack cocaine.

H.R. 460, the Crack Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2007:
Introduced by Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), H.R. 460 would also equalize the crack and powder penalties, but at the powder level. The bill has 20 cosponsors and has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee’s crime subcommittee.

The above discussed proposed legislation shows us that Congress is taking notice of the baseless 100:1 powder cocaine vs. crack cocaine discrepancy and is attempting to correct this injustice. All the evidence and studies show that the fears relied upon when the crack cocaine mandatory minimums were implemented never materialized, that the drugs are chemically identical and that there is no justification for the discrepancy; a discrepancy that has devastated a generation of young black males.

For more information about this and other sentencing issues, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com

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The case of Blakely v. Washington decided in 2004, significantly changed New York and Federal sentencing and substantially altered the way experienced criminal defense lawyers handled their most serious cases. It also led to the change in the once mandatory federal sentencing guidelines to a system that is now now merely advisory.

In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, Ralph Blakely pleaded guilty in a Washington State Superior Court to kidnapping his estranged wife. The statutory maximum for the offense Blakely pleaded guilty to was 53 months. The sentencing judge, however, sentenced Blakely to 90 months - more than three years above the 53 month maximum - finding that Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty. Note, Blakely never admitted to acting with deliberate cruelty nor did a jury find that he did so beyond a reasonable doubt.

Blakely appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals which rejected his argument that Washington’s sentencing procedure which allowed sentence enhancements above the statutory maximum based upon judicial determinations deprived him of his federal constitutional right to have all facts legally essential to his sentence determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary review. The United Supreme Court granted certiorari (agreed to hear the case) and ultimately found the Washington State sentencing procedure unconstitutional.

The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether a state judge may consider facts, that were not admitted by the defendant nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, to enhance the defendant’s sentence beyond the maximum sentence the judge may have imposed based upon facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

In striking down the Washington State sentencing procedure, the United States Supreme Court held that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. To allow otherwise would violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Where a defendant, such as Blakely, pleads guilty, the State may seek judicial sentence enhancements only if the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial fact-finding.

It is of critical importance to note that the statutory maximum is not necessarily the absolute maximum sentence that may be imposed but instead is the maximum sentence that may be imposed within the authorized sentencing range based upon the admitted or proven facts. In Blakely for example, Washington State argued that the challenged sentencing procedure was constitutional because a judge could never go above the statutory maximum based upon judicial findings but could only increase the sentence within the statutorily authorized range.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument noting that had Blakely been sentenced to 90 months based solely upon the admitted facts, the sentence would have been reversed even though it was less than the maximum 10 years.

If you have any questions regarding any sentencing issue, are awaiting sentencing or want to file a criminal appeal of your conviction or sentence feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com.

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As I have been discussing in previous blogs, the rationale behind the 100:1 powder cocaine to crack cocaine sentencing disparity has been proven to be unfounded and false. Yet another argument the New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell is raising in one of our appellate challenges to the constitutionality of the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine is that crack cocaine and powder cocaine are the same drug.

As observed by the United States Supreme Court, crack and powder cocaine are two forms of the same drug and they share the same active ingredient - cocaine hydrochloride. Kimbrough v. U.S. 128 S.Ct. 558, 566 (2007). Furthermore, numerous studies have shown that the physiological and psychotropic effects of crack and powder cocaine are the same, and the drugs are now widely acknowledged as pharmacologically identical.

For example, a 1996 study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association found analogous effects on the body for both crack and powder cocaine.

Similarly, Charles Schuster, former Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse and Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, found that once cocaine is absorbed into the bloodstream and reaches the brain its effects on brain chemistry are identical regardless of whether it is crack or powder.

In fact, crack cocaine is made by taking cocaine powder and cooking it with baking soda and water until it forms a hard substance. This hard substance can then be broken into pieces (rocks) and sold in small quantities.

Whether it remains powder cocaine or is “baked” into crack cocaine, the fact remains that they are the same drug and produce the same effects on the body. There can be therefore, no rationale basis to punish crack cocaine offenses more severely than powder cocaine offenses.

If you would like a free consultation regarding any New York or federal drug offense or sentencing issue, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at 888ANYCRIME.COM.

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As I have previously discussed, Congress justified Draconian mandatory minimum sentences for federal crack cocaine offenses upon their mistaken belief that, among other things, crack cocaine was more dangerous than powder cocaine because it was believed to be more addictive and create more violence than powder cocaine; that it was more harmful than powder cocaine; that it was popular with teenagers; and that its low cost made it more accessible and popular.

These concerns and beliefs have proven false. As observed by Congressman Alcee Hastings (D Fl): “Rather than waging war on drugs, [the mandatory minimums for crack offenses] waged war on America's poor and minorities.” Rep. Hastings also noted that the crack mandatory minimums were “rooted in propaganda rather than empirical data.” (See Congressman Alcee Hastings’ website )

The reality is, the mandatory minimums are not being imposed on the “major” and “serious” suppliers of crack cocaine but instead the majority of crack cocaine defendants are small-scale, street-level dealers. The 100:1 ratio disproportionately impacts far more low-level traffickers than it does the intended targets of the ratio. As observed by the Supreme Court, “the 100-to-1 ratio can lead to the anomalous result that retail crack dealers get longer sentences than the wholesale drug distributors who supply them the powder cocaine from which their crack is produced.” See Kimbrough v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 558, 564 (U.S.,2007).

Indeed, both the Sentencing Commission and the United States Supreme Court have acknowledged that real world experiences have shown us that the reasoning and assumptions that led to the creation of the 100:1 ratio have proven false.

Tilem & Campbell has presented the above arguments in an appeal currently pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the constitutionality of the crack v. powder cocaine disparity. We are arguing, among other things, that there is absolutely no rational basis to incarcerate those convicted of crack cocaine offenses (who are overwhelmingly African-American) significantly longer than those convicted of powder cocaine offenses (who are overwhelmingly Caucasian) involving similar weight.

If you or a loved one needs legal representation for an upcoming sentencing hearing, sentence appeal, or needs legal advise any any federal or New York criminal case contact one of the experienced criminal attorneys at Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at www.888ANYCIME.com.

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New York criminal defense firm Tilem & Campbell is vigorously challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences for federal crack cocaine offenses set forth in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA). We currently have one appeal on this issue pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and will be filing another appeal shortly.

The ADAA established a two-tier system of sentencing with 5 and 10 year mandatory minimum sentences for certain manufacturing and distribution offenses. Congress passed the 10 year mandatory minimum to combat “major drug dealers” while the 5 year mandatory minimum was for the “serious traffickers”. In reality, however, the mandatory minimums are weight driven. It is the weight of the drugs involved that controls with no regard for whether the defendant is a “major dealer” or “serious trafficker”.

The ADAA also established a 100-to-1 disparity between the distribution of powder cocaine and crack cocaine (21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)). For example, distributing just 5 grams of crack cocaine (about a thimble full) carries a mandatory minimum five-year federal prison sentence. However, one must distribute 500 grams of powder cocaine to trigger that same five-year federal prison sentence. (21 U.S.C. § 841).

The absurdity of this disparity is even more apparent when discussing the 10 year mandatory minimum found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), (B). Distributing just 50 grams of crack cocaine (less that 2 ounces) triggers a 10 year mandatory minimum. However, it would take 5000 grams of powder cocaine or "5 kilos" to trigger the same 10 year mandatory minimum. That’s a staggering disparity which is not supported by facts, reasons or reality.

The staggering disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentencing can be better appreciated when the two sentences are compared side by side:

Federal Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences for First Time Cocaine Offenders:

DRUG FIVE YEARS NO PAROLE 10 YEARS NO PAROLE
Crack Cocaine 5 grams (approx a sugar packet) 50 grams
Powder Cocaine 500 grams 5 kilos (5000 grams)

These mandatory minimums for crack offenses were passed because Congress mistakenly believed that crack was more dangerous than powder cocaine because it was thought to be more addictive and involve more violence than powder cocaine; that it was more harmful than powder cocaine; that it was popular amongst teenagers; and that its low cost made it more accessible. See Kimbrough v. U.S., 128 S.Ct. 558, 564 (U.S.,2007).

As I will discuss in my next blog, these concerns and assumptions proved to be unfounded and not supported by the facts. In fact, 23 years of real world experience has shown us that there is absolutely no rational basis for sentencing crack offenses any differently than powder cocaine offenses.

If you are awaiting sentencing, want to appeal a sentence or have any other questions about an appeal issue, feel free to contact one of the experience federal criminal defense attorneys at Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME for a free consultation or visit us on the web at 888ANYCRIME.COM

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Just 16 years after the passage of The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 which all but eliminated harsh mandatory minimums for federal drug offenses, Congress reversed course and passed The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA). The ADAA was passed by Congress during the media frenzy that followed the cocaine induced death of University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias. The ADAA established harsh mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses involving “crack” cocaine (referred to as “cocaine base” in the federal statutes).

Congressional members used Bias’ high-profile death as a political opportunity to portray a “tough on crime” stance. However, Congress utterly failed to undertake any discussion or debate about the failings of the mandatory minimums found in the The Boggs Act of 1951and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 (which I have discussed in previous blogs).
In fact, Sen. Specter noted that Congress “may be acting with undue haste” and Sen. Mathias stated that none of the members of the Senate “had an adequate opportunity to study this enormous package” and that the ADAA “did not emerge from the crucible of the committee process, tempered by the heat of debate.”

As I have discussed in prior blogs, the ADAA established Draconian mandatory minimums for relatively small quantities of crack cocaine while mandating much shorter sentences for an equal amount of powder cocaine. However, 23 years of experience has shown us that the fears that Congress used to justify these obscene mandatory sentences for crack offenses have simply not materialized.

Tilem & Campbell is currently challenging the constitutionality of the powder cocaine v. crack cocaine sentencing disparity in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. We also anticipate filing another appeal shortly (also in the Second Circuit) arguing that the powder v. crack sentencing disparity violates African-Americans’ equal protection rights. Should you have a sentencing issue or appeal you would like to discuss with our attorneys, call 1-888-ANY-CRIME toll free or visit us on the web at 888anycrime.com

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“Switchblade Knife” is defined in New York as any knife that has a blade which opens automatically by hand pressure applied to a button, spring or other device within the knife’s handle. (For the exact definition of “Switchblade Knife” see NY Penal Law § 265.00(4)).

It is an “A” Misdemeanor to possess a switchblade knife (Penal Law § 265.01(1) – Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree). However, it is not a crime to possess a switchblade knife if it is for use while fishing, hunting or trapping and you have a valid license to fish, hunt or trap issued pursuant to section 11-0713 of the New York Environmental Conservation Law (See Penal Law § 265.20(a)(6).

Although not stated in the statute, in order to be convicted in New York of illegally possessing a switchblade knife, you must “knowingly” possess the knife (See Model Jury Charge for Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (CJI 2d N.Y. Penal Law § 265.01(1); People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 428, 440, 497 N.Y.S.2d 637).

For example, in People v. Wood, 869 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1st Dept. 2008), defendant’s conviction was overturned where the trial judge refused to instruct the jury that the prosecution had to prove that defendant knew the item he possessed was in fact a switchblade knife.

If you or a loved one have been charged with any New York weapons offense including illegal possession of switchblade knife, illegal possession of a pistol or possession of any other weapon, contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 for a free consultation or visit us on the web at www.tilemandcampbell.com or www.888AnyCrime.com.

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In New York and elsewhere, it’s common for brake parts to be replaced with rebuilt parts. For example, it’s common for garages to install rebuilt brake calipers, brake pads and shoes, master cylinders and power brake boosters. Furthermore, when repairing or maintaining brakes on trucks, its also common to use rebuilt air compressors and brake valves. Therefore, the most important system on any vehicle, the braking system, is routinely repaired and maintained with re-built or refurbished parts. Many times, the parts to be rebuilt (the “cores”) are obtained from salvage yards (junkyards).

However, the New York State Legislature, in its infinite wisdom, has found it necessary to bar the installation of salvaged airbag systems (called inflatable restraint systems under New York law). Effective March 1, 1999, airbag systems in New York may only be replaced with new systems or salvaged systems which have been certified pursuant to standards set by a nationally recognized testing, engineering and research organization (See VTL § 398-d(6)(e) & 415(c)(2)).

Here’s the problem with this law; leave it to the New York State Legislature to pass a law requiring salvaged airbag systems to meet standards set by a nationally recognized testing, engineering and research organization when no such standards or organization to develop such standards exist. And, leave it to the New York Court of Appeals to hold that the failure of the Department of Motor Vehicles to develop such standards did not invalidate the law. N.Y.A.A.D., Inc. v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d 245, 771 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. 2003)
Accordingly, in New York, no matter what reason the air bag system was removed from a vehicle, it may not be sold and installed in another vehicle. Therefore, even if the original car was junked due to a blown engine or rear-end collision, the perfectly working air bag system must be junked.

For more information regarding any New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law issue, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-877-377-8666 or visit us on the web at www.TrafficTicketExpress.com.

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In continuing with my commentary on federal mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses and Tilem & Campbell’s challenge to the constitutionality of such sentences, it’s of paramount importance to point out other, influential groups and individuals who are also opposed to mandatory minimums for drug offenses. As previously discussed, former Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon were all opposed to mandatory minimums for drug offenses and, at Nixon’s urging, in 1970, Congress abolished almost all mandatory minimum sentencing for federal drug offenses with the passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970.

These former Presidents were not, and are not, the only influential individuals opposed to such sentences. With regard to the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 (both of which contained draconian mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses), a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee found that 92 percent of federal prison wardens who responded were opposed to the mandatory minimum sentences, and 97 percent were opposed to the prohibition against probation or parole. Of the probation officers who responded, 83 percent were opposed to mandatory minimums while 86 percent were opposed to prohibition against probation or parole. Of the federal judges who responded, 73 percent were opposed to mandatory minimums, and 86 percent were opposed to the prohibition against probation or parole.

Many members of law enforcement also supported the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and its elimination of the mandatory minimum sentences found in the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. According to then Congressman William L. Springer (R Ill.): “It is the opinion of most law enforcement people that the harsh mandatory sentences in narcotics law have been a hindrance rather than an aid to enforcement.”

Tilem & Campbell is vigorously challenging the constitutionality of the current mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses and the corresponding 100:1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine ratio. It is this ratio that brings about tremendously longer sentences for blacks and minorities convicted of crack offenses than their white counterparts convicted of powder cocaine offenses involving equal weight. If you are currently charged with a crime and are in need of a federal criminal defense attorney or if you have been convicted of a crime and which to discuss various post conviction remedies such as an appeal, contact Tilem & Campbell at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at www.888AnyCrime.com.

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New York criminal lawyer Peter H. Tilem has been admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, effective January 12, 2009. Having been recommended for admission by two current members of the bar of the US Supreme Court the motion for Mr. Tilem's admission was granted and his admission has taken effect.

The admission of Mr. Tilem to this prestigious bar will enhance the appellate practice of Tilem & Campbell and will give it the ability to challenge cases already in the United States Court of Appeals at the United States Supreme Court level, without seeking outside counsel. Tilem & Campbell has several criminal appeals pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and is currently challenging the mandatory minimums applicable to crack cocaine cases in federal courts.

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Tilem & Campbell is currently appealing the constitutionality of the federal mandatory minimums for federal crack offenses and the 100:1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine rationale. In continuing with a thorough review of the failings of prior mandatory minimums for drug offenses, I previously touched on the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. When Richard Nixon took office in 1969 he supported enforcement of then current drug laws to combat the county’s admitted drug problem. However, he came to realize that was not the best course of action.
(See www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2353&st=&st1=. (Visited December 14, 2008).

Nixon backed away from mandatory minimums and pushed The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (hereinafter the “1970 Act’) through Congress which eliminated all of the mandatory minimum drug sentences but one. (Mandatory minimums from between 10 and 20 to life remained for Engaging in a “continuing criminal enterprise”). The 1970 Act was an acknowledgment of failings of both the Boggs Act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. The 1970 Act was in lock-step with President Kennedy’s aversion to the mandatory minimums, Kennedy’s Commission’s findings against the mandatory minimums and President Lyndon Johnson’s opposition to the mandatory minimums. The Act had wide bi-partisan support including that of then Congressman, and future President of the United States, George H. W. Bush who supported the repeal of the mandatory minimums found in the Narcotics Control Act of 1956.

Considering the failings of mandatory minimums in the past as well as the current findings of the United States Sentencing Commission all in opposition to mandatory minimums and the 100:1 ratio in general, any rational basis for such mandatory minimums and their disproportionate impact on minorities falters.

To discuss any type of criminal case, federal sentencing issue, federal or state criminal appeal, feel free to contact us toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at www.888AnyCrime.

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As I indicated in prior blogs, Tilem & Campbell is currently appealing two cases challenging the constitutionality of the federal mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses and the 100:1 powder cocaine-to-crack cocaine ratio that results in grossly disproportionate sentences between the mostly minority crack offenders and their mostly white powder cocaine cohorts.

One Appellant Brief is already submitted in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and as the drafter of that Brief, I chose to analyze many different sources of information to show that the crack cocaine mandatory minimum sentencing laws (21 USC 841) were based on flawed data and have not achieved their intended goals. In doing so, I analyzed the history of other Congressional Acts imposing draconian mandatory minimums for drug offenses including the Boggs act of 1951 and the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. I also discussed President Kennedy’s disfavor for mandatory minimums and the conclusions of a Commission he assembled critical of such sentences and their recommendation that sentences fit both the offender and the offense and that rehabilitation should be the most important goal – not retribution.

I chose this strategy not to fill up space discussing irrelevant long-abolished statutes or the policies’ of Presidents who served 35 to 45 plus years ago but instead to elucidate the fact that the draconian mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for drug offenses has consistently failed over decades and tens of thousands of cases to solve the problem and stem the flow of drugs and their use. It was and remains the objective of my Brief to attack these mandatory minimums not only on strict scrutiny analysis but also on the rationale basis front.

In other words, I want to show the Second Circuit, through solid empirical data, that this mandatory minimum, throw away the key approach has consistently failed; that study after study has concluded that the rational for the mandatory minimums for crack and the 100:1 ratio was flawed and that mandatory minimums have failed for over 57 years to achieve their desired goal; and that the Kennedy Administration, the Johnson Administration and the Nixon Administration all opposed mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders based upon extensive Committee research.

Our Brief followed with commentary regarding the Sentencing Commission’s strong disagreement with the ratio and the mandatory minimums as well as the United States Supreme Court’s acknowledgment in Kimbrough that the fears were unrealized and that crack and powder cocaine are one in the same drug. Our brief also analyzed and the pending bi-partisan support for Legislation abolishing the ratio. This I argued, supports a strong argument the current laws fail under strict scrutiny analysis because they are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest insofar as all the experts recommend rehabilitation over incarceration and therefore, for a mandatory minimum to be deemed narrowly tailored, it cannot lump all offenders, (both addicts and major suppliers), in the same category.

The mandatory minimums for crack cocaine also fail the rational basis test because we are imprisoning minorities for decades for crack offenses while their white counterpart is receiving less than two years for powder offenses involving 100 times the amount of powder cocaine which, as authoritative experts have determined, is the same drug.

Continue reading "FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCING: LYNDON JOHNSON TAKES OFFICE AND ESTABLISHES THE KATZENBACH COMMISSION" »

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Tilem & Campbell is currently appealing the constitutionality of the federal crack cocaine statutory mandatory minimum sentences (21 USC 841). In our most recent appeal, we discussed, among other things, the history of mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses starting with the Boggs Act of 1951 and followed by the Narcotics Control Act of 1956. Both Acts imposed onerous mandatory minimum prison terms for relatively minor drug offenses. Both Acts also failed to stem the flow of drugs and their use. We discussed these prior Acts and their utter failures, as well as other empirical data, to support our argument that mandatory minimums for drug offenses have no rational basis.

In 1963, President Kennedy assembled the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse to address the country’s drug problem. Recall, at that time, drug offenders were facing the mandatory minimums found in Narcotics Control Act of 1956. The Commission studied drug use and the laws pertaining to those who abused drugs. The Commission concluded that rehabilitation rather than retributive punishment was essential to addressing the problem.

Regarding sentencing, the Commission opined that penalties should fit both the offender and the offense and be tailored to promote the offender’s rehabilitation. Draconian sentences, concluded the Commission, did not provide an effective deterrence. To the contrary, the Commission observed that the drug users were risking long prisons sentences to get their drugs. In other words, the lengthy mandatory minimums were having little or no affect on drug use.

President Kennedy’s disagreement with mandatory minimums was evidenced by his extensive use of his pardon power to free inmates languishing in prison. President Kennedy’s issuance of pardons and his commutation of lengthy drug sentences indicated to Congress his desire for a change in federal sentencing for drug offenders. This change, however, would not come about until 1970. As discussed in my next blog, after President’s Kennedy’s tragic assassination in the fall of 1963, President Lyndon Johnson also opposed mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses.

To avoid the potential for a Presidential pardon or commutation, some plea agreements (and I suspect more in the future) were also requiring that the defendant waive his right to seek a Presidential pardon or commutation. If you have a question about a plea agreement, sentencing issue, appeal or other criminal legal matter, contact Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at www.888AnyCrime.com.

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Tilem & Campbell is vigorously challenging the federal mandatory minimum crack cocaine sentencing scheme found in 21 USC 841. We are currently appealing two cases to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While most believe mandatory minimums were a new concept resulting from the crack cocaine explosion in the early 1980s, the truth is, mandatory minimums for drug offenses have a 57 year history in the United States. As you will learn, from their inception, mandatory minimums have never achieved their desired result.

Draconian mandatory minimums for drug offenses were previously implemented by Congress in 1951 and 1956 and they failed miserably and were ultimately repealed. One thing that is apparent about our government officials including the elected Legislatures, Presidents as well as the appointed members that head our Administrative agencies and the Federal Judiciary is that they simply do not learn from history. It’s as if they don’t even know it.

The Boggs Act of 1951
What Congress was seemingly oblivious to when they slammed through The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (and its draconian mandatory minimums for relatively small amounts of crack cocaine) in the middle of the night, was that approximately 35 years earlier in 1951, Congress had passed the Boggs Act which also had established mandatory minimum prison sentences for drug crimes.

Under the Boggs Act, simple possession of cocaine, heroin or cannabis carried a mandatory minimum 2 years with a maximum 5 years prison term. A second offense carried a mandatory minimum 5 years with a maximum of 10 years in prison. A third offense carried a mandatory minimum of 10 years with a maximum of 15 years in prison. Just as the 1986 ADAA was supported with flawed science, unfounded fears, and outright and erroneous concerns; so too was the Boggs Act and subsequent federal drug laws.

Continue reading "A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING FOR FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES" »

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As I indicated in prior blogs, Tilem & Campbell is currently challenging the constitutionality of the federal mandatory minimum sentences for federal crack cocaine offenses. We currently have an appeal pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and will be filing another shortly on behalf of an African-American appellant.

Our current appeal concerns an Hispanic defendant sentenced to the 10 year mandatory minimum for four federal felonies involving approximately 112 grams of crack cocaine (21 USC 841). We challenged the constitutionality of the 10 year mandatory minimum sentence on three grounds. Briefly, we argued that depriving the defendant of his liberty, a fundamental right, longer than one convicted of a powder cocaine offense involving the same weight violates his equal protection rights under both strict scrutiny and rational basis review.

We also argued that the 100:1 ratio and corresponding grossly disproportionate sentences imposed upon minorities for crack offenses compared to those sentences imposed upon the mostly white offenders convicted of powder cocaine offenses involving the same weight violates the defendant’s Fifth Amendment Equal Protection rights (note, the Equal Protection rights found in the Fifth Amendment apply to the Federal Government while the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States).

Finally, we argued that putting one in a jail for a decade for a crack offense when a powder cocaine offender convicted of an offense involving the same weight would receive less than two years violates the Eighth Amendment.

The above arguments are based on sound reasoning supported by numerous reports prepared the United States Sentencing Commission (the experts in the area of sentencing), the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Kimbrough as well as many government leaders as evidenced by the numerous proposed Bills which would abolish the ratio or drastically reduce it.

For more information about a federal sentencing issue, federal drug case, a New York drug case, an appeal or representation on any criminal matter, contact Tilem & Campbell 1-888-ANY-CRIME for a free consultation or visit www.888AnyCrime.com.

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At Tilem & Campbell, we represent a wide variety of defendants charged with anything from traffic infractions to serious felonies including controlled substance offenses. In a recent federal case, we represented a defendant charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with four drug offenses involving a total of approximately 112 grams of crack cocaine. Three of the offenses were Class A felonies which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years with a maximum of life imprisonment. Due to a prior drug felony, however, had the defendant gone to trial and lost, he would have been facing 20 years to life. The remaining offense was a Class B felony which carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years with a maximum of 40 years imprisonment.

Senior Partner, Peter Tilem, a former Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney’s Office (Manhattan) was defendant’s lead attorney and successfully negotiated a plea bargain pursuant to which the defendant would plead guilty as charged. In return the Government would not seek the 20 year mandatory minimum but instead would recommend the 10 year mandatory minimum. The plea agreement did not require that the defendant waive his right to appeal his sentence.

The imprisonment range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as calculated in the Pre-sentence Investigation Report was 78-97 months based upon a base offense level of 27. However, due to the statutory mandatory 10 year minimum term of imprisonment found in 21 U.S.C 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) for offenses involving crack cocaine, the defendant’s minimum term imprisonment increased to 120 months pursuant to USSG § 5G1.1(b).

This sentencing range was substantially higher than it would have been had the offenses involved powder cocaine because the Guidelines as well as the relevant statute (21 U.S.C 841) treat one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine. For example, had defendant been sentenced for a powder cocaine offense involving the same quantities, he would have been facing a sentencing range of 15-21 months.

Continue reading "TILEM & CAMPBELL APPEALS DISTRICT COURT’S FINDING THAT THE FEDERAL STATUTORY MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES (21 USC 841) FOR COCAINE BASE (“CRACK”) OFFENSES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL." »

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At Tilem & Campbell, we often consult with and are retained by those facing or serving 5, 10 or 20 year federal statutory mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine base (crack) offenses. Many individuals mistakenly believe that the United States Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Kimbrough v United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 struck down the statutory mandatory minimums for crack offenses. The decision did no such thing and has been widely misinterpreted as having struck down the federal statutory mandatory minimums for crack offenses as well as the 100:1 powder cocaine to crack cocaine ratio. In fact the Kimbrough case concerned a Booker issue – not a statutory mandatory minimum challenge. The Kimbrough decision held that the 100:1 ratio found in the United States Sentencing Guidelines is merely advisory; as are all of the Guidelines after Booker.

The Kimbrough decision held that a sentencing court may consider the 100:1 crack/powder cocaine disparity found in the Guidelines when determining a sentence. In Kimbrough, the defendant’s Guideline range was well above the statutory mandatory minimum. What the District Court did was consider the 100:1 ratio and its effect on the sentencing range. Based upon that consideration, the District Court, decided that the ratio resulted in an overly excessive sentencing range and sentenced the defendant to a sentence below the advisory sentence as calculated under the Guidelines – but above the 10 year statutory mandatory minimum.

However, the reasoning and discussion in Kimbrough established that the United States Supreme Court has now acknowledged that the fears that one time supported the 100:1 crack/powder sentencing disparity have proved unfounded and that crack cocaine and powder cocaine are the same drug and bring about the same physiological effects of the user. The decision also cited numerous Commission reports critical of the ratio and urging its abolishment.

For more information about the federal mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine offenses as well as Tilem & Campbell’s appellate challenges to such federal sentences, call 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit www.888AnyCrime.com

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Recently, Tilem & Campbell filed an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the federal statutory mandatory minimum sentences applicable to crack cocaine offenses and the 100:1 powder cocaine vs. crack cocaine ratio. The issues raised in the appeal will be discussed in future blogs as will the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kimbrough v United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007).

However, one must have a basic understanding of the federal statutory mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and how they apply to both powder cocaine and crack cocaine to understand the arguments against them as well as the Kimbrough decision. Germane to this discussion is an understanding of the often discussed 100:1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine ratio. It is this ratio that has resulted in crack offenders spending decades in prison while powder cocaine offenders convicted of offenses involving the same weight often spend less than two years in prison.

Basically, for sentencing purposes in the federal system, the relevant statute (21 U.S.C 841) treats one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams of powder cocaine. For example, possession of just 5 grams of crack cocaine (about a thimble full) triggers a five year mandatory minimum sentence. However, it would take 500 grams of powder cocaine (1/2 kilo) to trigger the same mandatory minimum. (See 21 USC 841). Therefore, one who possesses what is clearly a personal use amount of crack cocaine (5 grams) faces the same sentence as a major dealer of powder cocaine.

Indeed, 500 grams of powder cocaine becomes 1000 grams (or more) after being “cut” for resale. One thousand grams of powder cocaine equals approximately 36 ounces of powder cocaine. Therefore, the hapless crack junkie caught with what is clearly a personal use amount of crack cocaine (5 grams) must be sentenced to the same mandatory 5 year minimum that a major powder cocaine supplier would face for an offense involving 100 times the quantity.

The lunacy of the mandatory minimum crack sentences is even more apparent when dealing with just 50 grams of crack cocaine; just under 2 ounces. Offenses involving fifty grams of crack cocaine trigger a mandatory minimum 10 year sentence. However, under the 100:1 ratio, it would take 5000 thousand grams of powder cocaine (5 kilos) to trigger the same 10 year mandatory minimum. (See 21 USC. § 841(b)(1)(A)(II) (triggering 10 year mandatory minimum for offenses involving 5 kilograms (5000 grams) of powder cocaine). Recall, 50 grams of crack is just under 2 ounces (56 grams would be 2 ounces). However, 5000 grams of powder cocaine is approximately 179 ounces. If cut for resale, that 5000 grams of powder cocaine could easily become 10,000 grams; or about 360 ounces. That is major supplier weight.

Because crack cocaine is more prevalent in minority communities, especially African-American communities, African-Americans and other minorities are facing decades in prison while their white counterparts who deal in powder cocaine (which is the same drug) often times face 2 years or less. This racial disparity in sentencing for offenses involving what is the same drug has been, and will continue to be, the basis of equal protection challenges to the ratio. This will be discussed in future blogs.

The above is just a brief summary of a very complex issue. I will be discussing this issue in great detail in coming blogs including a detailed discussion about Tilem & Campbell’s federal appellate challenges to the crack cocaine mandatory minimums. For further information regarding sentencing issues or other criminal matters, contact Tilem and Campbell at 1-888-ANY-CRIME or visit us on the web at www.888AnyCrime.com.

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On the front page of today's New York Times, the Times is reporting a sharp increase in shoplifting and shoplifting arrests across the Country. Citing several factors including the weak economy the Times is reporting that shoplifting arrests are up ten to twenty percent over last year.

At the New York criminal defense firm, Tilem & Campbell we have also seen the increase in New York shoplifting cases through telephone inquiries to the firm, cases on which the firm has been retained, and cases we see in Court. Here in White Plains, New York, home to several shopping malls, the increase is clearly visible in the cases that the White Plains Court is handling.

It is important to remember that shoplifting in New York can result in several criminal charges including Petite Larceny and Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree both class "A" misdemeanors punishable by up to one year in jail. If the property stolen retails for more than $1000 the charges can be Grand Larceny and Criminal Possession of Stolen Property In the Fourth Degree, both felonies punishable by up to four years in prison.

In addition, here at Tilem & Campbell, we have heard reports of abusive store security guards lying to people detained for shoplifting and holding them for long periods of time before the Police are called. The store security guards are generally not police officers and therefore are not bound by the same rules a police officers.

New York shoplifting cases are extremely serious and can lead to severe consequences including a permanent criminal record. Here are a few tips based upon my extensive experience in handling shoplifting cases. While shopping:
1. Do not put any items inside any pocket, bag or clothing, if you cannot carry everything get a basket or cart.
2. Do not leave the store with items even if it to use the cell phone or get better reception and you intend to pay for the items.
3. When going from one store to another with purchased items, make sure you save the receipt.
4. If stopped by store security, do not make any admissions, do not apologize. Be cooperative but insist that you be able to speak toa a parent, guardian or lawyer.

If you are arrested for a New York shoplifting case, a New York Petit Larceny case or a New York Grand larceny case treat the matter with the seriousness that it requires. Contact us or any experienced criminal defense lawyer who handles these types of cases.

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As discussed in the previous blog, under certain circumstances, all occupants of a vehicle can be presumed to possess drugs, guns or other weapons found within the vehicle. We also discussed the effect of the presumption on the New York criminal case and went into some detail about the presumption as it applies to New york gun cases and New York Weapon cases.

Now we discuss the vehicle presumption as it applies to New York controlled substance cases. With certain drug possession offenses carrying a mandatory minimum of eight years, the stakes are very high when traveling in a vehicle with someone who may possess illegal drugs. Similar to the gun presumption, New York’s drug presumption applies to all vehicles except public buses (it applies in stolen vehicles unlike the gun presumption). According to a strict reading of the statute, the drug presumption applies to all persons in the vehicle at the time the drugs are found. Since generally the police take all of the occupants out of the vehicle, I would argue that in such a case the presumption does not apply.

Like the gun presumption, the drug presumption does not apply in three circumstances. The presumption does not apply to a cab driver or livery cab driver. It does not apply if a person in the vehicle is authorized to possess the controlled substance (has a prescription for the drug) and the drug is in the same packaging as when he received it. The presumption also does not apply when the drugs are found on the person of one of the occupants.

It is also important to remember that since the presumption only applies to controlled substances and marihuana (or marijuana) is not a controlled substance under New York Law, the presumption does not apply to marihuana.

If you are charged with any New York narcotics offenses contact one of the experienced criminal defense lawyers at Tilem & Campbell.

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New York Criminal Law establishes a presumption that all people in a vehicle are presumed to possess either drugs or guns that are found within the vehicle. What that means is that in New York each and every person inside a car will generally be charged with gun possession or drug possession for contraband that is found anywhere in that car, regardless of where the drugs or guns are found. (With certain exceptions, some of which are discussed below.)

NEW YORK GUN POSSESSION PRESUMPTION

In the case of gun, with possession of a loaded gun in New York carrying a mandatory minimum of three and one half years in prison, you are taking a tremendous chance driving with someone who may have an illegal gun. The New York gun presumption applies to all vehicles except stolen vehicles and public buses and applies not only to firearms but other weapons. The presumption has three major exceptions. The presumption does not apply if the weapon is recovered on the person of one of the occupants of the vehicle. It does not apply to the driver of a cab or livery cab and the presumption does not apply if one of the occupants has a license to carry the weapon concealed.

The presumption, however, does apply if one of the occupants has the firearm or other weapon on his person and discards it on the floor of the vehicle as the police are pulling over the vehicle. This situation can arise quickly and put everyone in the vehicle at risk under the presumption.

To learn about New York's vehicle presumption as it applies to New York drug cases click here.

EFFECT OF THE PRESUMPTION

It is important to remember that both the drug and gun (or weapon) presumptions under New York law are rebuttable presumptions. That means that although there is a presumption that all occupants of the vehicle are presumed to possess the contraband, evidence can be introduced to show that in fact one or more of the occupants did not possess the contraband. In other words, the presumption does not relieve the prosecutor of his or her burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It also gives the person charged under the presumption automatic standing to challenge the constitutionality of the police conduct. That means that it gives a person charged under a presumption the right to seek suppression of evidence that they might not otherwise to be able to challenge.

So if you or a loved one are charged with a New York weapon offense or a New York gun offense under New York’s gun presumption or a New York Controlled Substance offense under New York’s controlled substance presumption, contact an experienced New York criminal defense lawyer who has experience in these types of cases. Contact Tilem & Campbell for any questions about New York criminal matters.

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New York Traffic Ticket Lawyers, Tilem & Campbell are please to announce the posting of their newest web paging entitled "New York City Traffic Tickets". The page is designed to be a primer of the practices of the New York Traffic Violation Bureau Courts (TVB) that operate in New York City, Rochester, Buffalo and parts of Suffolk County. If you receive a traffic summons in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens, Manhattan or Staten Island in New York City it will be returnable to the Department of Motor Vehicles and be adjudicated in a TVB. The New York City Traffic Ticket page will educate you about the practices and procedures of these administrative courts.

The page is broken up by heading with topics such as "The Hearing", "Entering Your Plea" and "The Rules of Evidence at the Hearing" and more and therefore should be a simple reference for any questions realting to New York City Traffic Tickets.

If you receive a traffic summons in the City of New York or any other area that is covered by the TVB please refer to the "New York City Traffic Tickets" page or contact us at 877-DR SUMMONS. Keep in mind that the TVB only handles traffic infractions and not traffic misdemeanors or other types of violations.

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In a previous blog I explained that one doesn’t not have a statutory right to a speedy trial in a New York traffic violation case (such as speeding, red light, stop signs violations, etc). Does this mean that a New York court can take years to schedule your trial? The answer is yes and no. While there is no statutory right to a speedy trial in a traffic violation case, the courts have held that one charged with a New York traffic violation has a constitutional right to have his or her trial held within two years. This constitutional right is found in CPL § 30.20 which basically states that after a criminal prosecution is commenced the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial. This section does not set forth what constitutes a speedy trial however. It also applies to traffic violations because for purposes of procedure, traffic violations are treated as misdemeanors. See VTL § 155. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution also guarantees a right to a speedy trial even in traffic violation cases.

Numerous New York court cases have held that the speedy trial provision found in CPL § 30.20 applies to traffic violation cases. The question becomes therefore, what is considered an acceptable time frame within which one charged with a New York traffic violation must be brought to trial in light of CPL § 30.20? Two years seems to be the limit provided the delay is not caused by the defendant. Below are reviews of relevant cases:

In People v. Thorpe, 160 Misc.2d 558, 613 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1994) the Appellate Term dismissed a conviction due to an unexplained two year delay in bringing the case to trial. This is the case to rely on when making a speedy trial motion. See also People v. Matera, 2003 WL 21974065 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term), 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51180(U)(unexplained delay of over two years in bringing traffic infraction to trial warranted dismissal); People v. Rogoish, 2003 WL 21700087 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term), 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51120(U)(unexplained delay of over three years in bringing the traffic infraction to trial warranted dismissal)

Therefore, if you are charged with a traffic infraction in New York and never receive a trial notice, don’t call the court. Contact an experienced traffic court firm such a Tilem & Campbell and we will run your license to ensure that you didn’t miss a date. Then we will sit back and wait. If the trial notice comes more than two years later, Tilem & Campbell will file a written motion seeking dismissal. Finally, the above analysis and laws do not apply for tickets handled by the DMV Traffic Violations Bureau. Those tickets have are handled under a different set of rules which I will discuss in a future blog.

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The simple fact is, a motorist charged with a New York traffic violation has no statutory right to a speedy trial. The denial of a statutory right to a speedy trial in a New York traffic violation case is yet another example of the New York Judiciary completely disregarding the laws duly enacted by the Legislature and imposing their own will. It is yet another example of what I consistently refer to as judicial supremacy as opposed to judicial oversight. Such rulings by the courts quite simply amount to a judicial hijacking of the legislative role thus destroying the separation of powers.

A review of the relevant laws reveals that the Courts' denial of speedy trial rights in traffic violation cases (as well as the denial of other rights in traffic violation cases) is completely contrary to the clear and unambiguous wording of the laws; laws that the judiciary is constitutionally obligated to enforce and carryout whether they agree with them or not.

First of all, the New York State Legislature has determined that, with some exceptions, traffic “violations shall be deemed as misdemeanors and all provisions of law relating to misdemeanors . . . shall apply except that no jury trial shall be allowed for traffic infractions.” See VTL § 155. Therefore, if the Legislature has determined that traffic violations are to be treated procedurally as misdemeanors, under what possible theory could the speedy trial statutes not apply? See for example People v. Solomon, 1984, 124 Misc.2d 33, 475 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1984) where the court held that the right to speedy trial does not attach to actions commenced for traffic violations. See also People v. Howell, 158 Misc.2d 653, 601 N.Y.S.2d 778(1993)(Speedy trial statute applies only to felonies, misdemeanors, and violations, and “violation” is specifically defined to exclude traffic infractions.)

Under what possible theory of statutory construction could the Solomon court have concluded that statutory speedy trial rights do not apply to traffic violations in light of the clear wording of VTL § 155 which states that traffic violations shall be treated as misdemeanors?

In fact, NY CPL 30.30(1)(d) states that when a defendant is charged with a violation, the People must be ready within 30 days of the commencement of the criminal action. However, the courts have literally hijacked the legislative authority by ruling that the speedy trial provisions found in CPL 30.30 don’t apply to traffic infractions. If you are charged with a traffic violation in New York and more than two years have passed since the time you received the ticket and the time your trial is scheduled, contact Tilem & Campbell because while you may not have a statutory right to a speedy trial on a traffic violation case, you do have a constitutional speedy trial right which usually takes effect at about two years. In a future blog I will discuss the constitutional speedy trial right you have when charged with a traffic violation.

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There are generally no classifications of people who are exempt or disqualified from jury duty in New York State. However, in order to be initially selected for the jury pool in your county, you must be a citizen of the United States as well as a resident of the particular county that has summoned you for jury duty; have never been convicted of a felony; be at least 18 years of age and be able to communicate in English. See Jud Law § 510. If you don’t satisfy all of these qualifications you are ineligible for jury duty in New York State.

Prior to January 1, 1996, active members of the armed forces; elected federal, state, city and local officers; the heads of certain government agencies; and federal or New York State judges were deemed disqualified to serve as jurors. See Jud. Law 511 (1995). These statutory disqualifications were repealed effective January 1, 1996.

Furthermore, prior to January 1, 1996, certain full-time religious practitioners, certain members of the medical field including doctors, dentists, nurses, licensed physical therapists and even embalmers as well as attorneys, fire personnel, sole proprietors engaged in the full-time operation of their business, parents or guardians with children under the age of 16 and those over 70 years of age were exempt from jury duty. These statutory exemptions were repealed effective January 1, 1996.

If you have been selected for jury duty in New York State, have a jury trial scheduled in New York state or have any questions in general regarding jury trials in New York State including Westchester, Rockland, Dutchess or Putnam counties, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell PC for a free telephone consultation.

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Another compelling reason not to allow the issuing officer to also act as the prosecutor in a New York traffic violation case is supported by the Latin maxim “inclusio unius est exclusio alterius”. What this Latin Maxim means is that where a law expressly describes a situation where it applies, an irrefutable inference arises that what was excluded or omitted was intentionally excluded or omitted. This ancient rule of statutory construction is codified in New York McKinney's Statutes § 240 titled “Expression of one thing as excluding others”.

Section 240 states in pertinent part: “where a law expressly describes a particular act, thing or person to which it shall apply an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.” In other words, where a statute specifically mentions that said statute applies to one category of persons, said statute irrefutably implies the exclusion of other persons not specifically mentioned was intended by the Legislature. See e.g. Combs v. Lipson, 44 Misc.2d 467, 254 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1964)(Holding that the express grant of power to one person excludes by implication the grant of same powers to another.)
Applying this rule to situations where non-attorneys may represent others in New York, if the New York State Legislature enacted a statute which expressly described what class of non-attorneys could represent other people in court, an irrefutable inference arises that those non-attorneys not described in the statute may not represent others in a court or other quasi-judicial proceeding.

Indeed, the New York State Legislature has in fact enacted a law prohibiting a non-attorney from appearing as an attorney except is certain delineated circumstances. New York Judiciary Law § 478, titled “Practicing or appearing as attorney-at-law without being admitted and registered” makes it unlawful for those who have not “been duly and regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this state” from acting or holding themselves out as attorneys.

The same statute however, goes on to specify certain categories of non-attorneys that may otherwise act in an attorney like capacity despite the fact that they are not duly admitted to practice in the State of New York. For example, law students who have completed two semesters of law school or who are awaiting their bar exam results may, under the supervision of the Legal Aid Society or other government agency such as the District Attorney’s Office, partake in lawyerly activities otherwise prohibited for non-lawyers. Jud. Law § 478

Continue reading "WHY IS THE TROOPER OR OFFICER WHO ISSUED YOUR NEW YORK TRAFFIC TICKET ALSO PROSECUTING IT? PART IV – UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF “INCLUSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS”, THE LEGISLATURE’S SPECIFIC INCLUSION OF SOME NON-ATTORNEYS WHO MAY ACT AS AN ATTORN" »

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The simple fact is, the practice of the issuing officer prosecuting their own New York traffic tickets is allowed only because of an outright Judicial hijacking by the court’s of the State Legislature’s power. Generally, the New York State Constitution establishes that the Legislative Branch (consisting of the New York State Assembly and New York State Senate) enact the laws (with the consent of the governor) (see NY Const. Art. 3, § I).

The New York State Executive branch enforces and carries out the laws enacted by the New York State Legislature (See NY Const. Art. IV) and the New York State Judiciary branch interprets and applies the laws enacted by the Legislature (NY Const. Art. VI). It is not the function of the Executive and/or the Judiciary branches to create laws.
This division of powers and responsibilities is commonly known as the “Separation of Powers” doctrine most of us learned about early in our scholastic careers. The “Separation of Powers” doctrine is a bedrock principle in this country as well as in New York. Each branch of government should be free to carry-out its lawful duties free from the improper interference from the other branches of government. New York State Inspection, Sec. and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 233, 485 N.Y.S.2d 719, 475 N.E.2d 90 (1984).

Therefore, whether they agree with the law or not, law enforcement (which is part of the Executive Branch) must enforce a law duly enacted by the Legislature. For example, it’s not for law-enforcement to decide that drugs should be legal and refuse to enforce our drug laws. Similarly, absent some constitutional infirmity, judges are bound to impose and interpret the laws as written by the Legislature whether they agree with them or not.

Applying the Separation of Powers Doctrine to attorney admissions to practice law in New York, it is the New York State Legislature that has the unrestricted power to determine the procedures and by what evidence the qualifications for admission as an attorney to the New York State Bar should be ascertained. In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). In fact, in Cooper, the Court of Appeals noted that the authority and power to admit attorneys to practice in the State of New York is not an inherent power of the courts but is entirely subject to legislative action.

Continue reading "WHY IS THE TROOPER OR OFFICER WHO ISSUED YOUR NEW YORK STATE TRAFFIC TICKET ALSO PROSECUTING IT? PART III – A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE THREE BRANCHES OF NEW YORK STATE GOVERNMENT AND THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES" »

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As I explained in a previous blog, the practice of officers prosecuting the New York traffic tickets they issue was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals case; People v. Soddano. Soddano and it’s holding that officers may act as prosecutors for their tickets is flawed for several glaring reasons. First, the practice violates a principle as old as trials themselves - a witness may not act as an advocate at a trial. In other words, if the lawyer is a witness in a case, he may not act as one’s lawyer in that same case. For example, if I witness a car accident, I am forbidden from representing someone involved in that car accident. This is commonly referred to as the “Witness-Advocate Rule”. In fact, this ancient rule is codified in the Disciplinary Rules that attorneys in this State are obligated to follow. See N.Y.Ct.Rules, § 1200.21(c); (DR 5-102(c).

This is a very basic rule that most sixth-graders could comprehend once it was explained to them. If you are a witness in the case, you can’t represent someone in the case. Therefore, in a traffic ticket case, the issuing officer is not only a witness; he or she is usually the complaining, and sole witness in the case. Accordingly, under the “Witness-Advocate Rule”, the officer should be barred from representing the People. The officer should be barred from acting as an advocate in the very case he or she is the main witness. Very simple, right? Wrong!

You see, in most New York local criminal courts, “up is down” “down is up” “left is right” “right is left” and the Constitution and Due Process are mere annoyances that are simply cast aside. When I first became an attorney, I thought I was missing something. I became hesitant to even open my mouth in court because apparently in local criminal court, words have different meanings and statutes are interpreted and applied without regard to the plain wording of the law. I came out of law-school thinking the judges were the most wise and legally educated individuals in the equation. Quickly, however, I realized that I wasn’t misreading the law; I came to learn that the law doesn’t matter. It’s that simple – THE LAW DOESN’T MATTER. The extent to which most local criminal court judges will contort the law to ensure conviction and accommodate the prosecution is mind boggling.

How the courts justified officers prosecuting the tickets they issue when such conduct clearly violates the “Witness-Advocate Rule” is a perfect example of the contorted reasoning that courts will employ to justify improper prosecutorial misconduct and constitutional violations. In People v. Pappas, the Appellate Term held that the “Witness-Advocate Rule” didn’t apply to officers who prosecuted their own tickets because they are not attorneys and therefore are not bound by the Disciplinary Rules that attorneys must follow. 19 Misc.3d 140(A)(2008).

The court’s reasoning in Pappas is flawed. If the officers are not attorneys, they shouldn’t be prosecuting cases. By allowing officers to act as attorneys without being bound by the rules of attorney conduct removes a layer of protection designed to protect the public and ensure that those who practice law are fit to do so and comply with strict standards of conduct. It also puts an attorney representing a defendant at a disadvantage. Indeed, the defense attorney’s adversary (the officer) is not bound by the rules of attorney conduct. By allowing officers to prosecute their own tickets, without regard to the rules of attorney conduct, the Courts have created an unequal playing field. If the officer can violate the attorney Disciplinary Rules prohibiting a witness from representing a party; what other attorney Disciplinary Rules can the officer violate?

As I discuss in my next blog, the Legislature has indicated where non-attorneys may act as prosecutors and police officers are not one of the non-attorney classifications empowered by the Legislature to act as prosecutors.

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The answer to this question is fairly simple; when it comes to New York traffic violations, the Courts of New York State have allowed deeply rooted judicial principles founded on fairness to be disregarded. As I said in a previous blog, far too many judges have no apparent concept of the presumption of innocence and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This fact is more prevalent in traffic court where, in most (but not all) courts, if a traffic violation actually goes to trial, the guilty outcome is a foregone conclusion. The trial, sadly, is a rubberstamp process and the rubberstamp says “Guilty”.

The New York criminal justice system particularly as it pertains to lower level offenses is designed for speed. Some New York courts handle hundreds of tickets per day; others handle dozens per day. Needless to say, fair trials are not on the top of the judge’s list of things to do. In my opinion the desire to “move cases” has eroded our rights to a fair trial in New York traffic court. A prime example of placing the need to “move cases” over the rights of defendants is the practice of having the police officer who issued the ticket both plea bargain the ticket and if necessary, prosecute the ticket. This practice has been condoned by the highest court in New York. See People v. Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 727, 631 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1995) where the New York Court of Appeals held that officers may, upon a proper delegation from the duly elected District Attorney, prosecute the traffic tickets they issue. The Court acknowledged that the elected county District Attorneys are ultimately responsible for all prosecutions in their particular county (See County Law § 700) but held that the County District Attorneys could properly “delegate” the authority to prosecute traffic infractions to the issuing police officers.

In reality, I doubt the officers have any formal delegation of authority from the elected District Attorney to prosecute their own tickets. Tilem & Campbell handles hundreds of traffic tickets each year and I only recall one time where a local village prosecutor actually presented a written delegation of authority from the elected District Attorney allowing that local prosecutor to prosecute traffic violations within that village. In fact, if you were to ask the issuing officer under what authority he was acting as prosecutor, he or she would most likely have no idea what you were talking about. Most police officers probably learned as rookies that they negotiate and/or prosecute their own tickets. It is in reality, a matter of custom. Ask a local judge to dismiss or inquire as to what delegation of authority the officer has to act as prosecutor and most (not all) local court judges will look at you like you are speaking an unknown foreign language. That’s the reality of New York traffic court.

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So your New York Criminal case is heading to jury selection. At jury selection both your criminal defense attorney and the prosecutor will have an opportunity to question potential jurors chosen from the jury pool. (Jury selection itself will be discussed in a later blog). How is the jury pool assembled? Where does the commissioner of jurors for the county your case is be tried in get the names of people to summon for jury duty?

Potential jurors’ names are selected from such lists as voter registration, drivers’ license holders, registered motor vehicle owners, tax payers, those on public assistance, those collecting unemployment and/or those who have volunteered for jury duty. NY Jud. Law § 506. Therefore, that old-time belief that if you don’t vote you won’t be chosen for jury duty is no longer the case. Because one might be discouraged from voting for fear of being selected for jury duty does violate one’s right to vote. Marcus v. Levin, 198 A.D.2d 214, 603 N.Y.S.2d 323 (2nd Dept. 1993).

From the above mentioned lists, the commissioner of jurors randomly selects the names of potential jurors. This random selection may be done mechanically or by any other method to ensure random selection. NY Jud. Law § 507. The randomly selected individuals will make up the jury panel from which your jury will ultimately be selected.

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How jury pools are chosen in a New York misdemeanor cases depends on what type of court your case is in. Section 2012 of New York's Uniform District Court Act, New York's Uniform City Court Act or of New York's Uniform Justice Court Act, prescribes how jury panels are chosen in each of the aforementioned courts. In the New York City Criminal Court, the jury pool or panel is chosen in the same manner as in the Supreme Court in counties within cities having populations of one million or more.
When one reviews Section 2012 of the aforementioned acts, one realizes the section is not very enlightening. Both the New York State District Court Act and the New York State City Court Act merely tell us that jurors may be summoned as prescribed by the rules of the appellate department in which the particular court sits. So in reality, to determine how a jury pool is selected in a District or City Court we first turn to the CPL 360.10(2) which directs us to Section 2012 of the District or City Court acts as the case may be. After we look up Section 2012 in either act, it directs us to the appellate division rules for the department in which the particular city or district court sits. Now you know why lawyers like to get paid by the hour. It’s as if these statutes and rules were written by 3 different people who had no idea what the others were writing.
Section 2012 of the Uniform Justice Court Act is evening less enlightening bordering on comical. This section simply informs us that the jury panel in Justice Court trials is to be selected in accordance with the rules. What?! What Rules?! This is really comedic. Therefore, if you are going to trial in a local Justice of Village Court, the jury panel will be selected in accordance with the Rules – whatever they may be.
In reality, the New York State Judiciary Law is where we find the rules and procedures pertaining to the selection of the jury panel. Recall, it is the jury panel that your actual jury will be selected from. It is the policy of New York State that all litigants have a right to grand and trial juries (referred to as petit juries) randomly assembled from a fair cross-section of the community in the county or other local government subdivision where the court in which the trial is to take place is located. It is also the policy of this State that all eligible citizens have an opportunity to serve on grand and trial juries and in fact are obligated to when summoned unless otherwise excused. Jud. Law. § 500.
The jury panel is selected from a cross-section of eligible jurors drawn from the community where the crime was committed – not where the defendant lives. People v. Kellerman, 102 A.D.2d 629, 479 N.Y.S.2d 815 (3rd Dept. 1984). The panel of prospective jurors should reasonably represent a fair cross section of the community in which the trial is to take place. People v. Guzman, 89 A.D.2d 14, 454 N.Y.S.2d 852 (2nd Dept. 1982). However, there is not constitutional or statutory right requiring the trial (petit) jury be reasonably representative of the community in which the trial is to take place. Only the jury pool that the trial jury is chosen from need be reasonably representative of the community. People v. Moss, 80 Misc.2d 633, 366 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1975).
One way of knowing if the jury pool in a particular community is representative of the community in general is research the demographics of that community. In the pretrial conference, your attorney should inquire as to the make up of the jury panel. Your attorney should ask for a hearing on the manner of selection of the jury pool if an identifiable group is underrepresented. If your case is approaching jury selection and you have questions about the process, feel free to contact Tilem & Campbell for a free consultation.

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The order of proceeding in a jury trial in a New York State local criminal court is the same as those in a jury trial in a superior court when one is charged by indictment. CPL § 360.05. Therefore, the order of a jury trial in local criminal court is guided by CPL § 260.30. See CPL § 360.05.
The order of a jury trial in New York local criminal courts is as follows:
1. A jury must be selected and then sworn in. CPL § 260.30(1)
2. The judge must give preliminary instructions to the selected and sworn jury. CPL § 260.30(2)
3. In a jury trial, the People must then deliver an opening statement. CPL § 260.30(3).
4. The defendant may, if he or she so chooses, deliver an opening statement. CPL § 260.30(4).
5. The People must then offer evidence in support of the charge or charges in the information. CPL § 260.30(5).
a. If the People fail to adequately allege in their opening statement that defendant committed each element of the offense charge, the case should be dismissed. People v. Thomas, 21 A.D.3d 643, 799 N.Y.S.2d 653 (3rd Dept. 2005)
6. Next, the defendant may, but is not obligated to, offer evidence in his or her defense. CPL § 260.30(6).
7. If the defendant presents a defense, the People may then present rebuttal evidence. If the People so choose to present rebuttal evidence, the defendant may then present evidence in rebuttal to the People’s rebuttal. The court may, in it’s discretion, allow continued rebuttal evidence. The court may also, in it’s discretion, allow either party to offer evidence on their rebuttal which is not technically rebuttal evidence but actually evidence that is part of the parties original case. CPL § 260.30(7).
8. At the end of the case, the defendant may deliver a closing argument and then the People may deliver a closing argument. CPL § 260.30(8).
9. Next the judge must charge the jury and the jury will then retire to deliberate and if possible, reach a verdict. CPL § § 260.30(9), (10) & (11).
If you’re facing trial in local or superior court on any criminal charge and would like a
free consultation regarding your case, call Tilem & Campbell toll free at 1-888-AnyCrime.

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As a New York criminal defense attorney, at a law firm that handles a lot of criminal trials, I often am asked by clients charged with misdemeanors and/or violations in a New York State local criminal court if they must appear in court with me for trial. Generally a defendant must be present during his or her trial. CPL § 340.50 (1).
However, where a defendant is represented by an attorney, a court may, upon written motion by the defendant, waive the defendant’s appearance at trial provided the prosecutor doesn’t object. The defendant must file a written signed and notarized statement declaring the he or she waives their right to be present at trial and authorizing their attorney to conduct their defense in their absence. CPL § 340.50(2).
A defendant may also be excluded from his or her trial if they act in disruptive and disorderly manner to the point that the trial cannot proceed. Before a judge can exclude a defendant from his or her own trial, the defendant must be accorded a warning indicating that the defendant will be removed from the courtroom if he or she continues to act in a disruptive and disorderly manner. CPL § 340.50(2).
In reality, it is common place for defendants not to appear for traffic violation trials but instead to hire an attorney who appears with a signed and notarized “Authorization to Appear”. The written notice requirement is very often overlooked by the court and the prosecutor. However, there are some courts that require the formality of a written motion where the defendant chooses to go to trial on a traffic violation but not where the defendant chooses instead to have his attorney plead guilty to a reduced charge.
One judge who employs this policy is J. Glenn Galbreath of the Cayuga Heights Village Court. J. Galbreath has no problem waiving a traffic violator’s appearance at trial and taking pleas from attorneys with authorizations to appear signed by their clients. However, where a defendant chooses instead to proceed to trial on his or her traffic matter, J. Galbreath requires a written motion. Did somebody say coercive? Take a plea and save a trip to court or proceed to trial and either come to court or pay a lawyer to draft a motion. Sounds a bit coercive to me.
Not only does a defendant have a right to be present at trial, both the United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution grant a defendant the right to be present at all material stages of trial. Therefore, reversal of conviction was required where a defendant was not present during closing arguments and had not waived his presence or waived his presence by disorderly conduct. Benn v. Stinson, 917 F.Supp. 202 (1995).

Continue reading "GOING TO TRIAL IN A NEW YORK LOCAL CRIMINAL COURT – MUST DEFENDANT BE PRESENT?" »

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So you’ve decided to take your New York criminal case to trial. The People’s plea offer is unacceptable and your attorney, after carefully weighing the odds and risks, has advised you to reject the People’s offer and go to trial. As I said in my last blog, at the New York criminal defense law firm of Tilem & Campbell, if we take a New York criminal case to trial, we generally advise our clients to have a jury trial instead of a being tried by a single judge. So what happens next? How does a New York criminal trial proceed in a local criminal court?

Where a defendant is charged in a local criminal court with a misdemeanor, he or she is entitled to a jury trial. However, within New York City, one charged with a misdemeanor is only entitled to a jury trial if the potential sentence is more that six months. CPL § 340.40(2). The right to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases is statutory only as the New York State Constitution does not provide a right to a jury trial where the charges are less than a felony. People v. Erickson, 302 N.Y. 461, 99 N.E.2d 240 (1951); see also Article I, § 2 and Article VI, § 18 of the NYS Constitution; NY Civil Rights Law § 12 (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. However, it has been held that this section only guarantees the same right to trial found in the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution and that right only applies where a defendant is facing more than six months incarceration).

However, the statutory right to a jury trial in misdemeanor cases in New York was passed by the Legislature in response to the United States Supreme court’s 1970 ruling in Baldwin v. New York, which essentially held that the Sixth Amendment to the
federal constitution requires a jury trial where the defendant is facing more than six months imprisonment. 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970). Therefore, the right to a jury trial in New York where the defendant is facing more than six months incarceration is mandated by the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution. To summarize, New York provides for a jury trial in all misdemeanor and felony cases. Except, in New York City, where one is only entitled to a jury trial on a misdemeanor where one is facing more than six months incarceration.

At any time before trial, a defendant may waive his or her right to a jury trial and consent to be tried by a single judge. CPL § 340.40(2). A defendant in local criminal court is not entitled to a jury trial if the charge is only a violation such as most traffic infractions and disorderly conduct. However, if a defendant is charged with both a misdemeanor and a violation and chooses a jury trial, then both the misdemeanor and the violation will be heard by the jury. In such a circumstance, the judge does not decide the violation while the jury decides the misdemeanor. Instead, the jury will decide both. CPL § 340.40(3).

There is one exception to a defendant’s right to a jury trial in local criminal court where the charge is a misdemeanor. Where the defendant is eligible for a youthful offender adjudication and has never been previously convicted of a crime or been adjudicated a youthful offender, the case must be tried by a single judge; not a jury. CPL § 340.40(7).

If you are charged in a local or city court such as those found in Yonkers, Mamaroneck, Harrison, Larchmont, Eastchester, New Rochelle, White Plains, Tarrytown, Dobbs Ferry and others, contact Tilem & Campbell for a free consultation.

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While some New York Criminal Attorneys will waive your right to a jury trial in a New York local justice court, instead opting for a trial before the judge, at Tilem & Campbell, we think that is usually a mistake. At Tilem & Campbell, our policy is that if our client is charged with a misdemeanor and the People (the prosecution) will not reduce the charge below a misdemeanor, we often advise our clients to choose a jury trial. Why? Unfortunately, at the local court level in New York, far too many Judges work hand-in-hand with the prosecution to ensure a defendant’s conviction. That is the simple truth.

Judges at the local level in New York need not be attorneys and many are not. Whether they are attorneys or not, far too many local court judges simply have no apparent understanding about the defendant’s presumption of innocence and the People’s burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In many small villages and towns in New York, the police station and Courthouse are in the same building. The local police and the Judge share the same parking lot, ride the elevator together and see each other regularly in the building. Therefore, only on the rarest occasion will a Judge at the local court level find that a police officer lacked probable cause at a suppression hearing or that an accusatory instrument is insufficient or otherwise rule in a defendant’s favor on a meaningful issue. It would be very hard for the same judge that sees that police officer in the building to now decide that he didn't tell the truth at your trial.

Trials before judges in local criminal courts are far too often nothing more that an exercise in futility. The defendant’s guilt is a foregone conclusion. Do you really think a local judge is going to go against the local police and prosecutor that he or she must deal with on a regular basis?

For a local court judge to rule against the prosecution, the prosecution’s case must implode. And even when the prosecution’s case does implode, many times a local judge will bend over backwards to rationalize and legitimize law enforcement and prosecutorial misconduct. If your criminal case in a local justice court is proceeding to trial, you should seriously consider a jury trial and you should retain counsel who is experienced with jury trials.

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If you have been convicted of an offense in New York or elsewhere that triggers New York State’s sex offender registration laws, your criminal defense attorney must be familiar with the New York Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter "SORA"). Registration as a sex offender in New York is governed by Article 6-C of the New York Correction Law. Article 6-C is referred to and cited as the Sex Offender Registration Act. NY Corr. Law 168. The New York State Legislature's passage of SORA brought New York into compliance with the federal Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program (hereinafter the Wetterling Act) (42 U.S.C.A. ' 14071). Any state that failed to comply with the Wetterling Act would lose ten percent of its Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act funding. 42 U.S.C.A. 14071(g)(1)(A).

Under the Wetterling Act, the United States Attorney General shall establish guidelines for State programs that require a person who is convicted of a criminal offense against a minor or of a sexually violent offense or who is considered a sexually violent predator to register a current address with the local chief law enforcement officer.. 42 U.S.C.A. ' 14071(a)(1). One required to report in one state must inform that state when they move to another state and must also inform their new state of residence that they were required to report in their old state. The state they are leaving must also have procedures in place to inform the state the offender is moving to that the offender was required to register in their state. 42 U.S.C.A. ' 14071(b)(5).

The Wetterling Act also set forth guidelines establishing the length of time an offender must register for. The length of registration is either 10 years or life depending on the offense. The registration period commences on the date the offender is either released from incarceration, placed on parole or placed in supervised release. 42 U.S.C.A. ' 14071(b)(6).

The list of registerable offenses under SORA is quite lengthy and will be discussed in a future blog. Suffice it to say that New York can and does make mistakes about who must register. In addition, your level as determined by the Court, can greatly impact your life. If you are charged with any sex offense in New York or are moving to New York and are currently registered in the state where you currently live, consult an experienced New York Criminal Lawyer familiar with New York’s Sex Offender Registration Act.

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A New York State Prison inmate retains some basic due process rights despite being imprisoned. An inmate charged with a serious violation faces substantial punishment and should seek the advise of an experienced New York lawyer. When serious violations are alleged against the inmate, a Superintendent’s Hearing will be held. If the inmate is found guilty at the hearing, he must first file an administrative appeal. If his administrative appeal is denied, he can then file an Article 78 petition. An experienced New York attorney should be retained to represent the inmate on his or her Article 78 petition. One due process violation that should result in the reversal and even expungement of a guilty finding is the failure of the prison officials to tape record the hearing. All Superintendents’ Hearings must be “electronically recorded”. 7 NYCRR 254.6(a)(2).

The absence of the tape of the evidence relied upon by a hearing officer in a disciplinary hearing is a violation of the prisoner's fundamental due process rights. Scott v. Coughlin, 161 Misc.2d 777, 615 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Dutchess Cnty 1994).

The Scott case involved a Tier III Superintendent’s Hearing where Michael Scott was found guilty of assault and was sentenced to 365 days in the Special Housing Unit and six months loss of good time. Scott’s administrative appeals were denied.

Scott then filed an Article 78. While preparing Scott’s Article 78 papers, his attorney learned that several portions of the tape of the hearing were blank. One witnesses’ testimony was cutoff after only two minutes and another inmate’s testimony was not recorded at all. Because of the problem with the tape, prison officials conceded that reversal was required.
The issue in Scott then became whether the guilty findings should be reversed and the case remanded for a new hearing or whether the guilty findings should be reversed and expunged without a remand for a new hearing. The Scott Court agreed with the Petitioner and ordered that (1) the guilty findings be reversed and annulled; (2) all references regarding the proceeding expunged from Petitioner’s departmental and institutional files; and (3) all lost good behavior allowances be restored.

The Court then opined that the failure to record the hearing “violate[d] one of petitioner’s fundamental due process rights and not merely a procedural right.”

If you are an inmate who was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing, the very first thing you should do is immediately obtain a copy of the tape of the hearing. If it is blank or if you cannot understand what is being said (inaudible), you should raise this in your administrative appeal. Get a New York lawyer or New York law firm involved in the case as early as possible.

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Experienced New York Criminal Attorney’s who are familiar with the New York Criminal Procedure Law are familiar with CPL § 210.40 which authorizes Judges to dismiss cases in the “Interest of Justice” and the 10 factors that Judges need consider when deciding whether to grant such a motion. The Motion to Dismiss in the Interest of Justice is also known to many New York lawyers as a “Clayton” motion after the 1973 case that originally discussed the parameters of this type of motion. At Tilem & Campbell, our criminal lawyers have successfully used Clayton Motions to resolve difficult cases and protect the interests of our clients.

Our experienced criminal attorney’s have also used the factor delineated in CPL §210.40 to resolve serious criminal cases by addressing the factors in letters to prosecutors. By using the Clayton factors to show a prosecutor that a Judge might dismiss the case, we are sometimes able to convince a prosecutor to offer an ACD or a Violation when they had previously refused to do so. This strategy has been used by lawyers at this firm to resolve cases such as Assault, Insurance Fraud and Gun Possession.

Recently Judge Rory Bellantoni, of the Westchester County Court in White Plains, after an analysis of all of the factors delineated in CPL §210.40 dismissed a felony Sexual Abuse case in the interest of justice. In that case, prosecutors were offering an ACD or a dismissal of the charges and then suddenly withdrew the offer. A number of other factors also supported the dismissal. The case demonstrates that even very serious felony cases can be dismissed under Clayton and not only less serious misdemeanors.

No two cases are alike and some cases even though serious on their face warrant further analysis. The 10 factors listed in CPL §210.40 are generally a great place to start in evaluating the value of a criminal charge. The bottom line is get an experienced criminal defense attorney involved early in the case to get the maximum benefit and to have the most options.

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