Articles Posted in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

In a recent New York Assault case, the First Department’s decision in People v Manley addresses a common voir dire scenario: a prospective juror relays information to a court officer, the officer communicates it to the judge, and the judge decides how to proceed. The court held that such a relay is ministerial, not judicial, and therefore does not constitute an improper delegation of authority. The opinion also underscores a familiar theme in criminal appeals—preservation remains essential. Objections and requests for inquiry must be placed on the record at the time they arise.

The Holding in Plain Terms

During jury selection, a prospective juror informed a court officer that he recognized the defendant from the neighborhood near a men’s shelter where the charged assault occurred. The court paused questioning, elicited a brief explanation from the officer about that exchange, and excused the juror. On appeal, the defense argued that the judge ceded authority to the officer. The First Department rejected that claim. Passing along a message from a juror is a ministerial task; the judge retained control and made the decision. Because the defense did not object, the claim was unpreserved under CPL 470.05(2). Nor did the situation qualify as a “mode of proceedings” error, a narrow exception reserved for fundamental defects where judicial supervision truly breaks down.

New York’s highest court just affirmed a conviction in People v Tapia by upholding the trial court’s finding of probable cause. For you, that ruling matters because it confirms that officers can arrest on drug charges when trained narcotics cops observe a cluster of specific indicators—even without a “telltale sign” like seeing packets or hearing explicit drug talk. If you face a possession or sale charge arising from a quick street encounter, your defense should focus on dismantling those indicators one by one.

What the Court Emphasized

The Court of Appeals treated probable cause as a “mixed question” of law and fact. That means the appellate judges will not second-guess the lower court if the record reasonably supports the conclusion that officers had cause to arrest. In Tapia, the record included an experienced narcotics officer, a known drug hot spot, recent arrests in the same two-block area, and two separate hand-to-hand interactions with the same woman. Officers saw nervous glances, a reach to the waistband without looking down, an exchange of an object, the woman’s clenched fist, and a quick exit. Put together, those details supported the arrest.

If your teen faces a felony in New York’s Youth Part, you may be able to move the case to Family Court, where the focus shifts to services and rehabilitation. A new appellate ruling from Richmond County reverses a Youth Part decision that blocked removal and explains what “extraordinary circumstances” really means under CPL 722.23. The court held that a sixteen-year-old charged with weapon possession should have been sent to Family Court because the record did not show the kind of highly unusual facts needed to keep the case in criminal court.

What The Court Held

Prosecutors conceded the case did not fit any of the automatic retention categories. There was no claim the teen displayed a firearm in furtherance of another offense, caused significant injury, or committed a sex offense. Instead, the People asked the judge to keep the case using the extraordinary-circumstances safety valve. Their proof relied on the felony complaint and an assistant district attorney’s affirmation referencing a prior youthful offender matter and a social media livestream showing the youth holding a gun while using marijuana. No person was harmed, no property damage occurred, and the firearm was not used to further any other crime.

If you are facing a serious charge like assault in New York, your right to a fair trial includes more than just a competent defense—it includes how the jury is instructed on evaluating eyewitness testimony. In People v. Salas, the New York Court of Appeals tackled a defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the potential challenges of cross-racial identification. The decision highlights how preserved objections and thorough jury instructions can shape the outcome of a criminal case.

Facts of the Case

The prosecution charged Salas with second-degree assault following a 2019 altercation in Manhattan. During trial, the People relied heavily on testimony from the victim, who identified Salas as his attacker. The identification was made after a single-photo display, and the victim and Salas were of different racial backgrounds.

In People v. Brenda WW, the New York Court of Appeals addressed how the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) should be applied on appeal. Specifically, the Court clarified that while an appellate court has full authority to resentence a defendant under the DVSJA, it may not reduce or eliminate the mandatory postrelease supervision term by crediting excess time already served.

This decision underscores the importance of understanding both the procedural and sentencing implications of the DVSJA for those incarcerated as a result of surviving prolonged abuse.

The Background of the Case

Brenda WW was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, assault, and a weapons offense for killing her abusive husband. She received a sentence of twenty years to life, along with a five-year postrelease supervision term. Years later, she applied for resentencing under the DVSJA, which allows sentencing relief for incarcerated survivors of domestic abuse if they can prove that abuse was a significant factor in their offense.

Brenda presented extensive evidence that her husband had subjected her to years of brutal physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, including cigarette burns, strangulation, and repeated assaults. Based on this history, she argued that her twenty-year sentence was unduly harsh and requested relief under the DVSJA.

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In People v. T.P. (2025), the New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction for first-degree manslaughter, finding that trial counsel’s failure to object during a highly improper prosecutorial summation deprived the defendant of her right to a fair trial.

Case Summary and Facts

The defendant, referred to as T.P., was charged with first-degree manslaughter under Penal Law § 125.20(1) after she stabbed and killed her boyfriend during a violent confrontation. T.P. contended she acted in self-defense under Penal Law § 35.15, explaining that the victim had repeatedly abused her—physically, sexually, and emotionally—which was corroborated by witnesses and supported by a prior order of protection.

On the night of the incident, the confrontation escalated significantly. According to T.P., her boyfriend forcibly performed oral sex, strangled her, and during the ensuing struggle, fearing for her life, she grabbed a knife and stabbed him once.

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In People v. Bacon, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed a long-standing rule: if your defense lawyer fails to raise a specific constitutional objection during trial, you may lose the ability to argue that issue on appeal. This decision is a clear warning to anyone charged with a serious crime—the preservation of your rights depends heavily on the conduct and awareness of your attorney during every stage of trial.  It is essential to use experienced counsel when facing charges in New York.

What Happened in This Case

The case arose from a robbery and assault in Brooklyn. Two victims gave statements to police officers at the scene. One of them, while being treated in an ambulance, described the attackers, including the defendant. The prosecution did not call either victim to testify at trial. Instead, two police officers testified about what the victims had allegedly said, including identifying information about the defendant.

During the trial, defense counsel made only one specific objection to the officers’ testimony: a hearsay objection to a statement by one victim about what the other had said. The court sustained that limited objection. However, no constitutional objection was made under the Confrontation Clause, which protects your right to cross-examine the witnesses against you.

After the prosecution rested, the defense moved for a trial order of dismissal, arguing that the People’s evidence was not sufficient. Counsel mentioned that the jury could not evaluate the female victim’s physical or mental condition, and noted there had been no chance to cross-examine her. Still, the motion focused solely on the quality and sufficiency of the evidence, not on a constitutional violation.

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In the state of New York, case law is clear that police officers have the right to approach parked cars for any “objective, credible reason.” This gives officers significant leeway to at least approach vehicles that are stopped and parked. When, though, can the officer demand that the car’s occupant step out of the vehicle?

According to a New York case called People v. Eugenio:

“[w]here .. a vehicle is lawfully parked on the street and neither it nor its occupant is under any restraint, and the police have no grounds to suspect the occupant of criminality at that point, requesting the occupant to step out of the vehicle creates a new, unauthorized restraint.”

In New York, it is well established that to legally stop a vehicle, a police officer must have reasonable suspicion, based on objective evidence, that the car’s occupants were involved in a crime. Courts go back and forth on what it means for an officer to have “reasonable suspicion.” If an officer knows that an area has high crime rates, does this knowledge alone give the officer the required “reasonable suspicion” to stop a vehicle?

A recent opinion published by a New York court affirms that an officer’s general knowledge of crime in an area is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion on its own. In the case, a police officer went to a residence in Queens after reports of an alleged burglary. The 911 call indicated that two men were entering the back of the residence. The officer arrived at the scene and noticed a car in front of the house. The car that was at the residence left the home upon the officers’ arrival. Officers followed the car, stopped and searched the car, and arrested the driver for carrying concealed weapons in the vehicle.

Upon further review, however, the court learned that the officers did not have legal grounds to stop the car. The car’s driver was a female, whereas the burglary suspects were both males. There was nothing indicating that the driver might have been involved in the burglary, and it was not enough for the officers to cite the fact that the neighborhood was a high crime area.

During litigation, it is common for one party to have an expert testify in support of their case. In criminal cases, the state will sometimes try to qualify an arresting police officer as an expert in a certain area, which can bolster the officer’s credibility before the court. What does it take to be qualified as an expert in New York criminal cases? And what does this mean for defendants fighting criminal charges?

New York Case Law

A New York case called People v. Cronin sets out the following standard for expert testimony:

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